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First, I establish a comprehensive equity framework which joins together principles of adequacy and
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achievement and behavior data from the Allentown, Pennsylvania School District (ASD), I employ a mix of
quantitative and qualitative methods to ascertain how resources are directed to schools in accordance
with the comprehensive equity framework. I describe resource allocation using horizontal equity statistics
and I provide context by evaluating the relationship between student outcomes and attending a particular
school. Subsequently, I test: adequacy, looking at school outcomes for the entire student population and
various subgroups with higher needs; vertical equity, identifying how inputs are allocated differentially
based on schools' characteristics and demographics; and, comprehensive equity, a construct
incorporating both adequacy and vertical equity designed to measure the justness of the district's
approach to resource allocation. I also measure the portion of resource allocation in unexplained by
vertical and comprehensive equity and conduct a simulation of weighted student funding.
Qualitative analysis, comprised of interviews with district administrative personnel - at the central office
and in schools - provides context and the rationale for district resource allocation policies. Overall
findings uncover a misalignment between school-level student needs and resources in the ASD. Results
are strongest when considering human capital resources, including teacher effectiveness and teacher
efficacy. Based on my findings, I conclude that the ASD does not achieve comprehensive equity in school
year 2009-2010. This case study provides a window into equal educational opportunity within school
districts and offers a template for districts seeking to determine the extent to which they are serving
students equitably.
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ABSTRACT
EVALUATING INTRADISTRICT RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUITY: A CASE STUDY
Stephanie Levin
Richard M. Ingersoll
Financial and human capital resources play a vital role in the ability of a school
to fulfill its mission of educating students. Access to these resources varies – and this
variation is often due to districts’ allocation of resources among schools. Research on
equity often disregards this concern and focuses attention on differences among districtwide revenue sources. My dissertation explores the implications for equity of
intradistrict resource allocation through an examination of school disparities and district
practices in a mid-sized urban school district.
First, I establish a comprehensive equity framework which joins together
principles of adequacy and vertical equity. Then, using financial, personnel, student
enrollment/ demographic, and student achievement and behavior data from the
Allentown, Pennsylvania School District (ASD), I employ a mix of quantitative and
qualitative methods to ascertain how resources are directed to schools in accordance
with the comprehensive equity framework. I describe resource allocation using
horizontal equity statistics and I provide context by evaluating the relationship between
student outcomes and attending a particular school. Subsequently, I test: adequacy,
looking at school outcomes for the entire student population and various subgroups
with higher needs; vertical equity, identifying how inputs are allocated differentially
based on schools’ characteristics and demographics; and, comprehensive equity, a
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construct incorporating both adequacy and vertical equity designed to measure the
justness of the district’s approach to resource allocation. I also measure the portion of
resource allocation in unexplained by vertical and comprehensive equity and conduct a
simulation of weighted student funding.
Qualitative analysis, comprised of interviews with district administrative
personnel – at the central office and in schools – provides context and the rationale for
district resource allocation policies. Overall findings uncover a misalignment between
school-level student needs and resources in the ASD. Results are strongest when
considering human capital resources, including teacher effectiveness and teacher
efficacy. Based on my findings, I conclude that the ASD does not achieve
comprehensive equity in school year 2009-2010. This case study provides a window
into equal educational opportunity within school districts and offers a template for
districts seeking to determine the extent to which they are serving students equitably.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
Financial and human capital resources play a vital role in the ability of a school
to fulfill its mission of educating students. Access to these resources varies – and this
variation is often due to districts’ allocation of resources among schools. Research on
equity often disregards this concern and focuses attention on differences among districtwide revenue sources. My dissertation explores the implications for equity of
intradistrict resource allocation through an examination of school disparities and district
practices in a mid-sized urban school district.
Both the state and the federal government contribute significantly to school
district revenues. However, with the exception of Title I requirements, neither entity
mandates specific distributions of resources among schools, programs, or classrooms
within a district. Even state requirements that all students be provided an adequate or
thorough and efficient education have seldom been pursued below the district level.1
Pennsylvania’s former education finance reform agenda is a prime example of
state policy designed to improve spending equity for individual students through
allocation of funds to school districts. In 2008, the Pennsylvania state legislature voted
to alter the state’s basic education funding formula to address both inadequate funding
and serious inequities among school districts. Similar to other states’ approaches to
address inequities, this action requires restructuring at the interdistrict, rather than
intradistrict level. The formula adopted by the State is based on an adequacy target
1

There have been only two major cases that look at resource allocation below the district level: Hobson
v. Hansen in the District of Columbia and Rodriguez v. Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD).
Both were de-segregation cases and both relied on the theory of horizontal equity as the plaintiffs
charged that minority and poor students were deprived of equal protection of the laws.
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determined to provide all students with the necessary resources to become proficient on
state assessments and to meet state standards in twelve academic areas. It includes
weights to provide additional funds for economically disadvantaged students and
English Language Learners (ELL).2 With this policy, the State aimed to address a
multifaceted vision of equity; primarily, the new funding formula was designed to
achieve adequacy, an outcomes-based principle whereby all students are provided the
necessary resources to reach a predetermined standard. To realize this objective,
Pennsylvania’s new funding formula addressed vertical equity, an inputs-based
measure, by providing additional resources for students with additional needs. Also, the
new funding formula sought to improve horizontal equity, an inputs-based measure
requiring equivalent resources for all similarly situated students, by increasing the
State’s financial contribution such that children are not penalized due to the wealth of
their district3.
While the new funding policy seemed promising, realizing these ideals of equity
cannot be accomplished by the State alone. Districts, not states, are responsible for
allocating resources generated from all levels of government at the building or student
level. These district level allocation decisions impact how students with different
educational needs are served. My dissertation evaluates intradistrict resource allocation
using a conceptual framework built on theories of equity.

2

District size and regional cost differences are also incorporated in the funding formula. While higher
weights for special education students had been recommended, they were not included in the revised
funding formula.
3
The State’s financial contribution is determined by each district’s need for revenue to meet the State
adequacy target. It assumes no increase in local property tax rate.
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The data used in this dissertation is drawn from a case study of a mid-sized, urban
school district, the Allentown School District (ASD). This case study seeks to answer
the following research questions:
1. How are resources allocated among schools?
2. What is the rationale for resource allocation patterns among schools?
3. Using a comprehensive equity framework which encompasses adequacy and
vertical equity, what are the implications of resource allocation patterns?
4. What would be the financial impact of an alternative approach to resource
allocation aligned with the comprehensive equity framework?4
ASD, the third largest urban school district in Pennsylvania5, offers a rich environment
for research. Approximately 18,000 students are served in two early learning centers,
14 elementary schools, 4 middle schools, and 2 high schools. Seventy-eight percent of
students in the district are classified as economically disadvantaged6, 84% of students
in the district are non-white, and 64% are Hispanic. In the 2009-2010 school year, 8 of
20 schools met Adequate Yearly Progress goals; the graduation rate for the district was
70%; and 57% of all students tested proficient or above in math7. Leadership in the
district supported a thorough assessment of budgeting practices as well as an analysis of
the distribution of teachers among schools.
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School-year 2009-2010 data is used answer these research questions.
The Allentown School District is approximately two-thirds the enrollment size of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania.
6
These students are eligible for free and reduced priced lunch.
7
Thirty-nine percent of a sample of 4th grade students tested proficient or above on the National
Educational Assessment Program (NAEP).
5
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Significance of the Study
Though there is a sizeable body of research on interdistrict equity, the research on
intradistrict resource allocation is relatively sparse as most U.S. school finance research
that discusses equity focuses on the district. Concerns regarding the equal distribution
of resources, the appropriate enhancements to ‘level the playing field’, and the impacts
of resources on student outcomes have driven research almost exclusively at the federal
and state levels. Too little is known about the decisions districts make when
determining how to allocate resources to schools and students (Betts, Rueben, &
Danenberg, 2000). Below the district level, all schools are supported by the same state
aid package and local tax base and formulas to allocate dollars to schools are not
designed to address disparities in wealth (Schwartz, Stiefel & Rubenstein, 2008).
However, there are serious implications for equity at the school, program, and
classroom level, as well (Monk & Hussain, 2000; Roos, 1998; Satz, 2008). Rubenstein,
Stiefel, and Schwartz (2006) point out that the focus on “total or average resources at
the district level implicitly assumes that the average resources reach all schools more or
less evenly within a district” (p. 3). While state and local policies may be intended to
provide for all students equally, institutional, organization, political¸ and economic
factors can derail this objective (Picus, 1995; Roza & McCormick, 2006). Research has
shown that much of the variation in resources happens at the school level within, not
between, districts (Betts et al., 2000; Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor & Wheeler, 2007;
Imazeki & Goe, 2009; Rubenstein et al., 2006). Furthermore, even in schools that have
a diverse student body, it is not uncommon for minority and low-income students to be
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taught by less qualified teachers (Roos, 1998). By not paying attention to how districts
allocate resources, policy makers miss potential large-scale inequities.
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in resource allocation below
the district level. Researchers have debated the value of money in improving student
outcomes, and many have come to the conclusion that the way in which money is spent
is as important as the amount of money spent (Odden, Goertz, Goetz, Archibald, Gross,
Weiss & Mangan, 2008). Analysis of resource allocation below the district level
provides valuable information about the relationships between expenditures and student
outcomes (Stiefel, Rubenstein & Berne, 1998). Also, patterns of inequitable distribution
of resources become more evident. This information should lead to more efficient and
fairer spending decisions by educators, helping them to target effective interventions to
students in need (Schwartz et al., 2008). As demonstrated in the following chapter,
evaluations of equity among schools within districts have found uneven distributions of
resources, with less privileged students most often receiving inferior resources, such as
less experienced teachers (Schwartz et al., 2008).
Another reason that the examination of how districts allocate resources has
become particularly advantageous is that, under our present accountability system,
schools are held responsible for student outcomes. Standards-based reform under the
federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act requires schools to demonstrate the
proficiency of all their students (Odden, Goetz, & Picus, 2008). It is important that
schools understand what resources are necessary to meet this goal (Denison, Stiefel,
Hartman & Deegan, 2009). Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2007d) explain: “it is logical
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to investigate the extent to which schools of different types are playing on a level
playing field in terms of their access to the teaching and leadership resources that are
essential for meeting the achievement goals required under … accountability systems”
(p. 6). The focus on school accountability has led to the proliferation of assessments to
determine if students are achieving proficiency goals. Data collection and analysis has
improved greatly in recent years. Assessment results, integrated into sophisticated data
systems that link students and teachers over time, are now becoming available to help
determine if an adequate education is being provided within schools and districts
(Odden et al., 2008). Schools and districts can investigate the impact of classroom
effects (e.g., teachers), school effects (e.g., peers), and student mobility on student
achievement outcomes (Denison et al, 2009).
In 2005, California passed the first legislation of its kind requiring schools to
provide data on per pupil expenditures. This data must represent the actual salaries of
school personnel along with information on teacher credentials and experience
(Rubenstein et al., 2006). As required, online school accountability report cards
disclose school-level average teacher salaries. Analysis of this data reveals significant
intradistrict inequities8 (Miller, 2010). This appears to be the beginning of a national
trend, as Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) reauthorization discussions
have included calls for different measures of school-level comparability as well as
school-level reporting of teacher characteristics and teacher spending.
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Researchers report: “a 10 percent increase in the rate of student poverty in a California public school is
associated with a $411 drop in average teacher salary, on average, controlling for several characteristics
of districts and schools known to affect funding streams” (Miller, 2010, p. 2).
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Challenges to evaluating intradistrict equity – including the complexity of
district budgets, lack of accessible data at the school level, and difficulty in allocating
shared resources – impede research. Addressing these challenges is imperative,
however, as much of the variation in resources happens at the school level within, not
between, districts (Betts et al., 2000; Imazeki & Goe, 2009; Roza, 2005; Rubenstein,
Schwarz, Stiefel, & Hadj Amor, 2007). Insufficient focus on district level decisionmaking has left a gap in our knowledge as to the ability of districts to achieve equitable
resource allocation (Lankford, Loeb & Wyckoff, 2002; Miller & Rubenstein, 2008;
Rubenstein, Schwartz, Stiefel & Hadj Amor, 2007). Additional research is necessary to
highlight inequities where they exist.
In addition to a lack of understanding about intradistrict inequities, there is a
lack of evidence on the comparative efficacy of various resource allocation strategies.
For example, investigations into the impacts of weighted student funding initiatives9
have shown them to have positive, though often small, effects on equity (Carr, Gray, &
Holley, 2007; Chambers, Levin & Shambaugh, 2010; Roza & Hawley-Miles, 2004).
Yet, Baker (2009) points out that much of this research neither isolates the impacts of
the change to the allocation formulas, nor adequately considers the merit of the weights
used to direct additional funds to high cost students. Additional research is necessary to
help policymakers understand the implications of different resource allocation policies,

9

Weighted student funding is a system with two components: 1) funding follows the student through an
allocation formula that directs real dollars to schools according to the needs of the students within the
building; and, 2) funds are controlled at the building-level, not the district-level.
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including impacts on opportunities and outcomes for students, so that they may make
informed decisions that will support the learning of all children.
My research, a mixed methods case study of a mid-sized, urban school district
helps to fill this gap in the literature by offering a unique view into resource allocation
below the district level; insight into how and why a district’s resource allocation
decisions are made; and an analysis of how a district’s allocation decisions might
impact equity.
Methods
Using financial, personnel, student enrollment/ demographic, and student
achievement data10, I employ a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods to ascertain
how resources are directed to students. First, I describe ASD resource allocation using
horizontal equity statistics. I provide additional context by evaluating the relationship
between student outcomes and attending a particular school through the use of an
unconditional 2-level model. I then test: (1) adequacy, looking only at school outcomes
– both at the school level, taking into account the entire student population, and based
on outcomes of various student populations with higher needs; (2) vertical equity,
identifying how inputs are allocated differentially based on schools’ characteristics and
demographics; and, (3) horizontal equity post vertical equity, identifying how much of
resource allocation in unexplained by vertical equity. Lastly, I test comprehensive
equity, a construct I have developed which incorporates both adequacy and vertical
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Additional student outcomes data (i.e., attendance, disciplinary actions), is included in the analysis.
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equity and is designed to measure the effectiveness of the district’s approach to
resource allocation.
My measurement of adequacy is quite strait forward. I consider a number of
student outcomes (i.e., state assessment results, attendance, and suspensions) at the
school level as well as at the subgroup level within schools – and employ simple
statistical measures of dispersion to quantify the variation among schools.
In the remaining analysis, I take an analytical approach similar in theory to
methodology used by researchers to examine equity among school districts, whereby
regression analysis is used to determine whether funds allocated to districts match the
weights occurring in the state’s funding formula (Toutkoushian and Michael, 2007).
Given a limited sample size, and the desire to have a single measure with which to
evaluate district equity, I construct an index to use as a single weight at the school level
to account for school-wide needs given a school’s particular student population. By
altering my needs index to reflect differing theories of equity, I evaluate both vertical
equity and comprehensive equity in the Allentown School District. This model allows
me to examine the unexplained variations in per-pupil funding after taking into account
the additional needs of certain subgroups of students11 - a construct which I refer to as
“horizontal equity post vertical equity.” By correlating the needs index with various
resources, I am able to identify the direction, size, and strength of the relationship
between resources and school characteristics (as defined by the characteristics of the
student population – e.g., % poverty).While much of the analysis of equity has been
11

In their paper, Toutkoushian and Michael (2007) refer to this construct as horizontal equity.
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conducted at the district level, my research focuses its investigation at the building
level, comparing all elementary schools and all middle schools.
I employ qualitative research methods, composed of a review of district and
state financial documents and interviews with senior district administrators and a
School Board member, to illuminate the quantitative findings by providing a
description of the current resource allocation system and its rationale. Qualitative
research is useful in identifying impediments to greater equity among schools.
To address the final research question, “What would be the financial impact of
an alternative approach to resource allocation aligned with the comprehensive equity
framework?" I conducted a simulation. The simulation illustrates the implications of
two possible changes to the allocation of resources: the first change is based on the
State’s approach to funding districts and is consistent with vertical equity, and the
second change builds on this by also accounting for students’ prior academic
performance and is consistent with the district’s mission of having all students achieve
pre-determined12 academic and social outcomes.
Ultimately, this research project describes district resource allocation practices
and how these practices result in a misalignment between school-level student needs
and financial and human capital resources.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized into six chapters: a literature
review; background and data; methodology; district context and qualitative findings;
quantitative analysis and results; and my conclusion. The literature review begins with
12

The State sets yearly benchmarks for proficiency, as mandated by federal No Child Left Behind
legislation.
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an appraisal of various conceptions of equity leading to a framework used first to
evaluate existing studies of intradistrict resource allocation – and, later, to inform the
research questions and analysis of resource allocation in the Allentown School District.
This chapter also includes a discussion of intradistrict resource allocation policies and
procedures and completed studies of intradistrict resource allocation. Chapter Three
presents background information on both state and district policies to provide context
for the case study; the sources and collection methods of my data are also reviewed. A
description of the analyses follows, and specific research methods are explicated. In the
fifth and sixth chapters, I present my research findings from both quantitative and
qualitative analysis and the final chapter provides a summary of major findings,
limitations of the study, policy implications, and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW
The organization of this review of pertinent research reflects my approach to
understanding how districts allocate resources among students. The first section offers a
critical review of conceptions of equity consistent with a social justice perspective
calling for equal educational opportunity for all students. A theoretical framework for
grounding an analysis of resource allocation is derived from this review. The next
section explains the mechanisms for resource allocation from districts to schools,
programs, and classrooms. The first part of this section describes allocation policies
including institutional procedures and organizational concerns that influence allocation
patterns, such as incorrect (and correct) assumptions of need, administrative inertia, and
school reform initiatives. The political influence of key stakeholders (i.e., teacher
unions, connected parents, and the business community) and external requirements (i.e.,
court cases and supplemental federal funds) are also considered. Following this general
review is an examination of the constraints on school districts which limit their ability
to promote equitable outcomes for students. These constraints are categorized as local
education agency policies and practices and the teacher labor market. Weighted student
funding, an approach to resource allocation designed to address concerns of governance
and fairness, is also reviewed. The third section of this chapter offers a summary of the
major studies of intradistrict resource allocation, beginning with an assessment of
challenges to this line of inquiry and a discussion of the research methods employed
and ending with a review of the measures of inputs (i.e., teacher characteristics) used in
my analysis of intradistrict equity. Finally, this chapter reviews 34 studies of
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intradistrict resource allocation utilizing the different theories of equity presented
earlier in this paper. Studies are categorized according to their authors’ intention of
testing the existence of horizontal equity, vertical equity, and/or adequacy.
A Critical Review of Equity Models
Given the many views of what constitutes equity, analysis and evaluation of the
equitable allocation of resources at the school district level or elsewhere requires that
the concept be clearly defined. This section of the literature review explores definitions
of “equity” in relation to equal educational opportunity. Consideration of the
implications of four distinct approaches to equal educational opportunity – all which
have been quantified in the school finance literature - leads to a fifth approach which
capitalizes on the positive aspects and addresses the weaknesses of existing
interpretations of equity.13
While “equity” is generally conceived of as fairness in resource allocation by
economists, political scientists, and philosophers, the various disciplines use the term
for somewhat different ideas. Many legal scholars and philosophers characterize equity
in education as “equal educational opportunity”; however, the appropriate meaning of
this phrase has been debated for decades (Coleman, 1975). Peterson and Woessmann
(2007) acknowledge two interpretations of “equal educational opportunity:”
“For some, equal opportunity means only that everyone is treated the same way
within the school house and each is given instruction appropriate to his or her
ability, so that all are given the same chance to build on the capabilities they
bring to the school door. For others, equal opportunity asks schools to remedy
13

In 1964, James Coleman struggled with a similar task after being commissioned by the United States
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare “to assess the availability of equal educational
opportunities to children of different race, color, religion, and national origin.”
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the deficiencies that some children bring with them to school so that only
random chance determines which members of the next generation rise to the
highest positions of society.” (p. 4)

The first definition offered above is embraced by Peterson and Woessmann (2007)
as all that is required and feasible in a democratic society which values individual
liberty. This vision of equal educational opportunity calls for equivalent resources for
all students. The second definition of equal educational opportunity put forth above is
consistent with Rawls’ views on social justice, whereby students should have access to
resources such that their subsequent opportunities are equalized (Berne & Stiefel, 1984;
Rawls, 1971). This goal holds regardless of whether the focus is on inputs into the
education system or student outcomes. Inputs refer to resources dedicated to schooling
(i.e., money, human capital), and outcomes refer to results (i.e., knowledge acquired,
income, life satisfaction). An additional version of equal educational opportunity, one
that gained more traction in recent years as a result of the persistent ambiguities of
equity, requires that each student is prepared to perform at (at least) an adequate level
such that he/she can succeed economically, politically and socially.
Approaches to equal educational opportunity emphasize inputs (e.g., equal inputs
for all students), outcomes (e.g., adequate outcomes for all students), or a combination
of both. Different measurement tools are required to examine inputs and outcomes, and
calculating inputs can be more straightforward than quantifying outcomes.14 This
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When James Coleman was commissioned by the United States Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare to report on “the lack of availability of equal educational opportunities for individuals by reason
of race, color, religion, or national origin in public educational institutions” (Title IV of the 1964 Civil
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literature review examines four conceptions of equity which broadly cover the range of
approaches that have been considered by policy makers and scholars: horizontal equity
(equivalent resources for all students); vertical equity (resources directed to students
based on their differing needs); equivalent outcomes for all students; and adequacy
(equality of either inputs or outcomes up to a threshold level). An analysis of these
different interpretations of equity leads to a conceptual model of equity against which
policy makers can measure current practice.
Horizontal equity. The simplest approach to equity is to provide equivalent
resources to all students. Essentially, horizontal equity requires that students from
different backgrounds and living situations have access to comparable resources (i.e.,
financial support, qualified teachers and principals) (Clotfelter, Ladd & Vigdor, 2007).
This approach treats all students as if they are the same – it does not take into account
differences in student need or the costs of services. An equal distribution of resources to
all students ensures that the school is not responsible for creating inequalities, but it
does not provide the school with a means of redressing existing inequalities. One
manifestation of horizontal equity is “wealth neutrality” which maintains that “the
education a child receives should not be dependent on the wealth of the district in
which the child resides” (Underwood, 1994, p. 143).15 This particular approach to
horizontal equity addresses differences in local preferences for allocating public funds

Rights Act, Sec. 402.) he offered a similar analysis to the one provided in this paper, acknowledging
numerous concepts of equal opportunity (Coleman, 1975).
15
To attain wealth neutrality, Coons, Clune and Sugarman (1970) maintained that state aid should
supplement local revenues to the extent that local tax rates meet state requirements but local property
values are too low to meet the state’s guaranteed level of funding.
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to education. Wealth neutrality has been used by litigants in court cases challenging
state funding systems.
Horizontal equity is an inadequate measure of equity because the cost of
providing an education to different students varies according to students’ needs and
school conditions (Underwood, 1994). Certain students require greater supports to be
successful. Disadvantaged schools and districts are likely to require funds above and
beyond those of advantaged schools and districts. The reasons for this include the cost
of acquiring high quality teachers at less desirable schools, maintenance expenditures
for older infrastructure, the existing resource discrepancies between schools, and the
propensity of some parents to compensate their children’s education at higher levels
(Ladd, 2008). Another problem with using horizontal equity as the measure of equity is
that because no minimum amount of funding is required, even equivalent resources
could be insufficient, providing a very low quality education and potentially “leveling
educational resources downward for all” (Satz, 2008, p. 426).
Vertical equity. Vertical equity responds to some of the critiques of horizontal
equity by taking into account discrepancies among students. Specifically, vertical
equity is designed to address the fact that different students and conditions require
different treatment (or inputs) to have the opportunity to achieve similar outcomes
(Berne & Stiefel, 1999; Ladd, 2008). For example, economically disadvantaged
families and minority families often do not have the same access to a range of supports,
such as secure housing arrangements, health care, and high quality pre-school, that
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wealthier and non-minority families do (Rebell, 2007).16 For this reason, some students
require greater resources in order to address their needs. As Ladd (2008) argues,
“equality of outcomes requires inequality of inputs” (p. 404). This approach to equality
of educational opportunity leads to a greater consideration of student outcomes.
Vertical equity falls within a larger characterization of equal educational
opportunity whereby “all students … have an equal chance to succeed, with actual
observed success dependent on certain personal characteristics, such as motivation,
desire, effort, and to some extent ability” (Berne & Steifel, 1999, p. 13). Proponents of
this form of equity allow for differences in the allocation of resources among students
based on ability and effort, but do not accept differences based on morally arbitrary
traits such as wealth or ethnicity (Brighouse & Swift, 2008; Strike, 2008; Walzer,
1991).17 In the field of school finance, vertical equity calls for additional resources for
students with defined educational needs (Berne & Stiefel, 1999; Owens & Maiden,
1999; Underwood, 1994). These educational needs are generally identified as student
characteristics which research has shown to be highly correlated with a lack of
academic achievement.
16

See Grissmer, Flanagan, and Williamson, 1999, Reschovsky and Imazeki, 1999, Weiner, 2008 and
Baker and Green, 2009 for analysis on the costs of educating economically disadvantaged and minority
students.
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Scholars offer numerous views on this conception of equal educational opportunity. Brighouse and
Swift (2008) write that “an individual’s prospects for educational achievement may be a function of that
individual’s talent and effort, but … not be influenced by his or her social class background” (p. 447). In
other words, students with the same level of “merit,” conceived of as ability plus effort, should have the
same chance for success.17 Underwood (1994) believes that all students have the right to “the opportunity
to develop the skills necessary to be a productive member of society, to be able to participate in the
democratic process, and to exercise his or her constitutional rights” (p. 147), and Strike (2008) regards
“ability, aspirations, choice, and effort” to be “morally appropriate grounds for differences in treatment
and outcomes” while “race, class, gender, religion, and sexual preference are factors that should be
(generally) irrelevant” (p. 478). Similar to Strike, Walzer (1991) writes that justice requires that the
distribution of educational goods not depend upon students’ attributes such as ethnicity or wealth.
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A compelling reason to support this conception of equal educational opportunity
is that it is socially just, as students are afforded the same opportunity to succeed,
regardless of race, class or other ascribed trait (Brighouse & Swift, 2008; Satz, 2008;
Strike, 2008). Because success includes economic and political attainment, as well as a
life of enhanced experiences through appreciation of the arts and sciences, it is just that
all students be afforded the same opportunities (Brighouse & Swift, 2008).
Drawbacks to vertical equity, as with any approach to equal educational opportunity
that seeks to allocate resources to redress unfair disadvantages due to external
circumstances, have to do with its focus on inputs rather than outcomes, for the
individual and for society as a whole. First, vertical equity does not take into account
the quality of the education provided to students. Even with a means of compensating
for student disadvantages, all students might get a low quality education. This approach
to equity does not require that children be educated to even a minimum level.
Inadequate education is even more likely for those children with less ability or
motivation(Gutmann, 1987; Satz, 2008). Additionally, a system that is not concerned
with outcomes could lead to a reduction in overall productivity, negatively impacting
all children (Satz, 2008).
There are additional theoretical concerns that arise when vertical equity is
adopted as the determinant of equal educational opportunity. These include the
murkiness derived from holding students accountable for ability and motivation while
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compensating students for other ascribed traits18, and the conflict that arises between
the values of parental and local control and those of equality19.
Vertical Equity in Practice. Implementation of vertical equity necessitates a
way to adjust for the unequal circumstances of students. Adjustments provide greater
inputs to the students who require additional resources to achieve outcomes similar to
less disadvantaged students (Berne & Stiefel, 1999). To achieve vertical equity, states
use categorical programs to address the needs of particular groups of students. Some
states and districts also use pupil weights in their funding formulas to take into account
the additional needs of some categories of students such as English language learners or
Special Education students (Augenblick, Myers, & Anderson, 1997). Similarly, pupil
weights can be constructed to compensate students for past unequal treatment (Strike,

18

While vertical equity deems that groups of students should not differ in their outcomes, it does allow
individuals within these groups to differ. As such, there exists the possibility of large disparities among
students in terms of inputs and outcomes. Some argue that it is unclear why the line is drawn at this
point. Satz (2008) points out that it is wrong to hold individuals accountable for such traits at an early
age. She writes, “We expect children to go to school and master certain capabilities; it is not enough that
they have the opportunities to do so” (p. 429). Jencks (1998) agrees, stating, “I can understand the
argument that society is not responsible for children’s genes or for their upbringing. I have never seen a
coherent defense of the proposition that society is responsible for one but not the other” (p. 523).
Gutmann (1987) reaches a similar conclusion based on the likelihood that effort “is dependent upon
happy family and social circumstances” (p. 131). Brighouse and Swift (2008) do acknowledge that it may
be unfair to hold children accountable for their efforts which may be heavily influenced by background
circumstances, but address this difficulty by invoking/relying on the democratic process to determine
how “merit” is defined.
19
In the courts, local control has been referred to as a legitimate state interest while education has not
been identified as a fundamental right to be protected (Underwood, 1994). Ladd (2008) points out that
affluent districts will not compromise the quality of their schools to allow for equality. And Gutmann
(1987) makes the argument that they should not have to. She claims that forcing the equalization of
resources would violate the value of family autonomy. Brighouse and Swift (2008) also have concerns
with inhibiting parental freedom and, for that reason, are careful to incorporate values of the family into
their conception of meritocracy. When contemplating the value of family, Brighouse and Swift (2008)
make clear their view that educational equality should not “jeopardize, threaten, or undermine family
values” (p. 458). They do, however, carefully define family values in such a way as to limit its scope. For
example, spending time reading to children should be considered a family value while supporting elite,
exclusive institutions should not.
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2008). Implementing pupil weights requires two steps: first, establishing which
categories of students should be granted additional funds, and second, determining
appropriate weights for these categories. In practice, vertical equity relies on equivalent
resources per weighted pupil across schools and districts (Ladd, 2008). Equal outcomes
for categories of students, rather than individual students, is the desired result (Berne &
Stiefel, 1994; Ladd, 2008; Strike, 2008). This makes the distinction between
educational inputs and outcomes unclear (Strike, 2008).
While the idea of pupil weights is compelling as a theoretical approach to
school funding, there are concerns with its implementation. First, there is the possibility
that the weights will be incorrect. Berne and Stiefel (1999) explain that there is no
consensus on how to determine the correct weights. Strike (2008) shares this view and
worries that weights are arbitrarily assigned to students. Another issue is that pupil
weights are based on individual students and do not take into account concentrations of
disadvantaged students (Baker & Green, 2009). Ladd (2008) explains that to be more
accurate, “weights should take into account not only the characteristics of the students
themselves but also the extent to which students whose characteristics make them hard
to teach are concentrated in particular schools or districts” (p. 412). A final concern
with pupil weights is that individual students may be stigmatized. Since pupil weights
sort individuals into groups, the assumption is that these individuals are less responsible
for their lower achievement than others. As a society, we run the risk of identifying
some students as belonging to an “inferior” group (Ladd, 2008; Satz, 2008). Addressing
concerns related to inadequate outcomes for students leads to two additional approaches
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to equal educational opportunity – both of which use student outcomes to measure
fairness.
Equal outcomes. A third conception of equity, “equal outcomes” or “equality
of outputs” requires that resources be allocated in such a way as to create equal
outcomes. Outcomes can be defined in any number of ways, including student
achievement, graduation rates, prospective economic outcomes, or citizenship. A focus
on outcomes is consistent with recent education policy in the United States in which
student assessments are used as an indicator of student learning outcomes. In order to
achieve equal outcomes by all students, it is necessary to determine which inputs are
required to achieve them, which in turn requires an unequal allocation of resources
among students.
The idea of equal outcomes is appealing as it leads one to imagine a more
communal society with less competition and no disparities between the “haves” and the
“have-nots.” The adoption of an equal outcomes standard is unlikely, however, due
primarily to democratic concerns regarding autonomy and the role of government . A
system designed to ensure equal outcomes for all students would be extremely
expensive, as it would require the state to devote all of its educational resources to the
poorest performing students until they can match the accomplishments of the highest
performing students. Also, there would be a need for significant change in social and
economic policies outside of the educational arena (Clotfelter et al., 2007; Rothstein,
2004). Given limited resources, and public needs beyond education, a system such as
this might never be able to provide resources to higher performing students.

22
Furthermore, it is unlikely that taxpayers would endorse this conception of
equity, as available resources must be shared to address a variety of public needs
(Gutmann, 1987; Satz, 2008). The second problem is that, taken to its extreme, a
system of equal outcomes would lead to a homogenous student population. It is
unlikely that the public would embrace a system calling for entirely equal outcomes;
nobody argues in favor of a system where achievement scores are the same for all
students (Berne & Stiefel, 1999; Gutmann, 1987; Satz, 2008).
Another deterrent to an equal outcomes model is fear of the effect it would have
on the behavior of both students and the public. For example, there is concern that
undesirable incentive effects could reduce individual effort (Ladd, 2008), or that the
call for equal outcomes would cause a bidding war among parents for improved
outcomes (Brighouse & Swift, 2008; Gutmann, 1987; Ladd, 2008). Dealing with this
“arms race” would require restricting the power of parents – resulting in a politically
unfeasible loss of autonomy for families (Gutmann, 1987; Strike, 2008).
The final challenge of this equity ideal is that it is difficult to agree on what
constitutes appropriate outcomes. Even if assessment results were determined to be
appropriate outcomes to measure, the economic tools used to study the relationship
between inputs and outcomes, such as production functions and cost functions, are
inconclusive in terms of the type and amount of resources required to attain specific
outcomes (Berne & Stiefel, 1999). Therefore, the public lacks important information in
making accurate decisions regarding pupil weights.
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Adequacy. The final conception of equity presented, adequacy, has gained
traction in scholarly debate, policy, and practice as it addresses some of the
shortcomings of vertical equity and equal outcomes. As with the principle of equal
outcomes, adequacy is outcome-focused rather than input-focused. Unlike other
concepts of equity, however, adequacy is not comparative in nature. Similar to the
difference between a criterion-referenced test and a norm-referenced test, adequacy
requires measurement against specified criteria, not against other individuals (or
schools or districts). This difference makes adequacy a politically viable approach to
equal educational opportunity, since it offers a means of providing students with the
resources necessary in our society to attain a certain goal, such as citizenship,
proficiency on assessments, or social mobility. In doing so, adequacy frames education
as a right, consistent with the views of numerous legal scholars and philosophers.20
Adequacy provides an outcome level below which no student is allowed to fall.
The determination of this outcome level is crucial as it sets expectations for students
that may or may not impact their long term success. The theory of adequacy requires
that each child is allotted the necessary resources to attain a specified goal, but in
practice policy-makers have measured adequacy as at the district level, meaning that
districts within a state are held accountable for their students’ attainment of a predetermined standard (Berne & Stiefel, 1998). Adequacy differs from other conceptions
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Education is considered to be a right because it “is required by individuals (for them) to secure other
rights to which they are entitled, such as citizenship and autonomy” (Strike, 2008, p. 471). Further,
society has legitimate interests in educating all citizens – that complements the idea that education is a
right (Strike, 2008). This is held up in the Supreme Court’s Brown decision which states that education is
required for the “performance of our basic public responsibilities” (Satz, 2008, p. 432).
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of equal opportunity in that it requires value judgments as to what outcome is adequate,
or sufficient, and to what resources will support all students in reaching this particular
outcome (Guthrie & Rothstein, 1999). Finally, a key difference between adequacy and
vertical equity or equal outcomes is that it allows for inequality above this minimum
threshold.
Scholars and policy makers have debated the appropriate standard for all
students to meet.21 Policy makers have relied on state-wide test scores, construed to be
a proxy for long-term outcomes. This is problematic to the extent that these
standardized tests are insufficient in forecasting success22, but it does allow for a
measurable definition of adequacy: being deemed proficient on a state test.23 The recent
requirement that all students be tested provides a measure of school and student
21

Gutmann (1987) and Satz (2008) share the view that the threshold should be at the level at which a
person has the ability to participate effectively in the political process. This threshold is democratically
determined, as is the allocation of resources above the threshold level. This approach enables future
citizens to determine the appropriate level of adequacy (Gutmann, 1987). For Satz (2008), educational
adequacy is tied to the requirements of equal citizenship. This means that schools have an obligation to
break down “stereotypes and animosity between groups and encouraging intergroup knowledge and
understanding” (p. 425). Satz (2008) includes social and economic rights in her understanding of equal
citizenship. Therefore, “an education system that precludes the children of poorer families from
competing in the same market and society as their wealthier peers cannot be adequate” (Satz, 2008, p.
434). Satz’s view of adequacy requires “accountable output standards on a national level, increased
funding in many school districts, and substantial integration across class and racial lines” (Satz, 2008, p.
441). This threshold for adequacy is so high that it appears to converge with the conception of
meritocracy outlined earlier, where resources are directed to students with greater educational needs such
that all students reach a level playing field. Other visions of adequacy focus on private outcomes – such
as the ability to compete in the market. An example of this is Rawls’ view that all students should attain
outcomes “connected to his or her long-term life chances” (Rawls, 2001, as cited in Ladd, 2008, p. 412).
While some worry that adequacy may result in “leveling down,” conceptions of adequacy put forth by
Satz and Gutmann require a high enough threshold to deal with concerns related to a lower quality of
education. Satz (2008) points out that adequacy offers a minimum threshold of attainment that should
prevent states from under-funding schools and districts. An additional advantage of Satz’s and
Gutmann’s versions of adequacy is that they secure support for those that are most disadvantaged and
ensure that they can participate in society. Ultimately, this should restrict disparities in educational
outcomes (Satz, 2008).
22
Proficiency scores in certain disciplines, such as math and reading, might not represent the full set of
skills and knowledge that are necessary for a successful life (Guthrie & Rothstein, 1999).
23
This characterization of adequacy is consistent with the federal “No Child Left Behind” legislation.
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performance which has been used to determine whether states are upholding the
Constitutional mandate of provision of public education. Plaintiffs in adequacy lawsuits
are able to point to a clear definition of an adequate education, increasing plaintiff
victories and resulting in the allocation of new funds to disadvantaged districts
Advocates for directing more resources to disadvantaged students report that “the
adequacy movement has improved educational opportunities and led to gains in student
achievement, the ultimate litmus test” (Rebell, 2008, p. 436).
While adequacy has continued to garner support in recent years, there are a
number of concerns related to its use. Foremost, it addresses neither issues of inequality
nor the concept that education is a positional good (Reich & Koski, 2006). Adequacy
provides for a certain level of scholastic attainment, but beyond this level some groups
of students will have greater resources and better access than others (Baker & Green,
2008; Strike, 2008). This will inevitably result in the advantaged groups having greater
success, as the playing field is not truly level24. While all students will be able to
compete, the competition will be unfair as those who need no compensation have, in
essence, access to a superior education and, therefore, an advantage in economic and/or
political attainment (Brighouse & Swift, 2008; Strike, 2008).25 Since the current
standards are not being met by many students, this argument has some merit; still, the
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An adequate education alone may not provide all the benefits that schooling has to offer. Education is
valuable for reasons other than economic or even civic pursuits. Education can enhance one’s life
immeasurably by “enabling (students) to engage in a wide range of intrinsically valuable pursuits, such
as reading good literature and discussing it with friends, playing complex games, entertaining themselves
with mathematical puzzles, and socializing with people who speak other languages” (Brighouse & Swift,
2008, p. 462).
25
Adequacy advocates address this concern by claiming that an appropriately high standard would
minimize disparities (Satz, 2008).
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call for greater equity which may be achieved through adequacy models is equally
compelling.
Adequacy also suffers from two political liabilities. As educational adequacy is
highly dependent upon where the bar is set, it is conceivable that districts would set a
minimal adequacy standard and could thus be judged as providing an adequate
education, leaving huge variations between disadvantaged and advantaged school
districts. Affluent districts might even promote minimal definitions of adequacy in
order to avoid higher taxes to compensate less well-off districts (Strike, 2008). The
second political liability is that, in the likely event that the legislature is unwilling or
unable to produce the necessary funds, a theory of adequacy, in place of a theory of
vertical equity or equal outcomes, could result in an unequal system. This situation
might be more difficult to overcome than the situation where all schools are equally but
inadequately funded. Similar to the idea that a universal draft would increase resistance
to war, in a situation where all schools were equally but inadequately funded, more
districts would be vested in raising the level of support to an adequate level. With fewer
schools inadequately funded, there would be no “shared basis for improvement in
equity” (Kauffman, 2004).
One last technical issue with adequacy models, discussed earlier with regard to
equal outcomes, is that it is extremely difficult to address questions regarding
appropriate outcome measures and the links between inputs and outputs. Augenblick,
Meyers, and Anderson (1997), Guthrie and Rothstein (1999), and Ladd (2008) agree
that determining the necessary inputs to achieve certain outcomes is a slowly evolving
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science. Also, there are practical and theoretical concerns with the allocation of
resources, including the determination of accurate pupil weights. Researchers and
policymakers have not yet resolved the education production function and are currently
unable to ascertain what inputs are necessary to achieve certain outcomes (Ladd, 2008).
Questions such as “To what extent should schools be held responsible for the specified
outcomes?” and “Are the level of resources necessary to produce adequate outcomes in
reading the same as those required to produce adequate outcomes in math, or
citizenship?” remain unanswered (Guthrie & Rothstein, 1999, p. 251).
Comprehensive Equity Framework. The previous section reviewed four
approaches to equal educational opportunity, providing an overview of current methods
of establishing the existence of the equitable distribution of resources. Here I offer a
fifth approach, a conception of equity which joins together principles of adequacy and
vertical equity. This comprehensive equity framework seeks to ensure positive
outcomes for all students, is consistent with a social justice interpretation of equity, and
is politically feasible in a democratic society.
The intention of this new equity framework is twofold: 1) to ensure that all
students obtain the skills and competencies required to participate in a democracy and
be economically and socially self-sufficient and 2) to ascertain that, beyond the
minimum standards attained, all students are similarly situated to progress according to
their competencies and desires. The comprehensive equity framework, developed to be
used in evaluating resource allocation, embraces a definition of adequacy as all students

28
being “college and career ready”26 and, in addition, employs a paradigm of vertical
equity by requiring that, beyond adequacy, resources be distributed to students based on
their needs, thereby ensuring that students’ educational opportunities are not impacted
by circumstances over which they have no control. In this case, the paradigm of vertical
equity specifies that supplementary resources are directed to students with given
characteristics based on links between these characteristics (e.g., English-language
learner status, low-income status) and greater educational need. Supplementary
resources are not to be directed to students based on their possession of characteristics
unrelated to educational need (e.g., race).
Though they often presented as opposing views of equity, theories of adequacy
and vertical equity are not incompatible. When combined, they can promote the goal of
all students obtaining an education that prepares them to achieve a certain “standard”
and, above this standard, enjoy similar opportunities for success. In fact, adequacy
theories “should be used in conjunction with equity theories to ensure that all children
receive an education that (1) affords equal opportunity to all children, consistent with
educational need, and (2) is a quality education adequate to prepare students from
diverse backgrounds for life in the twenty-first century” (Morgan, Cohen & Hershkoff,
1995, p. 561).27 This formulation is consistent with the theory that understanding and
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College and career ready has been presented by the National Governors Association and the Council of
Chief State School Officers as “prepared for college-level courses upon matriculation (from high school),
or for a job that can support a family (Paulson, 2010).
27
Several researchers, policymakers, and legal scholars agree with this broad interpretation of equal
educational opportunity. Examples of supporters of an approach to equal educational opportunity which
includes aspects of both vertical equity and adequacy: 1) Berne and Stiefel (1999) recommend the
continued use of input measures along with output measures, as “many users (e.g., lawyers, the public)
find input equity meaningful” (p. 24); 2) Strike (2008) argues that equality and adequacy are
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rectifying inequities requires researchers and policymakers to take into account both the
relative position and the absolute achievement of students (Baker & Green, 2008;
Walzer, 1991).
A new equity framework is required to overcome the previously outlined
difficulties of existing approaches to equal educational opportunity. Adequacy’s
greatest drawback is that it does not fully address the problem of inequality. Vertical
equity’s most significant shortcoming is that it does not ensure that all students are held
to a minimum standard. Coupling adequacy and vertical equity provides a means of
assessing equal educational opportunity, along with a greater capacity to determine the
appropriate allocation of resources among districts, schools, and students.
Additional concerns related to adequacy and vertical equity can be addressed
with morally just policies and practices. For example, fears that the definition of
adequacy could be incorrect, or the bar for adequacy set too low, are dealt with by
offering more precise definitions with clear standards. As an illustration, the Obama
administration is considering moving away from a system which relies on state
assessments to measure long-term student outcomes and seeks instead to develop a
minimum criterion for all students of “college and career-ready.” An adequacy target
reconfigured to “college and career ready” as opposed to “proficiency on state
complementary approaches to school finance and proposes a three-tier approach. On the first tier, all
children receive a level of education that meets a certain threshold tied to outcome goals such as
citizenship or other social or economic goals. On the second tier, above this threshold, education is
provided equally to all students up to a specified limit. And on the third tier, families can make choices
for their children that result in unequal outcomes (Strike, 2008, p. 472); and, 3) Ladd (2008) suggests that
adequacy should be the primary goal, but disparities above the threshold should be limited, especially to
the extent that they are publicly funded. She explains that this approach is needed because of the deficits
of full equality, including its “undesirable incentive effects,” its high costs, and the desire that some
families may have to retain their position (Ladd, 2008, p. 415-416).
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assessments” is less likely to result in large numbers of students unable to participate in
democracy and/or compete in the economy. Furthermore, impediments to the
implementation of vertical equity, stemming from technical complexities related to
assigning accurate pupil weights to compensate for student disadvantages, are an
empirical problem that could be addressed with sufficient research into best practices
for service provision.
Lastly, the comprehensive equity framework has an advantage over the current
“adequacy” systems created by No Child Left Behind legislation. Systems which focus
only on student outcomes are ill-equipped to comprehend the relationship between
discrete resources and their impact on student progress. This makes it difficult for
districts to effectively and efficiently address budget shortfalls or expand programs
because administrators and policy-makers lack information on how dollars are spent at
the school level. A system which requires the evaluation of how dollars, personnel, and
programs are distributed among schools and students creates an environment in which
policy makers and stakeholders are better equipped to understand the implications of
resource allocation decisions.
This new equity framework will still suffer from some of the limitations
inherent in adequacy and vertical equity models. The most obvious limitations include:
1) difficulty in resolving the conflicting ideals regarding the appropriate standard for all
students to meet; and 2) the inability to eliminate all inequities among groups of
students. Sufficient resources would go a long way to minimize these limitations, but
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no equity framework can completely satisfy the numerous, and often incompatible,
requirements of all stakeholders.
The Equity Framework in Practice. With access to financial, personnel, student
enrollment/demographic, and student achievement data, quantitative methods can be
employed to ascertain how resources are directed to students.28 Based on the
comprehensive equity framework put forth in this dissertation, I test both vertical equity
and adequacy to provide a complete picture of equal educational opportunity in the
Allentown School District. Vertical equity is tested by identifying how inputs (i.e.,
expenditures, personnel) are allocated differentially based on schools’ characteristics
and demographics. This analysis uses weights to compensate for the additional needs of
certain students with given characteristics (i.e., ELL status, poverty). In order to
achieve a more detailed understanding of resource allocation, I further investigate the
allocation of ASD resources by quantifying the variation among school resources which
is not accounted for by defined school need.29 Adequacy is tested by examining student
outcomes. I first consider the effect of being from a particular school on student
outcomes. As my primary objective in evaluating intradistrict adequacy is to understand
the extent to which students are “college and career ready” by school, I look at the
percentage of students in each school that have not met benchmarks that put them on a
track to achieve this goal. I also examine the various student populations within each
school and consider their success in attaining “college and career ready” standards.

28

Additional student outcomes, such as behavioral data (i.e., attendance, disciplinary actions), can be
included in the analysis.
29
School need is determined by student population.
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Taken together, the evaluation of vertical equity and adequacy provides a
comprehensive and useful picture of equal educational opportunity.
Intradistrict Distribution of Resources - Process
In considering the implications of the allocation of resources among schools,
programs and classrooms, it is important to understand the processes by which funds,
services, and personnel are distributed within districts. The following section provides a
synopsis of the means in which resources (dollars, services, and personnel) are
disbursed. It begins with a description of allocation policies, highlighting institutional
procedures. These allocation policies are explained in terms of their implications for
equity. An exploration of organizational concerns, the political influence of key
stakeholders (i.e., teacher unions, connected parents, and the business community), and
external requirements (i.e., court cases, supplemental federal funds, and local education
foundations) follows. Next, district limitations, district human resource practices, and
the teacher labor market are considered as the constraints on resource allocation. This
section concludes with a discussion of weighted student funding as an approach to
resource allocation designed to address concerns related to the current system.
Allocation Policies. Schools are funded with federal, state and local revenues.
Based on 2006-07 U.S. Census data, nationally the local share of revenues is 44.1%;
the state share is 47.6%; and the federal share is 8.3%. The mix of funds varies
considerably from state to state. Illinois has the highest local share, at 58.9%30, and
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The District of Columbia is not included as it is funded with local (88.3 percent) and federal (11.7
percent) funds.
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Vermont has the lowest local share, at 5.3%31, (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). This same
variation can be seen within states as well. For example, in Pennsylvania among the
school districts with enrollments of greater than 10,000 students, the average local
share is 63.1%.32 Of these 17 districts, 8 districts have a local share higher than 75%
and 4 districts have a local share lower than 45%(U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).
In many states, as a result of court rulings or legislative mandate, the state’s
funding scheme is shaped to equalize spending across districts and ensure that an
adequate education is provided to all students. While states do not control how all
dollars are spent, a specific recommendation – especially with regards to per pupil
funding and additional funding for students deemed to have special needs – is implied.
However, because state aid is directed to school districts as opposed to schools,
classrooms or programs (or students), there is no guarantee that districts use funds in
accordance with the state’s intentions.
Institutional Procedures. Financial management of the public school system is
similar to financial management in the public sector in general. At the district level, a
budget is developed based on expected revenue (from state and federal aid and local tax
base) and forecasted expenses. In a small minority of cases, schools within districts are
provided with a lump sum to spend according to their own determined needs. (This
model will be discussed further in the section on weighted student funding.) Typically,
budgets are centrally managed, and district officials administer the use of funds, sorting
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Hawaii, with only one school district, is not included. Its local share is 1.6 percent and its state share is
89.8 percent.
32
The statewide local share in Pennsylvania is 57.0 percent.
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dollars into functions such as instruction, pupil personnel services, staff support
services, administrative support services, business support services,
operation/maintenance, transportation, food services, and central support services. For
accounting purposes, funds are further classified into categories such as salaries,
benefits, purchased professional and technical services, purchased property services,
other purchased services, supplies, dues/fees, and property.33
Understanding resource allocation within an equity framework. Roza (2008)
provides a framework for understanding district resource allocation. She offers eight
categories of inputs that must be allocated to schools (funds, staff, access to central
services, professional development, supplies/materials/equipment, program access,
roaming specialists, and, some combination of these) along with methods for how these
inputs are distributed. Distribution methods include formula (per pupil, per school, per
staff, per pupil type, and some combination) and non-formula allocations
(school/student/staff demand, discretion, politics, application process, other) (p. 12).
Berne and Stiefel (1994) explain that funding allocated on a per pupil basis is described
as “general” education funding (p. 407), and as such, can be interpreted as addressing
the call for horizontal equity. Funding categories designed to address the needs of
certain groups of students (such as ELL students or students with disabilities) can be
interpreted as addressing the call for vertical equity. While some forms of vertical
equity are addressed below the district level, it is important to note that disadvantages
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These particular cost functions and categories are used for district reporting to the Pennsylvania
Department of Education.
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due to the income level of students are not addressed by the allocation of state and local
revenues (Rubenstein et al., 2006).34
Just as district central offices allocate funds per pupil, they also allocate staff
per pupil, based on pre-determined class size requirements and enrollment. Teacher
positions are included in school budgets and translated into dollars using average
salaries, though most public school districts utilize salary schedules whereby payments
are linked to years of experience, level of education (degrees obtained), and coursework
completed (Podgursky, 2002). Given the range of experience, education, and
coursework, there is considerable variation among teacher salaries, and those higher on
the pay scale could be receiving double the salary of those lower on the pay scale
(Picus, 1999). This can result in large variations of actual expenditures at the school
level. Using data from four large districts (Seattle, Rochester, Baltimore, and Oakland),
Roza and Hill (2004) demonstrated that the uneven distributions of teachers (as
represented by their compensation) leads to large differences in resources devoted to
children based upon where those children attend school. As salaries and benefits make
up the largest proportion of school budgets, with the personnel budget representing just
over 80 percent of total expenditures for public elementary and secondary education in
2006-2007 (National Center for Education Statistics, 2010), this variation leads to a
lack of horizontal equity at the school level in many districts.
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Certain funding streams, such as Title I, are meant to be allocated through states and districts to
schools to address the needs of students in poverty. These funding streams are considered to be outside
state and local allocations.
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In addition to per pupil funds and positions, school budgets often include funds
which are intended to be directed to groups of students requiring additional supports,
such as ELL students and students with disabilities. As stated above, these funds
address vertical equity. Other funds may be allocated by the district central office to
address a range of concerns, such as accountability targets (i.e., not meeting Adequate
Yearly Progress as defined by the No Child Left Behind Act) and community desires.
Additionally, state legislatures may seek to control districts’ use of additional funds,
such as those resulting from adjustments to funding formulas, by targeting funds at
specific programs. This is intended to ensure that new funds are used to the greatest
benefit, or possibly to guarantee to that politicians receive credit for directing funds to
their legislative districts (Baker, 2003). Unfortunately, as discussed in the following
section, constraints on funding often create inefficiencies.
Not all funds flow from the district central office to the schools; in many cases,
over half of the budget remains at the district level (Roza, 2008). Examples of district
expenditures which do not flow through to schools include transportation budgets,
professional development services, and staff benefits such as pensions (Berne & Stiefel,
1994). To better understand the costs associated with providing an adequate or
appropriate education, it would be useful to have more complete information at the
school level. This would require greater consideration of expenditures that remain at the
district central office (Denison et al. 2009; Monk & Hussain, 2000).
Organizational concerns. Decisions regarding allocation of resources are made
with a number of considerations in play. While some policy decisions have been made
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democratically (by state legislatures or local school boards), others are tied to
organizational concerns, political influence, or external requirements.
Goertz and Natriello (1999) found that organizational considerations, more than
economic or political considerations, drive districts in their allocation of resources.
Their research, conducted in New Jersey after the Abbott Court decision mandated that
additional resources be allocated to poorly-funded districts, demonstrated that districts
spend additional dollars based on perceived needs and allocate dollars across
expenditure categories similarly to wealthier districts (p. 102), rather than in such a way
as to increase student performance.35 Goertz and Natriello (1999) wrote, “It appears
that at least in this early stage the spending norms were so strong that departures from
the patterns of spending evident in higher-performing neighboring districts were not
seriously entertained” (p. 127). Parallel findings have been made at the school level; in
an analysis of school budgeting, Goertz and Hess (1998) reviewed district expenditures
in Chicago, Illinois and Rochester, New York and found that additional funds were
directed towards long-established uses (such as reducing class size, adding programs
which had been reduced or eliminated, and professional development). Based on
surveys and interviews with school administrators, teachers, and parents, they surmise
that this was due to the budgetary constraints faced by administrators. However, Goertz
and Hess (1998) also suggest that school administrators make decisions based on their
own ideas on what is necessary for student success.
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The data for this study were collected in the early 1990’s, prior to NCLB requirements.
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Other researchers have sought to understand the distribution of resources below
the district level. Monk and Hussain (2000) used New York State data to study
allocations of existing funds and positions across different academic subject areas.
They found that considerable variation in expenditure patterns across districts is
correlated with certain district characteristics (i.e., spending, wealth, poverty, and size),
with spending having the largest effect on staffing levels (p. 21). They also concluded
that higher property wealth districts were more likely to move staff to secondary
academic areas and higher poverty districts were less likely to increase “professional
staff into the academic program” (p.21). Additionally, all four of these district
characteristics were positively associated with “the total net supply of resources into
administration” (p.21). The most interesting outcome of Monk and Hussain’s work,
however, is the discovery that decision-making was taking place at different levels
within the system and this is likely to impact resource allocation decisions.
Administrators at different levels within the education system are likely to have
different objectives. For example, accountability requirements might compel greater or
lesser adherence, depending on the ramifications of failure to meet targets. Different
governance structures also impact where and how decisions are made. In some cases,
management of school districts has been reconfigured to allow for certain entities, such
as the Mayor’s office, to have greater control over funds. Examples of this practice
include the 1995 restructuring of the Chicago school system under the control of a
Chief Executive Officer appointed by the Mayor (Goertz & Hess, 1998) and the 2002
restructuring of the New York City school system, when management was reorganized
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under the Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education (Goertz & Levin,
2009). Top-down management strategies certainly affect the allocation of funds, but
schools and districts responsible for implementing new funding plans are likely to
temper the influence of the central office (Iatarola & Rubenstein, 2007). This may be
due to a lack of understanding on the part of staff of the district’s goals (Roza, 2008), or
to the distrust of new agendas (McLaughlin, 1987). While school reform initiatives
designed to improve student outcomes have been evaluated (Fuhrman & Elmore, 2004;
Gross & Goertz, 2005), there has been little investigation into the impact of
accountability requirements on how funds are allocated. This research would clarify
how and where decisions are made and would provide better knowledge for policy
makers to understand how different expenditure approaches are related to
improvements in student outcomes (Denison, Stiefel, Hartman, & Deegan, 2009).
Political influence. The allocation of funds by the district central office is
seldom reviewed or questioned by the public (Schwartz et al., 2008). However, Ladd
(2008) and Augenblick, Meyers, and Anderson (1997) contend that politics plays an
important role in the allocation of resources at the local level, pointing out that the
political costs of higher taxes inhibit spending. Baker (2003) agrees, stating that
political officials call upon school administrators to increase efficiency to address
school resource needs. Also, wealthy school districts seek to keep their advantage;
schools with involved, powerful parents are more likely to demand high-quality
teachers (Lankford et al., 2002). This increases the likelihood that children of less
powerful parents will be taught by lower quality teachers (Clotfelter et al., 2005).
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Political groups, including parents and local community organizations, expend
significant effort to ensure that candidates (including school board members and state
legislators) who represent their views are elected (Roos, 1998). The lack of political
capital among poorer communities helps to explain the inferior conditions of their
public schools.36
Another influential political group is the teachers’ union (Roos, 1998), which
generally enjoys the strong support of many parents. A major role of the union is to
maintain and augment the compensation and benefits of their members. Working on
behalf of the instructional staff, the teachers’ union is often responsible for negotiating
labor contracts with the school district. Such contracts include seniority rules, which
mandate certain guarantees and benefits for educators who have the longest tenure (and,
consequently, the highest salaries), and are largely responsible for affecting teacher
allocation.
School districts’ effort to retain wealthier families is one more explanation for
the disparities among schools. Research shows that wealthier students are more likely
to attend magnet schools and other elite programs because the supports they receive at
home give these students an advantage in the application process (Elis, 2006). Even
within schools, tracking by ability often serves the more advantaged students, as
programs for gifted students are more likely to serve wealthier children. The argument
in favor of this disproportionate allocation of services is the increased tax revenue and
36

Integration was a successful strategy for improving public schools because families with more political
capital were willing to fight for the schools attended by their children. As inner-city schools re-segregate,
schools composed primarily of disadvantaged and minority students no longer have the same powerful
advocates on their behalf (Orfield & Lee, 2005).
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social capital provided by these wealthier families increases the ability of the district to
provide services to all students (Elis, 2006).
Imazeki and Goe (2009) suggest another reason minority students might be at a
disadvantage in terms of teacher quality. They contend that parents choose where to
live and send their children to school based in part on racial make-up, as they seek
environments with people similar to themselves. When minority parents have their
children taught by minority teachers, they are increasing the likelihood that the teacher
will have weaker credentials as measured by indicators such as college selectivity
(Imazeki & Goe, 2009). A counter to this argument is offered by Dee (2004); utilizing
data from the Tennessee’ Project STAR, Dee found that minority students benefit (as
demonstrated by increased math and reading test scores) from having a teacher of the
same race.
Although local politics play a significant role in the allocation of funds, politics
at the national and state level also exerts a great deal of influence. As we have seen in
Pennsylvania and elsewhere, the current standards-based reform environment, which
holds schools accountable for student outcomes, makes adequacy a politically viable
approach for allocating resources.
External forces. In addition to organizational and political influences at the
local level, external forces greatly affect school districts’ allocation of resources. Three
external forces designed to impact district allocation of resources are court cases, Title I
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6301 et seq.), and
Local Education Foundations (LEFs).
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Court cases. As mentioned earlier, few court cases have addressed resource
allocation below the district level. The two that have- Hobson v. Hansen and Rodriguez
v. LAUSD- looked beyond average teacher salaries and acknowledged the actual
differences in school per-pupil expenditures. In Hobson v. Hansen, the Court of
Appeals ruled that per-pupil teacher salary and benefits must fall within five percent of
the average across the city (Rubenstein et al., 2006b). The consent decree issued as a
result of Rodriguez v. LAUSD also addressed the unequal distribution of teachers
among schools; in order to reduce the discrepancies between teachers in low-minority,
higher wealth schools and teachers in high-minority, higher poverty schools, the
consent decree provided each school with a dollar budget with which to hire teachers
(Rubenstein et al., 2006b). The stated goal was to equalize non-categorical per-pupil
spending in 90% of schools to within $100 of the district average (Biegel & Slayton,
1997). Furthermore, in an effort to reduce the disparities among school faculties, the
consent decree required human resource decisions to factor in training and experience.
According to Michael Rebell, Executive Director of the Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
there have been no other major cases which have resulted in the redistribution of
resources from districts to schools (personal communication, October 2009).
Title I. Title I, Part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
(Title I) is the largest elementary and secondary education federal program, providing
approximately $14.5 billion in fiscal year 2009 (U.S. Department of Education, 2009).
Title I provides for greater vertical equity by enhancing resources for disadvantaged
students in high-poverty schools (McClure, 2008). Unfortunately, there are
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considerable problems with the allocation of Title I funds, resulting in distribution
patterns that do not correspond to the intent of the program. While inequities exist at
the state and the district level, I limit my discussion to inequities below the district
level.
States are required to pass not less than 95% of their allotted Title I funds
through to local educational agencies (LEAs)37, and four formulas combine to
determine the amount and destination of these funds. The Basic Grant, representing
52% of the total funds in 2010, is allotted as a per pupil value to all school districts with
at least 10 poor children and 2% of their children in poverty. The Concentration Grant,
representing 8% of the total funds, is allotted as a per pupil value to school districts
with higher numbers of children in poverty – at least 15% or over 6,500 children. The
Targeted Assistance Grant, representing 20% of the total funds, differs in that it
provides more dollars per child as the poverty rate of the district increases. Finally, the
Education Finance Incentive Grant, representing 20% of the total funds, targets funds in
high-poverty school districts in states which do a poor job of allocating money
equitably among students (New America Foundation). These grants are provided to
districts in a lump sum which schools can spend on supplemental educational
assistance, targeted assistance, school-wide programs, and public and non-public
programs. Title I regulations require that school districts rank their schools according to
percent low-income and allocate funds to schools accordingly. Schools with greater
than 75% poverty must be served first, after which the ranking can be adjusted to
37

The state may provide services directly to LEA’s or arrange for their provision if approved by the LEA
(U.S. Department of Education website).
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include attendance areas, such as grade spans. Districts have additional discretion in
determining the per pupil allocation in each school as well (e.g., designating a school
attendance area or school with 35% or more of the children from low-income families
as eligible) (U.S. Department of Education).
Title I regulations also require “comparability,” meaning that schools within
districts must be provided with the same state and local funds prior to the addition of
federal funds. Meeting the criteria for comparability is not burdensome; according to
the U.S. Department of Education’s non-regulatory guidance on Title I Fiscal Issues
(2008), a school district has met the comparability requirement if it has demonstrated to
the state that it has a “district-wide salary; a policy to ensure equivalence among
schools in teachers, administrators, and other staff; and, a policy to ensure equivalence
among schools in the provision of curriculum materials and instructional supplies” (p.
16). The LEA may also meet the comparability requirement by establishing and
implementing “other measures for determining compliance such as—
student/instructional staff ratios” (p. 16). This allows districts to meet the comparability
requirement by counting paraprofessionals along with teachers in calculating the
student/instructional staff ratio.
A major issue related to Title I comparability is that “staff salary differentials
for years of employment are not included in comparability determinations” (U.S.
Department of Education, Title I Fiscal Issues, 2008, p. 17), which allows the true cost
of educating students to be masked. School budgets are constructed with district
average salaries; in schools with less experienced and less credentialed teachers (those
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most likely to have more disadvantaged students) the budgeted amount is higher than
actual expenditures. In schools with more experienced and more credentialed teachers
(those least likely to have more disadvantaged students) the budgeted amount is lower
than actual expenditures. The result is that the highest poverty schools receive fewer
dollars per low income pupil than middle and low poverty schools (Riddle, 2004). As
Weiner (2008) explains, “equivalence” can be achieved with the use of a single-salary
schedule and other vague policies regarding “comparable” access to teachers (p. 37).
While Title I requires comparability to ensure that federal funds are
supplemental, the fact that expenditures on teacher salaries are not specified means that
federal funds supplement an unequal base. True comparability can only be achieved if
actual expenditures were calculated in school budgets. Compounding this inequality,
Roza (2008) reports that many districts use categorical funds (such as Title I) to provide
services to disadvantaged students and then use state and local money, which comes
with no strings attached, to provide the same services to more advantaged students.
Districts also fund programs outside of the allocation formula that go unnoticed in the
comparability calculation.
Local Education Foundations. Beyond those resources that flow through the
district and school budget, more privileged schools have access to considerable
additional assets. Local Education Foundations (LEFs) have been created in some
communities to raise private funds to supplement school resources (Elis, 2006). These
financial supports, as well as time commitments from parents and community members,
can impact resource allocation and reinforce inequality among students (Berne &
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Stiefel, 1994; Crampton & Bauman, 1998; Elis, 2006). Regarding the magnitude of
assets contributed by LEFs, a review of the literature by Zimmer, Krop, Kaganoff,
Ross, and Brewer (2001) found that “foundation contributions represent a small
percentage of revenue in all but a handful of schools” (p. 88). Given more recent fiscal
constraints, it is likely that this source of income has grown significantly, and will have
an increasing impact on differential allocation of resources.
Factors Impacting Resource Allocation. Additional factors which impact
resource allocation between the district and school level include the limitations placed
on school districts that restrict district administrators’ control of resources, the methods
in which human capital resources are distributed (i.e., district hiring practices, seniority
plans, salary schedules, working conditions and hiring preferences), and the teacher
labor market.
District limitations. Berne and Stiefel (1999) explain that, “In most cases,
despite special, bilingual, and compensatory education regulations, districts have
significant freedom to decide how to allocate revenues to their schools” because “state
general aid and locally raised revenues come with few restrictions on how it must be
spread among schools” (p. 5). However, others argue that budgets have considerable
restrictions, resulting from both external (i.e., federal and state) and internal
requirements. District obligations due to external sources include mandates from the
federal government resulting from policy decisions addressing such areas as
accountability (e.g., student assessment, school evaluation) and equal protection (e.g.,
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (Title I)). District
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obligations also include mandates from state governments, often tied to funding,
implementing federal requirements and creating their own sets of rules and regulations
(e.g., class size requirements). For example, in Pennsylvania, a recent funding increase
to previously underfunded districts as a result of a change to the state’s education
funding formula requires districts to spend 80% of new funds in specific areas tied to
increases in student achievement. Furthermore, many states courts have ordered
spending be tied to specific reforms (Peyser & Costrell, 2004). Additional restrictions
might result from teacher contracts which can specify salaries, class size, teacher
placements, and tenure (Goertz & Hess, 1998). While administrators have different
conceptions of what is required for success, in many situations those responsible for
budgets find that they do not have the necessary authority to make the types of
decisions they deem necessary. Levin and Quinn (2003) found that this situation was
magnified for leaders in high poverty schools. It is important to keep these various
restrictions in mind when holding districts and schools accountable for allocations of
funds and positions, as administrators have limited control over the distribution of
resources at the district level and below (Baker, 2003).
Distribution of human capital resources. A number of institutional policies
tied to personnel issues impact how human capital resources are distributed to schools
and programs. Specifically, hiring practices and school situations impact the ability of
school districts to successfully hire well-qualified teachers who will remain in their
positions. Conditions which impact hiring include: the use of seniority rules, salary
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schedules, working conditions, and hiring preferences by district and school
administrators.
District hiring practices. Researchers have found significant inefficiencies in
human resource practices that have serious ramifications on the ability of districts to
employ qualified teachers (Imazeki & Goe, 2009; Koski & Horng, 2007; Lankford,
Loeb & Wyckoff, 2002; Levin & Quinn, 2003). These inefficiencies begin during the
hiring process; many districts are unable to compete for the most qualified teachers
because they are not in a position to make hiring commitments at the time when most
teachers are seeking employment. In their study of hiring practices among urban
districts, Levin and Quinn (2003) and Koski and Horng (2007) identified major
impediments to well-timed hiring. First, teachers who plan to leave the system are often
not required to give notice early enough for district personnel staff to plan for the next
year’s staffing requirements. Second, state and local budgets are often not completed in
time for districts to have their funding allotments, preventing human resource offices
from knowing the number of placements they will be able to make for the coming year.
Finally, transfer rules in many districts give personnel with the greatest experience in
the district first priority in filling open positions. The result of late hiring is that large
urban districts lose the ability to hire candidates who are well-qualified and willing to
work in high poverty schools. Also, those candidates who are placed later in the year
are more likely to be a poor match and, therefore, more likely to be unsuccessful in the
position (Imazeki & Goe, 2009).
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Seniority. The advantage conferred on teachers with longer tenure is referred to
as seniority. This status is one of the bargained rights which unions and districts agree
to as part of the teacher contract.38 Seniority preferences are prevalent in many school
districts and restrict schools from having discretion in employment decisions, impacting
transfer and reassignment policies as well as hiring.39. As teachers gain more
experience, they tend to move out of schools with disadvantaged students (Betts,
Rueben, & Danenberg, 2000; Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, & Rivkin, 2004; Lankford,
Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002). While many researchers fear that the movement of more
experienced teachers out of high-poverty schools results in fewer high-quality teachers
where they are needed most (Hill, 2006; Moe, 2007), there is a growing body of
research that suggests that the most effective teachers do not transfer out of highpoverty schools (Hanushek, 2009; Imazeki & Goe, 2009; Ingersoll, 2002; Nelson,
2006).
One argument for strong seniority rules is that districts with robust benefits,
including seniority rights, attract high quality teachers. Koski and Horng (2007)
compared California districts with weak and strong seniority rules and found that
“strong seniority preference rules are associated with a greater percentage of
credentialed teachers in school districts” (p. 262). While this is true based on a
comparison of districts, Koski and Horng (2007) found that credentialed teachers are
not evenly distributed among schools within these districts. In fact, “schools with
38

Many districts without collective bargaining also have seniority rights firmly in place (citation? Maybe
the NCTQ website).
39
New York City has recently changed its hiring practices and now has an open system which allows
school leadership teams to make employment decisions (Goertz & Levin, 2008).
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higher percentages of minority students, within districts, have lower percentages of
credentialed and experienced teachers” (p. 262). That being said, Koski and Horng’s
analysis does not provide evidence to support the notion that seniority rules have an
impact on the distribution of teachers among schools within districts. There is,
however, a great deal of research supporting the impact of teacher preference on
employment decisions ((Betts, Rueben, & Danenberg, 2000; Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien,
& Rivkin, 2004; Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002). Clearly, seniority rules result in
the fact that new teachers are most likely to teach in schools with the most
disadvantaged children. However, there is some conflict among researchers as to the
effect of seniority rules. One would think that it would be beneficial for instructional
leaders to have control over the composition of their faculty. However, the impact of
district-union agreements guaranteeing seniority rights seems to be overwhelmed by
other considerations related to the teacher labor market (Koski & Horng, 2007).
Salaries. There is significant literature on the impact of wages on the choices
people make, when entering the job market and when choosing locations in which to
work (Boyd et al., 2004; Corcoran et al., 2004; Hanushek, 2006; Lankford et al., 2002;
Murnane et al., 1991). Some of this literature documents how women and minorities
are moving into fields with greater compensation opportunities than education
(Corcoran et al., 2004). This research suggests that an increase in wages would have a
positive impact on the ability of schools with harder to serve students to hire more
qualified educators. However, while wages can impact the decision of job seekers in
choosing to become teachers or in choosing between school districts, wages will not
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impact decisions at the school level because salaries remain the same (Boyd et al.,
2004).
Working conditions. While teachers report that compensation is an influential
factor in choosing employment, they also indicate that working conditions are
extremely important (Ingersoll, 2004). Furthermore, because salaries are unlikely to
have an impact on choice among schools in a district, working conditions become
critical in the distribution of teachers within districts, both in the initial employment
decisions (when there is choice involved) and, possibly more significantly, in later
employment decisions.
Working conditions are generally encompass the physical environment (such as
the condition of school facilities), materials to support instructions (such as books and
computers), workload (such as class size and time to accomplish tasks), student
behavior, professional development, decision-making authority, and support from
administration. In a review of the National Center for Education Statistics’ Schools and
Staffing Survey and the Teacher Follow-up Survey, Ingersoll (2004) found that
“significant numbers of those who depart from their jobs (in disadvantaged schools) …
report that they are hampered by inadequate support from the school administration, too
many intrusions on classroom teaching time, student discipline problems and limited
faculty input into school decision-making” (p. 2). Looking at the role of teacher
workforce policies in improving student outcomes, Boyd, Lankford and Loeb (2004)
found that school principals can positively alter working conditions in a school.
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Hiring preferences. District and school administrators often do a poor job in
identifying the best candidates to improve student outcomes, which can also impede
successful hiring (Ballou, 1996; Imazeki & Goe, 2009; Strauss et al., 2000). Research
by Ballou and Podgursky (1997) demonstrates that public schools do not show
preference for teacher candidates with strong academic records. Additional research
indicates that districts and schools concern themselves with supplemental roles teacher
candidates might be willing to take on (such as coaching) above other criteria that may
be more closely tied to their effectiveness in the classroom (Ingersoll, 2001; Strauss et
al., 2000). Districts are also likely to prefer candidates who are familiar with certain
schools or who have attended similar schools in the same district or local schools for
their training. This becomes an issue in terms of staff composition at the various
schools within a larger school district. A study by Strauss and colleagues (2000) of
school districts in Pennsylvania found that most school districts hired a large majority
of their teachers from schools of education within a 70 mile radius; eight large districts
(Allentown, Erie, Johnstown, Lancaster, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Reading, Sharon, and
Williamsport) hired over 80% of their teachers from within this radius. It would be
interesting to learn if educators with similar experiences (e.g., education training,
location of secondary education) are more likely to work together in the same building
within a district. Finally, as mentioned earlier, districts, on behalf of their parents, may
hire teachers that are most demographically similar to the children in the school. To the
extent that disadvantaged schools have provided an inadequate education to former
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students, teacher candidates who attended these schools may not be effective in the
classroom.
Teacher labor market. The single salary schedule in a school district, which
mandates compensation for teachers, means that teachers, rather than school districts,
have the most influence in determining how they are sorted across the school district.
Goldhaber (2008) explains, “The teacher labor market … adjusts based on the job
attributes of a school assignment through teacher sorting across schools, rather than
through salary differentials that depend on the job attributes of a school assignment” (p.
1). Many researchers have studied the movement of teachers to understand their
preferences, and have found, not surprisingly, that teachers choose to work in the more
desirable setting. For many teachers, this means favorable working conditions, students
with higher academic performance, less poverty, a lower percentage of minority
students, and fewer accountability requirements (Imazeki & Goe, 2009). Also, teachers
choose to work at schools close to their own home.
A great deal of research supports the impact of teacher preference on
employment decisions. Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff (2002) studied the movement
patterns in New York City and found that teachers transfer to schools with fewer low
performing, low income and minority students. Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien and Rivkin
(2004) reached similar conclusions using data from Texas, and Betts, Rueben, and
Danenberg (2000) found similar patterns in California. Miller and Rubenstein (2008),
Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2005), Ladd (2008), Boyd (2004), Imazeki and Goe
(2009), and others have written about their concern that experienced teachers (those
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with greater qualifications) will move away from schools with students requiring more
support, either due to low achievement or poverty. Teachers may assume that children
of low-income families will have fewer supports at home and will be less prepared to
learn (Clotfelter et al., 2007). This will leave vacancies for novice teachers to fill in
schools populated with the hardest-to-educate students. Based on the research on the
effectiveness of novice teachers, it is probable that these teachers are less effective
(Goldhaber, 2008).
A disturbing finding revealed by a number of researchers is that many teachers
have a strong aversion to working with minority students. Boyd, Lankford and Loeb
(2004) report that “both white and minority teachers tend to choose schools with lower
minority populations” (p. 109). In their analysis, Boyd et al. assume that this choice is
due to the working conditions of schools with high percentages of minority students,
rather than direct bias teacher against the minority students themselves. Other
researchers reach similar findings but do not attribute the preference for non-minority
students to be tied to other variables such as working conditions. In a major study of
teacher turnover in Georgia, Stinebrickner, Scafidi, and Sjoquist (2007) used a linear
probability and competing risks model to separate correlated characteristics of students
to determine what is driving teacher preferences. They found that teachers are more
likely to leave schools with higher proportions of minority students, not because of high
poverty or poor working conditions, but because of the racial characteristics of
students.
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There is some discussion in the literature that state and local accountability
measures also impact teachers’ employment decisions. Accountability systems are
designed to hold teachers accountable for the performance of their students. Most
systems look at the achievement of students according to certain standards rather than
student growth. Teachers who work with students who are struggling and unable to
reach proficiency targets are more likely to be penalized and less likely to receive
financial bonuses. For this reason, teachers will be attracted to positions in which they
would be more likely to have successful students (as defined by the accountability
scheme). Clotfelter et al. (2007) found this to be the case in North Carolina, where the
state accountability initiative made it more difficult for low performing schools to hold
on to their teaching staff and their principals. Interestingly, Boyd et al. (2005) found
that schools in New York State successfully directed teachers with more experience to
fourth grade classrooms in which state-required testing was being implemented. It is
likely that these schools made an intentional effort to enhance teacher quality in
classrooms in which students would be tested. Currently, efforts to replicate this
approach at the district level are being made through the use of financial incentives to
entice effective teachers and administrators to work in hard-to-staff schools (Goertz &
Levin, 2008).
Location is a final consideration in choosing employment for teachers, and has
implications for the larger school districts. Researchers investigating employment
patterns in New York and Pennsylvania have found that teachers prefer to work close to
where they grew up. Boyd et al. (2004) report that “over 60 percent of first-year public
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school teachers in New York take jobs within fifteen miles of where they grew up, with
85 percent taking jobs within forty miles” (p. 109). Similarly, Strauss, Bowes, Marks,
and Plesko (2000) reported that on average, 40% of teachers serve in school districts in
which they were students, and if they are not able to remain in the area in which they
grew up, prefer to teach in areas that are reminiscent of their hometown. This is
confirmed by Boyd et al. (2005) in their analysis of New York State data. There is also
a positive (though somewhat weaker) relationship between where teachers are trained
and where they work (Imazeki & Goe, 2009).
These findings reflect a potential concern for urban districts, in that teacher
candidates from their own schools may be less qualified, given the poor academic
opportunities available in the district (Boyd et al., 2004; Clotfelter et al., 2007). While
schools hiring “locals” have the advantage of knowing the candidates better, they may
not be acting in the best interest of the students in choosing local candidates over more
qualified outsiders (Goldhaber, 2008). As noted earlier, this may be tempered by the
fact that students are more successful when they are matched with teachers of a similar
race (Dee, 2004). In any case, urban districts do not supply nearly enough teachers to
fill their classrooms, and must therefore compete for non-local teachers who are
unlikely to choose them over non-urban districts. Given that student demographics are
unlikely to change, the best way to address the hiring challenges of urban districts
would be for districts to offer teacher candidates more, in the form of compensation and
working conditions. New York City has taken this strategic approach in its efforts to
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ensure that effective teachers are placed in hard-to-staff schools (Goertz & Levin,
2008).
Teacher mobility. While teachers’ preference for working close to where they
grew up has greater impact in terms of the ultimate distribution of teachers (Boyd et al.,
2008), high turnover in struggling schools is extremely harmful because vacancies are
filled with novice teachers who are likely to be less effective in the classroom.
Furthermore, the lack of faculty continuity in schools which must fill many vacancies
each year is detrimental to the schools as learning communities (Clotfelter et al., 2007).
That being said, there are contradictory findings as to the effectiveness of teachers who
transfer out of struggling schools (Boyd et al., 2008; Imazeki & Goe, 2009); a recent
study by Hanushek (2009) finds that ineffective teachers are the most likely to leave.
Weighted Student Funding. The inequitable allocation of resources below the
district level has led policy makers to consider alternative methods for distributing
resources to schools. School-based management and budgeting provides an approach to
financing that moves control of funds from the district central office to the schools,
closer to where the money is being spent and, presumably, to the knowledge regarding
the true needs of the students. Moving spending authority to the school allows school
leaders to budget dollars and hire staff in a more flexible and efficient manner. In return
for this authority, schools leaders become accountable for student outcomes. According
to Goertz and Stiefel (1998), school leadership, composed of administrators, teachers,
parents, and community members, can work together to determine how best to allocate
dollars among classrooms and programs. However, to be successful, school leadership
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must have access to, and knowledge of, financial data, as well as clear goals and
strategic plans in place to achieve those goals.
As an approach to school-based management and budgeting, weighted student
funding (WSF) is designed to address not only school-based management, but
inequities in intra-district resource allocation. In its report, “Fund the Child: Tracking
Inequality and Antiquity in School Finance,” the Fordham Foundation (2006) offers
five principles to define weighted student funding (p. 21):
1. Funding should follow the child, on a per-student basis, to the public school that
he/she attends.
2. Per-student funding should vary according to a child’s need and other relevant
circumstances.
3. The funds should arrive at the school as real dollars (i.e., not teaching positions,
ratios, or staffing norms) that can be spent flexibly, with accountability gauged
by results, not inputs, programs, or activities.
4. These principles for allocating money to schools should apply to all levels (e.g.,
federal funds going to states, state funds going to districts, districts to schools).
5. All funding systems should be simplified and made transparent.
Weighted student funding is attractive to a variety of stakeholders; for those on the
left of the political spectrum, it provides vertical equity by ensuring that students with
greater needs are allotted higher per-pupil funding (Rubenstein et al., 2006); for those
on the right, it moves control away from the school district and closer to the student,
thereby supporting decentralization to “promote efficiency and foster school choice”
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(Baker, 2009, p. 2). An additional advantage of WSF is that it is transparent. Dollars, as
the universal unit of measurement, serve as a metric that allows onlookers to ensure that
funds are distributed according to predetermined need.
Weighted student funding encompasses two significant goals for discussions of
equity: the use of actual teacher salaries in determining budgets, and school control
over budgets. Examples of WSF to date demonstrate that each of these goals is difficult
to implement on its own, and that one does not necessarily lead to the other. Edmonton,
Cincinnati, Seattle, Oakland, San Francisco, New York City and Houston have all
implemented some aspects of weighted student funding. (Seattle has since ended its
WSF plan and Philadelphia is in the process of creating a pilot project to test the idea.)
Of these districts, only Oakland is confronting salary issues. The great advantage of
including actual teacher salaries, as opposed to average teacher salaries, in the
budgeting processes is that schools can use their additional funds to assist less
experienced teachers with professional development or to make other enhancements to
the school. Through their weighted student funding initiative, Oakland was able to
balance the distribution of resources across all schools (Hill, 2008); the other
metropolitan districts that have implemented some version of WSF are limited in their
control over budgets by teacher contracts and district constraints. Advocating for the
successful implementation of WSF, Roza (2008) explains that the use of actual budgets
is necessary, writing: “Allocations that inhibit the power of school leaders to make
decisions about resource use in their schools can undermine the district’s efforts, and
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thus the district should avoid allocations managed centrally or according to central staff
discretion” (p. 26).
In order for weighted student funding to work, five factors must be firmly in place.
First, schools must be granted real budgeting and spending authority, including hiring
of staff. Second, most of the budget should be allocated through WSF. Third, the
weights must be correct. In 1999, Picus wrote, “Without some kind of system to
provide support and knowledge about what kinds of programs are available and which
ones work for children with particular needs … it would be difficult to ensure that
schools would be capable of meeting these needs” (p. 33). The fact that educators are
uncertain as to the best approaches to serve students with particular needs raises the
question of how appropriate weights should be determined. The variation in weights
from district to district suggests a lack of clarity with regard to the true cost of serving
certain categories of students. Fourth, the decision-makers at the school level must be
fully informed and competent to take on the new management and budgeting
responsibilities. Roza (2008) warns that, “If school leadership is weak, then increasing
the portion of resources allocated at the school level may not be a viable strategy” (p.
25). Few schools have the capacity to be successful in these new roles. Fifth and
finally, school districts must have a plan in place to support schools that are
unsuccessful. More specifically, districts must determine what authority stays with the
school and what authority reverts to the district in this instance (Goertz & Hess, 1998).
Even when all these variables are addressed, it is unclear if a weighted student
funding system is the answer to the problem of inequitable allocation of resources.
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Recently completed studies of WSF systems in Texas, California, and Ohio have
arrived at both positive and negative conclusions. A review of WSF in Houston by
Miller and Rubenstein (2009) seeking to determine “the effect of the WSF budgeting
system on the actual distribution of resources across” across schools (p. 3) found that
the WSF budgeting system did result in more resources being allocated to schools with
students in need of greater supports. Furthermore, this reallocation did not take place in
comparison districts working without a WSF budgeting system. Alternatively,
Chambers, Shambaugh, Levin, Muraki, and Poland (2008) arrived at mixed results in
their analysis of spending patterns in San Francisco and Oakland to determine the
impact of their WSF systems on the distribution of resources according to student need.
They discovered that San Francisco “increased the proportion of total resources
allocated to high-poverty relative to low-poverty middle and high schools” but that, in
Oakland, “there did not appear to be a significant difference in [the] relationship
between per pupil expenditure and student poverty” as a result of having a WSF system
in place (Chambers et al., 2008, p. xi). In fact, subsidies meant to address tensions in
schools with high numbers of veteran teachers (to alleviate short-term issues due to the
use of actual salary numbers in determining budget allocations) seemed to negatively
impact the relationship between per pupil expenditure and student poverty. Matthew
Hill, Oakland Unified School district’s Executive Officer for Strategic Project, has
confirmed these findings, reporting that while Oakland’s weighted student funding
initiative has resulted in greater equity and transparency in revenues, a subsequent
increase in equity and transparency has not been seen with expenditures (Hill, 2008).
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Finally, based on research comparing districts with weighted student funding to
districts with typical funding processes in Texas and Ohio, Baker (2009) concludes that
weighted student funding is not necessary for districts to “achieve greater rationality in
cross school expenditures,” as “districts not using weighted funding appear comparably
able to target resources to schools with greater student needs” (p. 21).
Measuring Intradistrict Equity
While a significant amount of research has addressed equity concerns at the
district level (Iatarola & Rubenstein, 2007), there has been limited research on
intradistrict resource disparities. This research has found great inequities within
districts, often greater than those among districts (DeAngelis et al., 2005; Lankford et
al., 2002; Monk & Hussain, 2000). For example, Clotfelter et al. (2005) find that “about
two-thirds of the overall black-white difference in exposure to novice teachers reflects
patterns within, rather than across, school districts in North Carolina” (p. 19). However,
while studies of individual districts have shown significant disparities, there is no
national or state data that quantifies the extent of the differences among schools in per
pupil spending.40
This following section of this dissertation first looks at challenges to studying
intradistrict resource allocation. It then reviews some of the methods which have been
employed by researchers to better understand the impact of intradistrict resource
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Augenblick, Meyers and Anderson reported this in 1997, and it remains true in 2010. However, this
may be challenged with the reauthorization of ESEA as one proposal requires the states to collect and
disseminate data on school-level expenditures (Sawchuk, 2009).
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allocation. Finally, it presents the findings of the research using the equity principles
discussed earlier in this chapter.
Challenges to studying intradistrict resource allocation. While there are
numerous studies examining resource allocation below the district level, “relatively
little research has focused on the processes and patterns of resource allocation across
schools within districts” (Rubenstein et al., 2006, p. 2). There are four main reasons for
this: first, there is a significant lack of accessible data on school level expenditures.
Second, expenditure data does not tell the whole story and can be misleading. Third, it
is difficult to allocate shared resources fairly. And fourth, most often districts, not
schools, control the administration and management of budgets.
Lack of data. While districts may report on expenditures by function (such as
instruction, instructional support, and administration), this information is often not
helpful to researchers as “accuracy, consistency, and detail of the reported data, as well
as assumptions made by researchers in creating categories and assigning individual
expenditures to each” are often in question (Stiefel, Rubenstein, & Berne, 1998, p.
449). Cohen (1997) argues that a shortage of administrative capacity is responsible for
the inadequate collection of school-level data. Goertz and Odden (1999) add to this
assertion, attributing the scarcity of data to a “lack of school-based funding policies” (p.
x).
Expenditure data does not tell the whole story. Even if the school level budget
data is available, it does not, on its own, accurately represent the total value of
resources. Dollars for personnel, for example, are often a combination of staff positions
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and salaries which have not been untangled (Berne & Stiefel, 1994, p. 408). As we will
see, many studies on intradistrict allocation find that funding directed to schools with
higher percentages of low-income students appears to be equitable (horizontally and
even vertically), but closer investigation reveals that teachers serving in schools with
greater numbers of low-income students are more likely to have lower salaries,
corresponding to their minimal experience and credentials. Furthermore, it is often the
case that school budgets use average teacher salaries in place of actual salaries. As
stated earlier in this paper, the use of average salaries masks discrepancies in actual
teacher salaries at the school level.
Allocation of shared resources. Another way in which expenditure data does
not reveal the details of resource allocation has to do with the allocation of shared
resources. According to Miller et al. (2004), “shared resources, including programs,
staff, and funds managed by the central office for the purpose of educating children, are
not reported in school budgets despite the fact that they can represent a substantial
portion of the total resources which benefit any one school” (Abstract). Resources
allocated to the district central office could include everything from professional
development, such as support for struggling teachers in schools with more
disadvantaged students, to music programs, which may disproportionately impact
schools with higher proportions of high-income students. Fringe benefits and pensions
may also not be allocated directly to the schools. Stiefel et al. (1998) found that fringe
benefits and pensions were not allocated to schools in any of the four districts they
investigated - Chicago, Fort Worth, New York City and Rochester. To measure the
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impact of this practice, Miller et al. (2004) constructed a cost allocation model for
Denver Public Schools. It revealed that school-level budgets increased by one-third
when district budgets were apportioned accurately. This situation is especially
troublesome because central office budgets can hide such funding inequities. Roza
(2008) reports that, “Funds doled out through central budgets were less equitable than
those allocated in school budgets in both districts, as shown by the coefficient of
variation computed on the total dollars received per pupil” (p. 21). Clearly, studies
which do not accurately allocate resources may be biasing their results.
Methods employed in studying resource allocation. A review of the literature
reveals 34 studies which examine intradistrict resource allocation. This paper takes a
new look at these studies in order to synthesize the findings on intradistrict resource
allocation utilizing an equity framework. A matrix has been developed to help
categorize the studies in different ways. (See Appendix A.) Information collected in the
matrix includes: data source; methodology; findings; the relationship between inputs
and variables of interest; and, the conception of equity being measured (i.e., horizontal
equity, vertical equity, or adequacy).
The following discussion first examines how researchers study intradistrict
resource allocation in these 34 studies. Most investigate the relationships between
inputs and given variables of interest. Inputs generally include financial and/or human
capital resources and variables of interest include outcomes such as relative position
among student subgroups in terms of allotted resources or student performance (e.g., a
comparison of expenditures among groups of students identified by certain
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characteristics such as income level or race, an analysis of the relationship between
student subgroup and student performance).
One input that has not been used in extant studies of intradistrict resource
allocation is a measure of teacher effectiveness. This is largely due to the lack of an
available metric. Given the expansion of the use of value-added methods which link
teachers to student outcomes, some districts now have access to value-added measures
for teachers. Other potential inputs that could be considered in an analysis of resource
allocation are measures of teacher self-efficacy and teacher collective efficacy – as
these metrics of teacher quality have shown to be related to student outcomes. I suggest
that teacher value-added measures and teacher efficacy measures be included as teacher
quality inputs in future studies of intradistrict resource allocation.
Inputs. Thirty-three (33) of the 34 studies identified analyze how one or more
specific inputs provided by the district are allocated among schools and students.41
Most inputs fall into four broad categories: total expenditures per pupil; total
instructional expenditures per pupil; pupil-teacher ratio; and, teacher quality. Of the
studies reviewed, 14 investigate total expenditures per pupil, 8 investigate total
instructional expenditures per pupil, 8 investigate pupil teacher ratio and 18 investigate
teacher quality.
Human capital resources. While there has been debate as to the value of money
in improving student outcomes (See Burtless, 1996; Ferguson, 1991; Hanushek, 1989;
Hedges, Lain & Greenwald, 1994), most scholars conclude that money matters, but is
41

One study, conducted by Baker and Green (2009), was designed to investigate the costs associated
with black student concentration necessary to ensure adequate outcomes.
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insufficient to improve outcomes (Grubb, 2009; Picus, 1995). Therefore, in addition to
looking at money alone, it is necessary to examine what the money buys. Twenty-one
of the reviewed studies look at various teacher characteristics and/or pupil-teacher
ratios as a means of quantifying resources. This is consistent with the research on
improving student academic outcomes as researchers have identified “teacher quality”
as the input most highly correlated with student achievement (Card & Kreuger, 1992;
Ferguson, 1991; Rivkin, Hanushek & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004; Sanders & Horn,
1998; Sanders & Rivers, 1996). Goldhaber (2006) writes, “Education research
convincingly shows that teacher quality is the most important schooling factor
influencing student achievement. A very good teacher as opposed to a very bad one can
make as much as a full year’s difference in learning growth for students. Indeed, the
effect of increases in teacher quality swamps the impact of any other educational
investment, such as reductions in class size” (p. 1).
Researchers have investigated teacher characteristics as proxies for teacher
quality. The teacher characteristics most often studied are those for which there is data
readily available (Rice, 2003). Unfortunately, these do not include such important
teacher characteristics as teachers’ expectations for students, teachers’ efficacy42,
ability to motivate, and perseverance are less frequently addressed in the literature.
Lack of readily available data on these characteristics has also resulted in a lack of
teacher effectiveness measures in studies of resource allocation.

42

Tournaki & Podell (2005) define teacher efficacy as “a teacher’s belief that teaching can overcome
factors external to the teacher, such as the home environment” (p. 300).
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Seven teacher characteristics that have been used on studies of intradistrict
resource allocation as measures of teacher quality are: experience; credentials; content
knowledge and pedagogical knowledge; general academic ability and intelligence;
teacher training; certification status; and, National Board Certification status. Because
these teacher characteristics have been used by researchers on the input side of their
equation, it is important to establish the relationship between these characteristics and
student achievement.
Experience. A number of studies have demonstrated the positive impact of
teacher experience, particularly in the first few years of teaching. In 1998, Roos
reported, “Although research suggests that there may be a leveling off of teacher
effectiveness after five to eight years of teaching, a strong body of research as well as
ample anecdotal evidence reveals that first- and second-year teachers are considerably
less effective than those who have some experience” (p. 42). An extensive review of
the literature conducted by Rice (2003) arrives at a similar conclusion. More recent
research conducted by Rockoff (2004) and Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2007) is
consistent with prior work. Using data from two New Jersey school districts, Rockoff
(2004) finds “evidence that teaching experience significantly raises student test scores,
particularly in reading subject areas. Reading test scores differ by approximately 0.17
standard deviations on average between beginning teachers and teachers with ten or
more years of experience” (p 248). Clotfelter et al. (2007), with access to ten years of
longitudinal data from North Carolina, also find evidence that “novice teachers in the
sample are less effective than teachers in the sample with some experience, but beyond
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the first couple of years, more experienced teachers are no more effective than those
with a couple of years of experience” (p. 19). As Goldhaber (2008) writes, “all else
equal, novice teachers tend to be less effective than those with more experience” (p.5).
Credentials. Research on the relationship between credentials, most often
thought of as degrees associated with level of education (i.e., master’s degree or
doctorate), and student achievement provide mixed results. Hanushek (1997) and Monk
(1994) find that a master’s degree is either uncorrelated or negatively correlated with
student achievement. Rice’s (2003) review of the literature also finds ambiguous results
with regard to the impact of advanced degrees at the primary level. However, advanced
degrees in mathematics and science seem to be linked to positive outcomes for high
school students studying mathematics and science (Rice, 2003). Betts et al. (2000)
discovered that the percentage of teachers with a master’s degree is “in some cases …
positively and significantly related to test scores” and that “a higher percentage of
teachers with only a bachelor’s degree within a given grade is negatively related to
student achievement” (p. xxii). Finally, recent research conducted by Clotfelter, Ladd
and Vigdor (2007) find that weak credentials are associated with large negative effects
on student achievement, particularly in math education.
Content knowledge/ pedagogical knowledge. In her review of the literature,
Darling-Hammonds (2000) reports weak and inconsistent findings on the relationship
between subject matter knowledge and student achievement. Other researchers have
arrived at conflicting conclusions regarding content knowledge (Hill, Rowan & Ball,
2005; Monk, 1994). For example, based on correlations of student achievement and
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National Teacher Exam (NTE) scores in Pennsylvania, as well as studies outside of
Pennsylvania, Strauss (2000) finds stronger content knowledge to be associated with
stronger classroom achievement. As noted above, the effects of teachers with degrees in
mathematics seem to be associated with student achievement in mathematics (Goe,
2007). To the extent that degrees in mathematics represent mathematics content
knowledge, there is evidence that content knowledge in mathematics is associated with
student achievement in mathematics.
With regard to pedagogical knowledge, Darling-Hammonds (2000) reports
stronger and more consistent findings on the relationship between pedagogical
knowledge and student achievement. Supporting this position, Rice’s literature review
(2003) concludes that pedagogical coursework seems to contribute to teacher
effectiveness, and that both pedagogical and content knowledge coursework enhance
this relationship.
General academic ability and intelligence. Researchers have studied the impact
of teachers’ general academic ability and intelligence on student achievement with
varied results.43 In reviewing the earlier literature, Darling-Hammond (2000) found
small and statistically insignificant correlations between teacher intelligence and
general academic ability. A more recent study by Harris and Sass (2007) corroborates
this, finding no evidence that college coursework or scholastic aptitude, as measured by
college entrance exam scores, impacts student achievement. Other researchers reach
very different conclusions. Ferguson and Ladd (1996) used data from several Alabama
43

Measures used by researchers to quantify intelligence include the quality of the teachers’
undergraduate institution, teacher test scores, certification test scores, SAT scores and ACT scores.
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school districts to demonstrative that if teachers of Black children were to have higher
test scores on the ACT44 (by an increase of one standard deviation), about two-thirds of
the achievement gap in Alabama would be eliminated. Also concerned by the
inequitable distribution of teachers among students, Clotfelter et al. (2006) analyzed
administrative data on North Carolina public schools. Looking only at 5th grade, they
found licensure test scores in mathematics to be strongly associated with student
achievement. The Goldhaber (2003) review goes further and concludes that measures
of teacher academic ability are generally the best predictors of student achievement. A
few years later, Goldhaber (2007) found a positive relationship between teacher
licensure tests and student achievement and, in 2008, he reported that “stronger records
of academic proficiency” as measured by “the selectivity of the colleges (teachers)
graduated from or their performance on tests such as licensure exams or the SAT or
ACT college-entrance tests” are associated with greater effectiveness in the classroom
(p.5). Finally, some studies have identified a relationship between teachers’ verbal
ability and student achievement, especially for certain students (Darling-Hammond,
2000; Rice, 2003).
Teacher training. Measuring the impact of specific teacher training programs is
a relatively new phenomenon. Monk and King (1994) examined the total course credits
in area of specialization to discern the impact of quantity of courses taken and found a
positive relationship with student outcomes. This impact was also greater among
students of teacher training programs with lower pre-test scores, indicating that teacher
44

The ACT test assesses high school students’ general educational development and their ability to
complete college-level work. (Retrieved on April 10, 2010 from http://www.act.org/aap/.)
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training is most helpful to those with fewer skills (as cited in Strauss, 2000, p. 12).
More recent research differs from these studies, in that it seeks to better understand the
relative impact of various teacher training programs. Harris and Sass (2007) looked at
different types of programs in Florida to distinguish those programs that are most
highly correlated with student achievement. They concluded that teacher training has
little influence on teacher effectiveness, with the exception of content-focused
professional development, which seems to have an impact on middle and high school
math achievement. In an effort to better understand the components of teacher training
tied to student achievement, Boyd et al. (2008) estimate the effects of features of
teacher training programs in New York City on teachers’ value-added scores, which
indicated teachers’ impact on student test scores in mathematics and English language
arts. Results point to discrepancies across teacher training programs in teacher
effectiveness.45 Other programs have looked more specifically at alternative
certification routes and, in so doing, consider the associated teacher training required
(Constantine, Player, Silva, Hallgren, Grider & Deke, 2009).
Certification status. Teacher certification or licensure provides a means of
ensuring that teachers reach a certain threshold before being considered competent to
educate students. Certification varies by state, but generally requires that the teacher
candidate has completed a state-approved teacher education program, possesses a major
or minor in the field in which he/she will teach, earned a certain number of education
credits, passed a test in basic-skills, pedagogy, and subject area, and has had the
45

The state of Louisiana has taken on a similar research agenda as a means of evaluating and improving
teacher training programs (citation).
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opportunity to student teach (Darling-Hammond, 2000). Alternative certificate
programs are also available in many states for non-traditional teacher candidates. Most
of the requirements remain, but time frames for entering the classroom may be
different. Rice’s (2003) review of the literature regarding teacher certification is
consistent with that for other teacher characteristics: most studies revealed that teacher
certification in mathematics had a positive effect on high school mathematics
achievement.
At the time of Rice’s publication, the studies did not reveal a positive effect of
emergency or alternative-route certification on high school mathematics achievement.
One of these studies, conducted by Goldhaber and Brewer (2000), examined the impact
of different certification status (e.g., probationary certification, emergency certification,
private school certification, no certification, and standard certification in subject area)
on 12th grade students. They found that teachers holding a standard certification in
mathematics had a significant positive impact on student achievement, while teachers
holding a private school certification or no certification did not. However, teachers
holding emergency certification had the same impact on student achievement as those
holding a standard certification (p. 129). More recently, research conducted by
Clotfelter et al. (2007) finds regular licensure to have a positive effect on student
achievement, again with larger effects for math than English language arts. Finally, in a
review of a New York City initiative46 to remove uncertified teachers from the

46

This initiative was dependent upon three policy changes: the virtual elimination of temporary licenses
for uncertified teachers effective in September, 2003; the creation of alternative certification programs;
and, the development and the Teaching Fellows program (Boyd et al., 2007).
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workforce and replace them with teachers certified through an alternative route, Boyd,
Lankford, Loeb, Rockoff, and Wyckoff (2007) attribute a reduction in the test score gap
between students in high- and low-poverty schools to the influx of more qualified
teachers replacing emergency certified teachers in high-poverty schools.
National Board Certification status. The National Board for Professional
Teaching Standards (NBPTS) has created a certification system that goes above and
beyond state certification systems.47 Calling for “high and rigorous standards,” National
Board Certification requires an initial screening, preparation of a portfolio, and
successful completion of a set of assessment exercises (Harris & Sass, 2008). While the
impact of National Board Certification is disputed, many states financially support
teachers’ efforts to become Nationally Board certified, and provide financial incentives
to those who achieve certification. Citing research conducted by the National Research
Council (2008) and Goldhaber and Brewer (2007), among others, NBPTS claims that
“research is consistently positive about the impact of National Board Certification on
improvement to teacher practice, professional development and areas of school
improvement that are critical to raising student achievement” (National Board for
Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) website, www.nbpts.org).
On behalf of the National Research Council, Hakel, Koenig, and Elliot (2008)
reviewed studies of National Board Certification on student achievement. These studies
were conducted mainly in North Carolina and Florida, states with excellent databases to
track teachers and students, as well as a significant numbers of National Board
47

More than 82,000 teachers have achieved National Board Certification (NBPTS website).
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Certified teachers. While studies found a relationship between National Board
Certification and higher student achievement, the effects detected were small and less
significant in Florida than North Carolina (Hakel et al., 2008).48 Goldhaber and
Anthony (2007) arrived at a slightly different conclusion, finding that teachers who are
National Board certified are more effective than teacher applicants who do not become
certified. They also found that the benefits that accrue in terms of student achievement
vary by grade level and student type. Lastly, they found no evidence that the process of
becoming certified increases teacher effectiveness (p. 146). A study conducted by
Harris and Sass (2008) challenges Goldhaber and Anthony’s conclusions, finding
“relatively little support for NBPTS certification as a signal of teacher effectiveness”
(p. 25). Only in a few isolated cases did the authors find National Board Certification to
be associated with student achievement. These associations are small, with the
exception of future National Board Certified teachers who are middle school math
teachers. However, Harris and Sass (2008) agree with Goldhaber and Anthony in
regards to their finding that the process of becoming certified does not increase teacher
effectiveness.
Relationship among teacher characteristics. Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff
(2002) have found that the seven characteristics listed above (experience; credentials;
content knowledge and pedagogical knowledge; general academic ability and
intelligence; teacher training; certification status; and, National Board Certification
48

One study reviewed, conducted by Sanders, Ashton and Wright (2005), had been commissioned by the
NBPTS. Using data from two large school districts in North Carolina, the authors compared teachers
with and without National Board Certification and found no effect of certification on student
achievement.
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status), as well as other teacher characteristics, are highly correlated. They explain,
“Schools that have low quality teachers as measured by one attribute are more likely to
have low quality teachers based on all other measures” (p. 42). This is not surprising, as
there is understandable overlap among many of the teacher characteristics. For
example, it makes sense that credentials, which represent instruction in a specialized
content area and/or pedagogical skill), is highly correlated with content and
pedagogical knowledge.
Value-added measures. A potential human capital resource input that has not yet
been utilized in studies of intradistrict resource allocation is value-added measures. The
availability of value-added measures is growing as support and incentives from states
and the federal government for implementing value-added systems has increased.49
This metric could be used at both the school level and the teacher level if the data were
available. Value-added models measure teacher and school effectiveness as determined
by their students’ growth on standardized assessments. The more sophisticated valueadded measures take into account students’ previous test performance, as well as other
student characteristics, and predict students expected growth. To the extent that growth
in a given year is greater or less than predicted, the school or teacher is given credit.
Using several years of data, statisticians can measure the impact that a teacher or school
has had on student achievement (Hershberg, Simon & Lea-Kruger, 2004).

49

Most recently, the U.S. Department of Education’s Race to the Top competition required that rigorous
teacher evaluation be based on student outcomes (Glazerman et. al., 2010; Baker et. al., 2010).
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There is general agreement among researchers that value-added systems provide
better measures of teacher effectiveness than achievement scores alone, which take no
account of student growth. Value-added systems are also thought to provide better
measures of teacher effectiveness than simple growth measures that do not take into
consideration student attributes (Baker et. al., 2010). However, there is an extensive
debate in the research community as to the viability and appropriate use of value-added
methods. In response to the U.S. Department of Education’s Race to the Top
competition, the Board on Testing and Assessment of the National Research Council
(2009) submitted a letter expressing concern with, among other issues, the use of valueadded methods to evaluate teacher effectiveness. They cite experts Henry Braun
(Educational Testing Service) and Daniel McCaffrey and J. R. Lockwood (Rand) to
support their argument that, “a great deal is unknown about the potential and the
limitations of alternative statistical models for evaluating teachers’ value-added
contributions to student learning” (National Research Council [NRC], 2009, p.8). The
Economic Policy Institute also issued a report warning against the use of value-added
methods as a tool for teacher evaluation (Baker et. al., 2010). Concerns regarding
value-added methods include the accuracy of results derived from using value-added
methods and the impact of utilizing value-added measures for personnel decisions.50

50

Some concerns regarding the impact of value-added methods have to do with their potential use by
administrators. For example, if value-added scores are used to evaluate teachers, some researchers fear
that teachers will focus only on tested materials, thereby narrowing the curriculum (Baker et. al., 2010).
This could happen at the class level, where a teacher spends more time on subject matter covered in the
state assessment, or at the school level, where time spent on courses such as history and art is restricted in
order to make more time for English Language Arts and Mathematics, tested subjects. Using valueadded to make high stake decisions could also lead to teacher demoralization and even cheating (Baker
et. al., 2010). Other concerns include: the political issue of having a metric that is difficult to explain to
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While questions regarding the impact of the adoption of value-added methods are of
great importance, only the accuracy of results derived from using value-added methods
is useful for the purpose of studying inequities in the distribution of human capital
resources.
I will briefly address the numerous issues tied to value-added methodology and its
ability to provide valuable estimates of teacher effectiveness, but for a more
comprehensive review of the technical subject matter, see Henry Braun’s (2005),
“Using Student Progress to Evaluate Teachers: A Primer on Value-Added Models.”
1. Students and teachers are not randomly assigned (Baker et. al., 2010; Braun,
2005; Harris & Sass, 2009; NRC, 2009). Baker et. al. (2010) explain “teachers’
value-added effects can be compared only where teachers have the same mix of
struggling and successful students, something that almost never occurs, or when
statistical measures of effectiveness fully adjust for the differing mix of
students, something that is exceedingly hard to do” (p. 11).
2. Value-added methods are only as good as the assessments they are built on. For
the most part, assessments are not perfectly aligned to standards (Baker et. al.,
2010; NRC, 2009). Furthermore, they do not cover all the material for which
teachers are responsible (e.g., teaching respect, responsibility). Another
technical issue is that tests have ceilings and floors, which can prevent student

teachers as well as the community at large (NRC, 2009); the fact that new teachers and teachers not
teaching tested material cannot be included in a system-wide evaluation initiative; and, the fact that
decisions based on value-added methods leading to the removal of teachers do not make sense if
replacement teachers are no better (Baker et. al., 2010).
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demonstration of growth or regression (Baker et. al., 2010; NRC, 2009). Finally,
measurement error exists for all assessments.
3. Statistical properties of value-added assessment lead to results that may be
imprecise. Specifically, measurement errors lead to misclassification of some
teachers (Baker et. al., 2010). The Board on Testing and Assessment (BOTA) of
the NRC (2009) points out that value-added measures can vary unexpectedly
from year to year. One cause of this instability can be small class size which
lessons the power of the analysis for any given teacher. Also, while tests that are
vertically aligned lend themselves more readily to value-added assessment,
most assessments used in value-added modeling are not vertically aligned
(Baker et. al., 2010). Finally, there are a variety of value-added models being
implemented, and they differ in their sophistication. Glazerman et. al. (2010)
point out that “any practical application of value-added measures should make
use of confidence intervals in order to avoid false precision, and should include
multiple years of value-added data in combination with other sources of
information to increase reliability and validity” (p.5).
4. Not all teachers are teaching material that is covered by state assessments. This
is a significant issue as educators for untested grades and subjects are unable to
be evaluated through value-added methods.
5. Positive and negative outside influences on students’ learning may be wrongly
attributed to teachers.Value-added methods attribute student improvement
beyond, or less than, that predicted to their teachers. Therefore, outside
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influences on student learning, other than those controlled for in the valueadded model, are attributed to the teacher. Influence can come from other
teachers, either in the same grade-level or from a previous years’ instruction.
When students receive instruction from more than one teacher it is very difficult
to accurately attribute gains in learning (NRC, 2009). Other influences can
include summer activities, mobility, and parental support.
6. Valid value-added results rely on complete data bases and accurate links
between students and their teachers which are often lacking. Districts are in the
process of building this infrastructure, but many have a ways to go (NRC,
2009). Student mobility presents a particular challenge for many districts (Baker
et. al., 2010).
While legitimate concerns abound, there is a body of evidence that supports the use
of value-added methods. Three recently published studies serve as examples: Harris
and Sass (2009) studied value-added and principal ratings in a mid-sized Florida school
district and found value-added measures “constructed from multiple years of test score
data” to do “a much better job at predicting future teacher performance than principal
ratings” (p. 28). Subsequently, Goldhaber and Hansen (2010) conducted a large study
using North Carolina data to examine the stability of value-added model estimates and
their value in predicting student achievement (p.1). They found value-added teacher
effect estimates to be “better indicators of teacher quality (at least as measured by
standardized tests) than observable teacher attributes” (p.2). Lastly, the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation (2010) issued a preliminary report of its Measures of Effective

81
Teaching (MET) project. Their analysis reveals, “In every grade and subject, a
teacher’s past track record of value-added is among the strongest predictors of their
students’ achievement gains in other classes and academic years. A teacher’s valueadded fluctuates from year-to-year and from class-to-class, as succeeding cohorts of
students move through their classrooms. However, that volatility is not so large as to
undercut the usefulness of value-added as an indicator (imperfect, but still informative)
of future performance” (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2010, p.9).
The Brookings Brown Center Task Group on Teacher Quality also issued a report
in 2010 which supports the role of value-added. The authors of the report state:
If student test achievement is the outcome, value-added is superior to other
existing methods of classifying teachers. Classification that relies on other
measurable characteristics of teachers (e.g., scores on licensing tests, routes into
teaching, nature of certification, National Board certification, teaching
experience, quality of undergraduate institution, relevance of undergraduate
coursework, extent and nature of professional development), considered singly
or in aggregate, is not in the same league in terms of predicting future
performance as evaluation based on value-added. (Glazerman et. al., 2010, p.9)

Given this finding, it is not surprising that the report advocates for the use of valueadded measures. However, the authors acknowledge that “there is much to be learned
about how best to use value-added information in human resource decisions”
(Glazerman et. al., 2010, p.1). This view is consistent with that of the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation, which promotes the use of value-added as a means of adding useful
information to inform decisions to improve student outcomes (Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, 2010).
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Many who caution against the use of value-added methods are most uncomfortable
with its use in high stakes decisions such as compensation and tenure. Despite this
concern, they remain interested in pursuing a research agenda that augments the
knowledge base related to the evaluation of educators (Baker et. al., 2010; NRC, 2009).
Researchers seeking to better understand the distribution of human capital resources
among schools and students would benefit from the consideration of value-added
measures of teacher and/or school effectiveness as an input to be equitably allocated.
Teacher efficacy measures. Teacher efficacy measures and teacher collective
efficacy measures are two additional human capital resource inputs that also have not
yet been utilized in studies of intradistrict resource allocation. Teacher efficacy has
been defined in the literature as an individual teacher’s attitude and thinking about his
or her ability to positively impact student outcomes (Skaalvik & Skaalvik, 2010;
Soodak & Podell, 1996). Tschannen-Moran and Woolfolk Hoy (2001) go further and
describe the construct as a teacher’s “judgement of his or her capabilities to bring about
desired outcomes of student engagement and learning, even among those students who
may be difficult or unmotivated” (p. 783). This definition gets to idea that a teacher’s
input can serve to override negative influences that a child might bring to the classroom
given their abilities and/or their family backgrounds. Teacher collective efficacy is a
similar construct, but rather than being based on an individual teacher’s views of his or
her potential impact on students, it is individual teachers’ views of the ability of an
entire group of teachers, to impact students, such as all the teachers in a school
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(Goddard, Hoy & Hoy, 2000; Henson, 2001; Skaalvik & Skaalvik, 2010).51 One
argument for the relevance of studying efficacy is that self-efficacy informs motivation,
and people behave in a way that is consistent with their expectations of what their
actions might facilitate (Bandura, 1986).
Numerous studies over the years have provided evidence that teachers’ selfefficacy is related to positive student outcomes, including academic achievement,
motivation, and student self-efficacy (Henson, 2001; Tschannen-Moran & Woolfolk
Hoy, 2001). These findings are consistent regardless of the measurement tool
employed. Not surprisingly, researchers have also found that self-efficacy is strongly
related to positive impacts on teacher practice and behavior, and that teachers with
weaker self-efficacy are more controlling and critical of students (Woolfolk Hoy,
2003). Another interesting finding related to individual teacher efficacy is that, beyond
pre-service training, it appears to be stable, and not readily subject to change (Henson,
2001; Tshannen-Moran, Hoy & Hoy, 1998).
While less research has been conducted on the relationship between collective
efficacy and student outcomes, the studies which do exist reveal that collective efficacy
has a positive impact. In fact, in a study by Goddard, Hoy & Hoy (2000), “collective
teacher efficacy was more predictive of elementary students’ math and reading
achievement than gender, ethnicity, or socio-economic status” (Henson, 2001).

51

According to Skaalvik & Skaalvik (2010), while there is little research that evaluates the relationship
between individual self-efficacy and collective efficacy, the studies which exist point to a positive
relationship between the two, but the constructs are theoretically different.
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A concern with considering individual teacher efficacy and teacher collective
efficacy as teacher and school-level “qualities” or “characteristics” is that measures of
efficacy (at this point) rely solely on teachers’ self reports, which has implications for
the validity of the data. Furthermore, this line of research continues to evolve as
researchers use differing measures to capture these constructs.
Outcomes - variables of interest. As researchers consider the implications of
intradistrict resource allocation, they examine how inputs are differentially related to
groups of students. The most common variables of interest to researchers and policy
makers are race, poverty, ELL status, special education status, school size and student
performance. Of the 34 studies reviewed, 15 investigate differential impact by minority
status, 26 investigate differential impact by poverty status, 4 investigate differential
impact by ELL status, 6 investigate differential impact by special education status, 3
investigate differential impact by school size, and 10 investigate differential impact by
student performance. Additionally, 3 studies examine measures of equity to determine
the variation on per-pupil expenditures.
Reviewing the research. In their paper, “Rethinking the Intradistrict Distribution
of School Inputs to Disadvantaged Students,” Rubenstein et al. (2006) provide a review
of studies that address this topic, dividing them into three categories: those quantifying
school-level funding disparities; multivariate studies relating school funding to student
characteristics; and, multivariate teacher characteristic results. Teacher characteristics
include: experience, salary, education and certification. Pupil-teacher ratios are also
considered in this group of studies is. Other studies not falling into these categories
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include those which look at non-fiscal resources, such as class size, course offerings,
and instructional time (Odden et al., 2008; Betts, Rueben and Dannenberg, 2000;
Burke, 1999). An example of research into the impact of non-fiscal resources is
provided by Betts, Rueben and Dannenberg (2000) who investigated both class size and
course offerings in California schools in 1997-1998.52
Another way to classify the types of studies that address intradistrict resource
allocation is by the unit of analysis employed by the researcher. Some studies look at
how resources are allocated among schools within a given school district. For example,
Summers and Wolfe (1976) looked into resource allocation in Philadelphia; Rubenstein
(1998) looked into resource allocation in Chicago; Owens and Maiden (1999) looked
into resource allocation in a large district in Florida; and Berne and Stiefel (1984),
Iatarola and Stiefel (2003), Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2002), Boyd, Lankford,
Loeb, Rockoff, and Wyckoff (2007), Iatarola and Rubenstein (2007) and Schwartz,
Stiefel, and Rubenstein (2008) looked into resource allocation in New York City.
Other studies investigate multiple districts and their allocation decisions.
Focusing on elementary schools, Owens (1972) investigated the distribution of human
capital resources (teacher salary expenditures, teacher experience, and teacher verbal
ability) among students by income and racial make-up of neighborhoods in nine large
cities. Carr (1998) used school-level data from eight large school districts in Texas to
explore resource allocation and Stiefel, Rubenstein and Berne (1998) conducted school
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While Betts et al. (2000) find little variation in average class sizes across schools, they identify
significant variations in the number of Advanced Placement courses offered as well as the percentage of
courses that satisfy public university entrance requirements.
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level equity analyses in Chicago, Fort Worth, New York City and Rochester. More
recently, Rubenstein, Schwarz and Stiefel (2007) studied resource allocation in New
York City, Cleveland, and Columbus, and Miller and Rubenstein (2008) examined the
magnitude of intradistrict resource disparities in four mid-size school districts in New
York City.
Yet another group of studies looked at resource allocation across schools in
separate districts (Rubenstein et al., 2006). Many of these studies focus on districts
within a given state to avoid misinterpretations due to different policy environments.
Hertert (1995) and Betts, Rueben and Dannenberg (2000) looked at fiscal and nonfiscal allocations among students by race, income and performance throughout schools
in California. DeAngelis et al. (2005) created an index of teacher quality to determine
how teacher quality is distributed among students by poverty and minority status and
student performance in Illinois. And, Clotfelter et al. (2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008) use
data from North Carolina to evaluate how teachers are distributed among schools
according to their attributes such as credentials, experience, aptitude (as measured by
quality of undergraduate institution and licensure test scores) and certification. Finally,
a set of studies look at the impact of district characteristics on intradistrict resource
allocation. Monk and Hussein (2000) employed multivariate models to examine the
influences of school district spending, wealth, poverty, and size on internal decisions
about how to divide staffing resources across different areas of the curriculum. Taking
another approach, Pan, Rudo and Smith-Hansen (2003) studied the allocation decisions
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of high-performing and low-performing districts in an effort to determine how
successful districts allot resources.
Findings - Evaluating Equity in Resource Allocation. None of these
approaches to categorizing intradistrict resource allocation studies differentiate between
studies which test the relationship between: (1) inputs, such as funding and staffing, and
how they are allocated equally among different groups of students based on race,
poverty level, etc. [horizontal equity]; (2) inputs, such as funding and staffing, and how
they are allocated differentially among different groups of students based on race,
poverty level, etc., [vertical equity]; and, (3) inputs, such as funding and staffing, and
student achievement outcomes [adequacy].
Certain methodologies are used to address these different conceptions of equity.
When looking at horizontal equity, researchers often provide descriptive analyses and
summary statistics that measure the variation in per pupil expenditures, such as the
range, the restricted range, the coefficient of variation, the Gini coefficient, and the
McLoone index. (For example, see Clotfelter et al., 2005; DeAngelis et al., 2005;
Hertert, 1995; Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003, Rubenstein, 1998; and, Stiefel et al., 1998.)
Horizontal equity can also be tested with a regression analysis, allowing researchers to
identify the direction, size, and strength of the relationship between resources and
school characteristics.53 If, for example, resources were distributed according to the
ideal of horizontal equity, one would expect to see, on average, no relationship, either
positive or negative, between the allocations to schools with different characteristics or
53

Theoretically, this analysis can be done at the program level or classroom level as well.
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groups of students with different characteristics (Owens & Maiden, 1999). The
existence of vertical equity is evaluated with similar techniques, but regression analysis
is utilized more often. Following the same logic as in our example of horizontal equity,
according to the principle of vertical equity, one would expect to see a positive
relationship between school funding and, for example, student poverty. (Examples
include: Ajwad, 2006; Berne & Stiefel, 1994; Boyd et al., 2007; Clotfelter et al., 2007;
Owens, 1972; and Schwartz, Stiefel, & Rubenstein, 2008.) Analysis of adequacy
focuses on the impact of inputs on student outcomes as opposed to the allocation of
inputs. Researchers investigating adequacy employ similar methodological tools to
those used when testing for vertical equity, but the relationships being investigated are
between inputs (funding, teacher quality, etc.) and student achievement. In other words,
the equation is turned around. Researchers test to see if achievement (as measured by
assessments) of groups of students (defined by certain characteristics) is equivalent. To
the extent it is not, the principle of adequacy has not been achieved. (Examples of
studies of adequacy include Betts et al. (2000) and Iatarola and Rubenstein (2007).)
Horizontal equity. Determining whether a study is testing horizontal equity or
vertical equity is sometime difficult, as it requires the author of the study to articulate
whether they examine resources distributed equally among all
schools/classrooms/students, or resources distributed in a way as to compensate for
disadvantages among all schools/classrooms/students. Summers and Wolfe (1976)
suggest that certain allocations are “intended to be neutral … unrelated to the
proportion of disadvantaged” students (p.331). These might include school desks, or
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books, or nurses. Researchers have investigated the allocation of resources to determine
if their allotment is indeed neutral.
Summers and Wolfe (1976) conducted an early study of the equitable allocation
of resources in Philadelphia. When looking at how funds are allocated to African
American students in elementary schools, they discovered that “neutrally intended
resources,” with the exception of “teacher and principal quality characteristics,” were
distributed equitably (p. 341). They found this not to be the case at the junior high
school level, where “neutrally intended resources” were allocated disproportionately in
favor of non-minority students. Again, teachers’ and principals’ quality characteristics
were unfairly allocated. At the high school level, horizontal equity was found to be
most prevalent (p. 341).
More recent studies have led to similar results, finding overall expenditures to
be distributed according to the principle of horizontal equity (Hertert, 1995;
Rubenstein, 1998; Stiefel, Rubenstein & Berne, 1998). Findings were less definitive
when looking at expenditures tied to instruction. For example, Owens and Maiden
(1999) found that the percentage of African American students in a school and the
percentage of students on free/reduced lunch programs are negatively associated with
instructional expenditures while Baker (2003) found that “limited English proficient
and low-income populations … led to increased allocations to instruction and
instruction-related staff, including librarians and school counselors, but not to increases
in classroom teachers” (p. 22).

90
A consistent finding in the literature is that schools with more disadvantaged
students are more likely to have more teachers with less experience, fewer credentials,
lower certification status, less content and pedagogical knowledge, and lower academic
ability and intelligence (Ingersoll, 2002). Research on intradistict teacher distribution
bears this out. While it is often the case that high-poverty schools have higher teacher
to student ratios, these teachers also receive lower salaries and are considered to be less
qualified by measures such as experience and education (Schwartz et al., 2008). This
finding has been corroborated by Owen (1972), Summers and Wolfe (1976), Stiefel,
Rubenstein & Berne (1998), Lankford, Loeb & Wyckoff (2002), Iatarola & Stiefel
(2003), DeAngelis et al. (2005), Clotfelter et al. (2007), and Rubenstein et al. (2007).
This is also the case for schools with higher percentages of non-white students
(Clotfelter et al., 2007; DeAngelis et al., 2005; Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002;
Owen, 1972; Rubenstein et al., 2007; Stiefel, Rubenstein, & Berne, 1998; Summers &
Wolfe, 1976). Lankford et al. (2002) write, “Low-income, low-achieving and non-white
students, particularly those in urban areas, find themselves in classes with many of the
least skilled teachers” (p. 38).
Vertical Equity. Vertical equity is a function of the extent to which resources
are allocated with the intention of being compensatory -- addressing the needs of a
certain group of students that may have particular hurdles to jump (Summers and
Wolfe, 1976). Federal funds, such as Title I, have been designed to provide for vertical
equity by addressing the needs of low-income students. Iatarola and Stiefel (2003)
write, “In order to measure vertical equity in spending, we include categorical revenue
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with general education operating revenue and we specify school and student
characteristics that have been identified with higher costs of learning, such as poverty
status, limited English proficiency classification, high mobility, and learning disability
status” (p. 70).
In their review of the literature on intradistrict resource allocation, Rubenstein et
al. (2006) find strong evidence that “higher concentrations of student needs, such as
poverty, are sometimes associated with higher levels of per-pupil spending” (p. 6). My
own review of the literature confirms this finding. For example, Stiefel, Rubenstein and
Berne (1998) determined that for general education or total funds, Chicago, New York,
Rochester and Fort Worth provide mixed results--some positive relationships and some
weak negative relationships. However, dollar allocations tend to favor schools with
lower poverty levels. In New York City, Iatarola and Stiefel (2003) found vertical
equity to be lacking in elementary schools but more recent work by Schwartz, Stiefel
and Rubenstein (2008) revealed that the relationship between funding and the
percentage of the low-income students, limited English proficiency students, and
special education students, is positive, demonstrating vertical equity. Also, Ajwad
(2006) analyzed the relationship between expenditures per pupil and discretionary
resources and concluded that “the combined effect of poor students and a poor
neighborhood is to raise school spending per pupil” (Abstract). One last study that
looks at the relationship between resources and disadvantaged students in eight school
districts in Texas reports that resources are disproportionately allocated to schools
serving high needs students, demonstrating vertical equity. However, there is scarce
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evidence that this allocation of resources is having an impact on student outcomes
(Clark, 1998). It is possible that the vertical equity seen in the eight Texas school
districts does not lead to improvements in student performance because of the way that
the dollars are spent. As found in the investigation of horizontal equity, researchers
reveal that schools with more disadvantaged students may have more money allotted to
them, but their teachers are likely to be less educated (Baker, 2009; Rubenstein et al.,
2007). I was unable to identify any studies that found a positive relationship between
teacher qualifications and size of the population of disadvantaged students. Goertz and
Stiefel (1998) acknowledged this contradiction, that the distribution of financial
resources overall could be allocated in accordance with the ideal of vertical equity
while the distribution of teacher quality would not.
Adequacy. Rubenstein et al. (2004) explain that adequacy can be measured by
examining the extent to which groups of students with certain similar characteristics,
such as race or poverty, receive the necessary resources to achieve standards. However,
this approach is conceptually difficult to grasp – perhaps because of the ambiguous
relationship between inputs (such as dollars and staffing) and student achievement.
Of thirty-four studies reviewed on intradistrict allocation of resources, only five
address adequacy as a form of equity. The earliest of these studies was conducted by
Betts et al. (2000). The authors ask the question: “Do existing inequalities in school
resources contribute to unequal student outcomes?” (p. viii). Using regression analysis
which allows the researchers to control for school and student characteristics, they find
the level of teacher experience and the percentage of teachers without a full credential
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to be strongly related to student achievement. They also find teachers’ education level
to be related to student achievement, but this relationship is weaker. However, the
strongest relationship is between student achievement and student socioeconomic
status.
Pan, Rudo, and Smith-Hansen (2003) looked at the relationship between
financial and staffing resources and student performance using data from low- and
high-performing school districts in four states in the Southwest (Arkansas, Louisiana,
New Mexico, and Texas) and 12 districts with consistent gains in student performance
in an effort to help determine the necessary resources to achieve success. This study
found that high-performing districts spent more money and employed more staff in
certain instructional areas. Clotfelter et al. (2006) also sought to understand what
resources are necessary for high student performance. They found that teachers with
more experience and with higher licensure test scores are positively associated with
students with higher test scores.
Two final studies that consider adequacy rely on data from New York City.
Iatarola and Rubenstein (2007) sought to evaluate the impact of a policy change calling
for more stringent graduation requirements (the outcome in question). They employed a
regression analysis controlling for unchanging school characteristics through school
fixed effects and for changes affecting all schools through year effects, and found that
spending levels and resource allocation changed somewhat in response to the new
policy. Further research is necessary to determine the impact of the new funds on
student graduation rates. Finally, Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, Rockoff, and Wyckoff (2007)
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looked at the relationship between teacher qualifications and student outcomes and
found that changes in teacher qualifications, such as SAT scores or certification status,
appear to be related to “a modest improvement in the average achievement of students
in the poorest schools” (p. 2).54
Districts might be more likely to address the needs of struggling students in
response to standards-based reform and state and federal accountability requirements.
Given the strong correlations between low-performance and student characteristics such
as income and race, it is reasonable to assume that students considered to be
disadvantaged would have more resources directed their way (Gross & Goertz, 2005).
As better data becomes available to quantify student achievement, it is likely that more
researchers will seek to investigate the relationship between the quantity and quality of
resources and student outcomes in an attempt to support policy makers in their efforts
to address all three conceptions of equity: horizontal equity, vertical equity, and
adequacy.
Summary
This chapter began with a review of four conceptions of equity, spanning
principles of equivalent inputs to adequate outcomes. I propose a fifth model to serve as
a framework which I use to evaluate resource allocation in the Allentown School
District. Following this theoretical discussion of equity, this chapter presents an
analysis of the current processes which dictate how resources are distributed below the
district level. This analysis makes clear that there is a complex system in place, shaped
54

The authors used a measure of student growth derived from value-added analysis to investigate the
impact of teacher characteristics on student growth.
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by district allocation policies and the teacher labor market, with multiple forces
influencing how resources are allocated among schools and programs. The next
segment of this chapter provides a review of the existing research on intradistrict
resource allocation. This review discusses the research challenges and then considers
the methods employed in studying resource allocation. Lastly, findings of intradistrict
resource allocation studies are presented.
A synopsis of these findings reveals the following points: 1) overall
expenditures are often distributed according the principles of horizontal and vertical
equity, with equivalent or greater financial resources being allocated to schools and
students with greater needs. However, this is more likely to be the case at the high
school level than the elementary school level. Furthermore, there is a question as to the
sufficiency of the additional resources directed to disadvantaged schools and students to
achieve vertical equity; and, 2) human resources, as opposed to financial resources, are
less likely to be distributed equitably. Disparities in teacher quality – as defined by
measurable indicators such as years of experience, certification status, and content and
pedagogical knowledge – are most often perversely related to school and student
characteristics (i.e., schools with more disadvantaged students often have more teachers
with less experience, fewer qualifications, etc.).
According to the model of comprehensive equity developed earlier in this
chapter, school districts should be able to demonstrate that resources are distributed
such that all students are able to participate as citizens and be economically selfsufficient. Beyond this distribution, public funds should be disbursed in accordance
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with the principle of vertical equity with additional compensation for disadvantaged
students. Finally, comprehensive equity requires that resource allocations not favor
students based on unjustifiable criteria such as race. The review of studies investigating
intradistrict resource allocation does not produce findings consistent with
comprehensive equity.
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CHAPTER 3 – BACKGROUND AND DATA
Pennsylvania’s Definition of Equity
Pennsylvania has consistently received low ranks on measures of school
funding equity. As of 2008, prior to the implementation of a new funding formula,
Pennsylvania ranked 8th among all states in terms of school finance inequity, based on
the average percentage difference in per-pupil spending among school districts (Federal
Education Budget Project). While other states have altered their school funding
formulas as the result of court-ordered mandates, Pennsylvania’s legislature confronted
the issue directly, commissioning a costing-out study to establish the actual resources
necessary to ensure that the students of Pennsylvania receive an adequate education.55
In response to the recommendations of this study, the governor proposed a budget that
included additional funds to be directed to certain districts. The budget, along with a
new school funding formula, was enacted by the legislature in the summer of 2008.
Pennsylvania’s new formula sets an adequacy target determined by the number
of students in each school district and their educational needs. Specifically, a base cost
of $8,003 is allotted for each student, and then additional funding is provided based on
the number of low-income students and English language-learners, the district’s size,
and regional cost differences (Augenblick, Palaich & Associates, 2007). Districts that
are unable to raise sufficient funds to meet the adequacy target are provided with state
funds to cover the gap. Of the 501 districts in the state of Pennsylvania, 471 districts
55

This work was instigated by a group of business leaders in the Lehigh Valley (Education 2010) who
had commissioned Augenblick, Palaich & Associates to study the Allentown School District. The
consultant’s analysis revealed a $2000 per pupil revenue gap which, in part, was the result of the state’s
funding formula to districts (“Pennsylvania’s Costing-Out Study,” n.d.).
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had spending below the estimate of what it would take to have their children reach an
adequate level.
For the purposes of the costing-out study, an adequate education is defined as
100% of students achieving proficiency on state reading and mathematics assessments
and mastering state standards in 12 academic areas by the year 2014 (Augenblick,
Palaich & Associates, 2007). Per pupil allotments include the cost of educating an
average student in the Commonwealth to meet state performance expectations plus
“weights” for certain categories of students (including students in poverty, special
education students, gifted students, and English language learners) to allow them to
also meet state performance expectations.
The authors of the costing-out study used three methods to determine the
appropriate per pupil allotments: a successful school district approach, which examines
the spending of high performing school districts as measured against state performance
expectations; a professional judgment approach, which relies on the expertise and
experience of educators to specify the resources, staff, and programs that schools need
to meet performance expectations; and an evidence based approach, which uses
education research to help provide answers about how resources should be deployed in
schools so that students can meet performance expectations (Augenblick, Palaich and
Associates, 2007). Findings of these analyses led Augenblick, Palaich and Associates to
develop a new state funding formula designed to enable all districts to reach their
proficiency goals. Table 1 describes the weights tied to student needs used to determine
the appropriate state funding.
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Table 1. Value of Formula for Factor Related to Student-Based Need
Student-Based Need
Special Education
Poverty
English-Language
Learners
Gifted

Value or Formula for Factor
1.30 x all students enrolled in special
education programs
0.43 x number of students eligible for
free/ reduced-price lunch
((-.023) x (LN of 2005-06 enrollment)
+3.753) x number of ELL students, with a
minimum of 1.48 and a maximum of 2.43
[ASD: 1.4978 x number of ELL students]
((-0.13) x (LN of 2005-06 enrollment) +
1.482) x number of gifted students, with a
minimum of .20 and a maximum of .66
[ASD: 0.2052 x number of gifted students]

Note. Adapted from Costing-Out the Resources Needed to Meet Pennsylvania’s Public Education Goals
(p. 30), by Augenblick, Palaich and Associates, Inc., 2007.

The school funding formula adopted by the state is designed to ensure that
education funds are distributed among districts to ensure vertical equity. Such an
approach is intended to provide for an adequate education for all students. This formula
provides a basis for defining equity in Pennsylvania.
Governance and Resource Allocation in Allentown School District
The Allentown School District operates with a $233 million budget and
employs more than 2,300 educators and support staff (school year 2010-2011), making
it the sixth largest employer in the Lehigh Valley. The Allentown School Board sets
policies for the district, guided by the Pennsylvania School Code. It is also engaged in
long-range planning and formal and informal evaluation of district initiatives. Required
duties of the Board include levying taxes, electing the superintendent and all district
employees, approving matters relating to investments and expenditures, and adopting
the annual budget. Nine school directors are elected by district residents to serve on the
board for four-year terms. Though locally elected, school directors are considered to be
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state officials designated by law to administer the school system. The superintendent
and the administrative team support the board in all educational and financial actions
(ASD Board Brochure), and the superintendent serves as a non-voting member of the
board.
Budgets for the Allentown School District are prepared by the Chief Financial
Officer in cooperation with district administrators. All budgets are informed by
contracts with the various public employee unions operating in the district as well as
state and federal requirements. Procedures for allocating funds among schools and
programs have evolved over the years but appear to be comparable to the vast majority
of school districts in the United States. Budgeting is centralized and comprehensive
school-level budgets are not produced. To satisfy ESEA requirements for Title I
allotments, the district provides teacher average costs at the school level rather than
including actual costs. Specific methods for resource allocation are reported in greater
detail in Chapter V. In school year 2010-2011, the administration in Allentown hired
the education consulting firm of Cross & Joftus56 to conduct a resource assessment,
providing district personal with detailed information of how and where money was
being spent in the 2009-2010 school year.
Data Collection
All data collection has been approved by the Allentown School District and the
University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board. Data collection took place
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Cross & Joftus collaborated with Education Resource Strategies in this work.
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during the 2010-2011 school year and consists of document analysis and interviews; the
analysis is based on 2009-2010 data.
The information used to complete this study includes data on students, teachers,
and schools. Student data includes student characteristics (i.e., ELL status, poverty,
race, special education status), student achievement data (i.e., Pennsylvania System of
School Assessment scores, AYP performance levels), and student behavior data (i.e.,
attendance, disciplinary actions). This data is collected at the district and state level and
reported by the state.
Teacher data includes teacher attributes57 (i.e., years of experience, credentials),
teacher compensation, and metrics of professional practice (i.e., evaluation reports,
value-added scores, teacher self-efficacy measures, teacher collective-efficacy
measures). Information on teachers’ attributes presents the greatest difficulty in terms
of data collection. The human resources department has data on teachers’ years of
experience, credentials (e.g., B.S., M.S.), professional development courses taken,
teachers’ certification status, and teachers’ college attended and grade point average in
personnel files in the Administration Building. The department does not keep PRAXIS
test scores, which could serve as a proxy for content and pedagogical knowledge.
Unfortunately, teacher data has not yet been transferred to a centralized personnel
database, so only information on experience and credentials is available for my study.
Data collected on teacher compensation include salary, benefits, and funding source.

57

I was unable to attain reliable teacher data on general academic ability, training, or certification status
– beyond the fact that all teachers in elementary schools and middles schools are “highly qualified” as
required by No Child Left Behind federal legislation.
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Amassing metrics of professional practice required some additional collection
of data. The district’s only available measure of individual teacher practice is an
evaluation report that indicates whether teachers are “satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory.”
Over 98% of teachers were categorized as “satisfactory” in the 2009-2010 school year.
As this finding does not provide much discrimination for an equity analysis, I have not
used it in my study. Two district initiatives were implemented in the 2011 to support
the collection of measures of teacher practice: first, the district contracted with SAS
EVAAS to provide teacher level value added scores; and second, I administered a
survey to all the teachers in the district to question their sense of self-efficacy and the
collective efficacy of the building in which they work.
As a result of additional data collection, I have four measures of human capital
resources that have not been included in the literature on intradistrict equity. The first
metric of professional practice which I use in my analysis is ratings of teachers
according to their value-added scores. This metric is used to differentiate among
schools on the basis of the portion of highly effective teachers in each school and the
portion of highly ineffective teachers in each school. The second metric used in my
analysis is a calculation of teacher efficacy determined using data from a survey
administered to all elementary and middle school teachers. Two additional measures
are similar in that they rely of value-added measures and efficacy measures, but they
differ in that they offer a view of what the entire school offers to students. The Growth
Index, provided by the State for each school, is a measure of student progress across the
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tested grade levels in schools. Teacher collective efficacy measure provides teachers
perspectives regarding their schools’ faculty, as a whole, to impact student outcomes.
Value added measurements of low and high teacher effect. Teachers have long
been acknowledged for their students' accomplishments. Many have pointed out that
this is unfair, as teachers are only responsible for a portion of student achievement
outcomes. Value-added models were developed to address this problem. In theory, they
partition out student growth that is the result of the classroom environment, or teacher
practice, and the growth that is due to what the student brings to the classroom: her
prior knowledge, the support of her family, previous teachers, etc. After these factors
have been separated these models can, essentially, rate teachers based on their
contribution to student achievement outcomes.
Value-added models rely on student assessment results and links between
teachers and students. Data systems have been enhanced in recent years, making the
application of value-added models possible though approach only offers information on
teachers that are teaching tested grades and subjects (such as Mathematics and English
Language Arts). To date, the information generated through the PA Value-added
assessment system has been primarily used as a tool to aid teachers in their instruction.
For example, value-added results can identify the type of students (high achieving or
low achieving) with which the individual teachers are achieving the best results. This
information can be used to target appropriate supports to teachers.
The more data that is included in value-added models, the more accurate their
results. This limits the models' validity in situations with a great deal of missing data.
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As previously discussed, there are additional technical concerns that must be
acknowledged when using value-added models to measure teacher effectiveness: one
such concern is that value-added models generally assume that students are randomly
assigned to classrooms, which is often not the case. Also, a teachers' influence may go
beyond his classroom, thereby skewing the results for other teachers. Additionally, not
all value-added models are the same - and some provide better information than others.
More practical concerns include the fact that value-added models are complex and
difficult to explain.
While the state does not provide teacher level value added scores to school
districts, it is possible to obtain this information if the district is willing to provide
teacher level data and student level data, and links between them, to an organization
with the capacity to conduct the analysis. ASD has contracted with SAS EVAAS to
provide teacher-level value-added scores for all elementary school teachers in grades
four through five and middle school teachers teaching mathematics and English
Language Arts in grades six through eight. Students in these grades must take the
Pennsylvania System of School Assessment (PSSA), providing the data required to
conduct value-added analysis.58 Using a longitudinal, mixed model approach, SAS
EVAAS offers a complex statistical model which provides less vulnerable outcomes
than simple value-added models (McCaffrey, Han & Lockwood, 2008). Furthermore,
SAS EVAAS methodology has been approved as a viable growth model for states and
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SAS EVAAS currently has a contract with the State to provide school- and district-level value added
data.
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districts to include in their Teacher Incentive Fund and Race to the Top applications59
(U.S. Department of Education website).
With data on student PSSA scores, and links to teachers provided by the district,
SAS EVAAS was able to construct a teacher level value-added measure. This measure
compares teachers within the district and divides these teachers into quintiles according
to their effectiveness. Definitions for these quintiles are provided below:


Level 1, Least Effective: Teachers whose students are making substantially less
progress than state growth standard (the teacher’s index is less than -2).



Level 2, Approaching Average Effectiveness: Teachers whose students are
making less progress than the state growth standard (the teacher’s index is less
than -1 but equal or greater than -2).



Level 3, Average Effectiveness: Teachers whose students are making the same
amount of progress as the state growth standard (the teacher's index is less than
1 but equal to or greater than -1).



Level 4, Above Average Effectiveness: Teachers whose students are making
more progress than the state growth standard (the teacher's index is less than 2
but equal to or greater than 1);



Level 5, Most Effective: Teachers whose students are making substantially
more progress than the state growth standard (the teacher's index is 2 or
greater).

59

The first two growth model pilots awarded by the U.S. Department of Education were awarded to
Tennessee and North Carolina, each engaging SAS EVAAS to provide value-added analysis.
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For my equity analysis, I look at how teachers are dispersed among schools
according to their effectiveness as defined above. More specifically, I consider schools
in two ways: 1) by percentage of teachers60 in bottom two quintiles of effectiveness
(least effective and approaching average effectiveness); and 2) by percentage of
teachers61 in top two quintiles of effectiveness (above average effectiveness and most
effective).
Three-hundred-forty-one (341) value-added measures were provided for elementary
and middle schools. There are 819 teachers in elementary and middle school. This
represents only 31% of all teachers. This is due to a number of reasons: 1) in
elementary schools, the majority of scored teachers get rankings for both reading and
mathematics; 2) in elementary schools, only teachers in grades four and five are
included in the calculus; and 3) value-added scores were only provided for teachers
with two years of data available. Table 2 provides school level data.

60
61

This is calculated only for teachers with value-added scores.
This is calculated only for teachers with value-added scores.
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Table 2. Number and Percentage of Teacher-Level Value Added Scores by School

School

Number of
Teachers
included in
Analysis

% of all
Total Number
Teachers
of Teachers in included in
the Building
Analysis

McKinley ES
Lehigh Parkway ES
Cleveland ES
Jackson ES
Ritter ES
Washington ES
Muhlenberg ES
Sheridan ES
Jefferson ES
Roosevelt ES
Mosser ES
Hiram Dodd ES
Union Terrace ES
Central ES

4
1
5
5
8
9
7
7
7
4
4
7
9
10

18.4
18.1
18.5
18.4
32.4
39.2
34.8
42.2
50.1
36.5
46.2
46.2
43.2
50.3

22%
6%
27%
27%
25%
23%
20%
17%
14%
11%
9%
15%
21%
20%

Harrison-Morton MS
Raub MS
Trexler MS
South Mountain MS

42
42
47
36

56.0
67.1
68.3
84.6

75%
63%
69%
43%

Given the small sample size of teachers with value-added scores, especially in
elementary schools, this data should be considered with great caution. Also, while this
metric may be more useful in middle schools where a greater number of teachers are
included in the analysis, there is still an issue stemming from the variation among
schools in the percent of all teachers included in the analysis. As demonstrated in the
table above, Harrison-Morton Middle School has scores for 75% of its teachers while
South Mountain Middle School has scores for only 43% of its teachers.
Growth Index. Just as teacher effectiveness is determined through an analysis
of what “value” teachers add, the Growth Index similarly provides a measure of what
“value” an entire school adds. According to an informational document provided by
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one of the state’s Intermediate Units (IU5), “the index is a value based on the average
growth across grade levels and its relationship to the standard error so that comparison
among schools is meaningful” (IU5, 2011, p.4) A growth index of fifty indicates that,
on average, students in the school achieved a year’s worth of academic growth in a
year.62 A growth index greater than fifty indicates that, on average, students in the
school achieved more than a year’s worth of academic growth in a year and a growth
index less than fifty indicates that, on average, students in the school achieved less than
a year’s worth of academic growth in a year (IU5, 2011). In my equity analysis, I
consider how the State’s calculated growth index for each school varies by school.
Teacher efficacy. An additional input that has not been included in research on
intradistrict equity is that of teacher efficacy. As noted earlier, both teacher selfefficacy and teacher collective efficacy have shown to be related to student outcomes.
As such, it is worthwhile to include these metrics as measures of teacher quality,
resources which are potentially differentially distributed across schools. In order to
evaluate teacher efficacy, I administered a survey to all teachers in ASD. (The email
sent to principals requesting that they have the teachers in their building respond to an
email survey is included in Appendix D.) The survey presented to teachers included 25
responses: the first response required was to indicate in which building the respondents’
primary teaching responsibilities lay. The following twelve items measured teacher
self-efficacy, and the final twelve questions measured teacher collective efficacy.
Survey response was high. Assuming that all teachers, and only teachers, received the
62

The Growth Index provided by the State uses zero to indicate a year’s worth of growth in a year. I have
transformed their numbers in order to accurately apply my equity statistics.
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request to complete the survey, 79% (429) elementary school teachers responded and
91% (251) middle school teachers responded.63
My dissertation uses the Teacher Beliefs Scale – short form (TBS), originally
called the Teacher Sense of Efficacy Scale, to measure teacher self-efficacy.64 This
instrument, developed by Tschannen-Moran and Woolfolk Hoy (1998), uses a 9 point
likert scale with anchors at 1– Nothing, 3 – Very Little, 5 – Some Influence, 7 – Quite a
Bit, and 9 – A Great Deal. Items in this survey include: “How much can you do to
motivate students who show low interest in school work?” and “How much can you do
to get students to believe they can do well in school work?” (See Appendix D.) A
confirmatory factor analysis of responses reveals three constructs: efficacy in classroom
management, efficacy in student engagement, and efficacy in instructional strategies.
(See Appendix D for Promax-rotated Standardized Regression Coefficients.) These
constructs were also found by the survey creators in their own research.65
The following table and figures provide survey results. Figure 1 demonstrates
the average of all schools- by school level. Figures 2 and 3 provide responses from
middle school teachers and elementary school teachers. Next, Table 3 presents the
means and standard deviations of the average school response for elementary and
middle schools. As can be seen, there is slightly greater variation among elementary

63

I was unable to confirm that principals sent the email request to only teachers in their building – and
the only identifier requested was “In which school did you teach for the majority of last year (September
2009-June 2010).
64
The Teacher Efficacy Scale is available for use by researchers on the website of Wayne K. Hoy,
professor in educational administration in the School of Educational Policy and Leadership at Ohio State
University.
65
Alpha reliabilities for the constructs encompassed in the TBS are .86 for Classroom Management, .81
for Student Engagement, and .86 for Instructional Strategies (Tschanen-Moran & Woolfolk Hoy, 2001).
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schools than middle schools. Horizontal equity statistics provided in Chapter 5
corroborate this finding.
9.00
8.00
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
Classroom Mgmt

All High Schools

Student Engagement

All Middle Schools

Instructional Strategies

All Elementary Schools

Figure 1. School Level Comparison of Teacher Responses to Self-Efficacy Survey
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Figure 2. Elementary School Teacher Responses to Self-Efficacy Survey, by School
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Figure 3. Middle School Teacher Responses to Self-Efficacy Survey, by School
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Table 3. Mean and Standard Deviation for School Average Response to Teacher
Self-Efficacy Survey
Classroom Management
Student Engagement
Instructional Strategies

Elementary Schools
Mean(SD)
7.52(.38)
7.18(.40)
7.61(.41)

Middle Schools
Mean(SD)
6.96(.26)
6.04(.22)
7.58(.10)

For my equity analysis, I use scores for each construct determined by computing
the unweighted means of the items that loaded onto each factor.66
In order to examine how the ‘input’ – collective efficacy – is distributed across
schools, I included the Collective Teacher Efficacy Scale (CES) in my survey to
teachers.67 Developed by Goddard (2002), this tool measures “the shared perceptions of
teachers in a school that the faculty as a whole will have positive effects on students”
(Hoy, n.d.) This instrument uses a 6 point likert scale with anchors at 1- Strongly
Disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 – Somewhat Disagree, 4 – Somewhat Agree, 5 – Agree, and 6
– Strongly Agree. Items in this survey include: “If a child doesn’t want to learn teachers
here give up” and “Teachers here don’t have the skills needed to produce meaningful
student learning.” Goddard reports that the validity and the reliability of this form are
strong (Goddard, 2002). However, Henson (2001) points out that this tool has not been
tested across multiple samples.
The Ohio State University website which posts the Collective Efficacy Scale
also provides a scoring key. First, half of the items are scored in reverse. (For 6 items,

66

These groupings are items 1, 3, 6, and 8 for Efficacy in Classroom Management; items 2, 4, 7, and 11
for Efficacy in Student Engagement; and, items 5, 9, 10, and 12 for Efficacy in Instructional Strategies.
67
The Collective Efficacy Scale is available for use by researchers on the website of Wayne K. Hoy,
professor in educational administration in the School of Educational Policy and Leadership at Ohio State
University.
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Strongly Disagree becomes a “6” rather than a “1.”) Second, an average school score is
computed for each item through the averaging of responses of each teacher in a given
building. Finally, the sum of the average item scores for all 12 items is divided by 12.
The result is a number between 1 and 6. (The average of all elementary schools is 4.3
and the average of all middle schools is 3.6) Information is provided to standardize
these scores based on normative data provided in a representative Ohio sample.68 Four
elementary schools are “below average” and ten elementary schools are “above
average” with their average score being 526. All middle schools are “below average”
with their average score being 416. My equity analysis uses this information to look at
how collective efficacy is distributed across schools.

68

With the standardized score, “500” indicates average.
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Table 4. Teacher Collective Efficacy, by School
Lehigh Parkway ES
Washington ES
Muhlenberg ES
Ritter ES
Jefferson ES
Jackson ES
Hiram Dodd ES
Union Terrace ES
Cleveland ES
Sheridan ES
Mosser ES
McKinley ES
Roosevelt ES
Central ES

Standardized Scores
612
579
579
569
536
533
510
508
506
503
499
497
477
462

South Mountain MS
Harrison-Morton MS
Francis D. Raub MS
Trexler MS

450
449
389
379

Note: Survey conducted in April, 2011. Responses were to address SY2010
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Collective Efficacy
700
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Figure 4. Teacher Collective Efficacy, by School
Note: This is a standardized scale. A score of 500 represents the average score in a representative sample
of teachers/schools from Ohio. A score of 400 would be lower than 84% of all schools in the sample.

School data includes school demographics, student achievement data (i.e.,
average PSSA scores, number of “high” PSSA scores, number of “mid” PSSA scores,
number of “low” PSSA scores, school-wide AYP performance level, and AYP status –
percent below basic, percent basic, percent proficient, and percent advanced), human
capital data (i.e., number of new teachers, average years of teacher experience, number
of teachers in highest performance category using value-added scores, number of
teachers in lowest performance category using value-added scores, percent of teachers
with Masters Degrees, experience level of principal), school effectiveness data (i.e.,
school-wide value-added score, AYP status), and budget information (i.e., total funds,
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total teacher compensation69, average teacher salary, allocation of funds, source of
funds). I pay particular attention to Title I and other funding sources coming from
outside the district.
Data was collected from the Pennsylvania Department of Education (Office of
Elementary and Secondary Education and Bureau of Budget and Fiscal Management)
and the Allentown School District (Business Office - budget and payroll, the Human
Resources Office, and the Assessment and Accountability Office). To help in this
effort, ASD engaged the consulting firm, Cross & Joftus, to conduct a basic review of
how resources are deployed in the district. Cross & Joftus collected data on both
allocated and non-allocated operating costs, and accounted for all grants and funding
sources (i.e., Title I, School Improvement Grants, IDEA). Alternative schools were not
included in their data collection efforts. Cross & Joftus awarded a sub-contract to
Education Resource Strategies (ERS), an education consulting firm partnering with
large urban districts (i.e., Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Duval County, Los
Angeles, New York City, Oakland, Philadelphia, St. Paul) to reconfigure how people,
time and money are used in urban education. Cross & Joftus tailored ERS materials and
approaches to support the needs of a smaller district.

69

Compensation data will be collected such that average teacher salaries, as well as total teacher
compensation, can be determined at the school level.

117
Table 5. Data Used in ASD Resource Allocation Study
Data

Source

Year

Use of Data

ASD
PDE/ASD
PDE
ASD

SY2010
SY2010
SY2010
SY2010

Context
Context
Context
Context

ASD-SIS

SY2010

#(%) students receiving free
lunch
#(%) students receiving reduced
price lunch
#(%) special education students

ASD-SIS

SY2010

ASD-SIS

SY2010

ASD-SIS

SY2010

#(%) ELL students

ASD-SIS

SY2010

#(%) gifted students

ASD-SIS

SY2010

AYP reading (total, by
subgroup)

ASD-

SY2010

Determine school
need(CE,VE)
Determine school
need(CE,VE)
Determine school
need(CE,VE)
Determine school
need(CE,VE)
Determine school
need(CE,VE)
Determine school
need(CE,VE)
Measure adequacy

AYP math (total, by subgroup)

ASD-

SY2010

Measure adequacy

SY2009

Determine school need(CE)

SY2009

Determine school need(CE)

SY2009

Determine school need(CE)

SY2009

Determine school need(CE)

SY2010

Measure adequacy (academic)

SY2010

Measure adequacy (academic)

SY2010

Measure adequacy (academic)

SY2010

Measure adequacy (academic)

District Data
Overall funds
State funds
PA-Pact funds
Title I funds
School Data
Enrollment

Accountability
Accountability

% proficient reading (total, by
subgroup)

ASD-

% proficient math (total, by
subgroup)

ASD-

% below proficient
reading(total, by subgroup)

ASD-

% below proficient math (total,
by subgroup)

ASD-

% proficient reading (total, by
subgroup)

ASD-

% proficient math (total, by
subgroup)

ASD-

% below proficient reading
(total, by subgroup)

ASD-

% below proficient math (total,
by subgroup)

ASD-

% attendance

ASD-SIS

SY2010

% in-school and out-of-school
suspensions
Total operating budget

ASD-SIS

SY2010

ASDBudget
ASDBudget
ASDBudget
ASDBudget

SY2010

Measure adequacy (nonacademic)
Measure adequacy (nonacademic)
Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

Poverty spending
ELL spending
Special education spending

Accountability
Accountability
Accountability
Accountability
Accountability
Accountability
Accountability
Accountability
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Professional development
spending
Total teachers
Total paraprofessionals
Total administrators
Average teacher salary
Average class size
Average teaching experience

ASDBudget
ASD-Human
Resources
ASD-Human
Resources
ASD-Human
Resources

ASDBudget
ASD SIS
ASD-Human

% teachers < 3yrs of teaching
experience
Teacher evaluation (Sat/Unsat)

Resources
ASD-Human
Resources
ASD-Human
Resources

% of highly effective teachers

ASD-

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Measure HE, VE, and CE

SY2010

Look at variation in
student outcomes

SY2010

Look at variation in
student outcomes

Accountability

% of ineffective teachers
Teacher self-efficacy
Teacher collective efficacy
Student Data
AYP reading

ASDAccountability
ASD-Stud
services
ASD-Stud
services

ASDAccountability

AYP math

ASDAccountability

Additional information was amassed in interviews with key stakeholders, including
central office administrators, building administrators, and School Board members. The
following chapter provides greater detail on qualitative and quantitative methods.
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CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY
This case study employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to examine
intra-district resource allocation. This research was composed of three stages: the first
stage entailed the development of an equity framework to serve as the theoretical basis
for analysis of district practices with regard to the distribution of resources among its
schools. The second stage, described in greater detail in this chapter, involves the use of
a variety of tools (i.e., statistical analysis, in-depth interviews) to examine the current
practice of one mid-size, urban, school district. Finally, using district data, a simulation
is conducted whereby alternative practices for the distribution of resources are tested.
The Case Study
The case study method allows for thorough examination of a single entity: in
this instance, the Allentown School District (ASD) (Merriam, 1998). This approach
lends itself to a deep understanding of intradistrict resource allocation, including the
rationale(s) behind procedures and methods utilized to disburse funds and human
capital across schools. While not considered to be statistically generalizable, a case
study can offer analytic generalization, given an appropriately developed study design
as offered in this research (Yin, 2004). Furthermore, information obtained from
interviews with key stakeholders as well as financial data, enrollment data, and student
outcomes data, provides for a robust analysis (Yin, 2003).
Site Selection. I chose ASD because of its participation in the University of
Pennsylvania - Institute of Education Sciences (IES) Pre-doctoral Program. ASD
maintains a collaborative relationship with the University of Pennsylvania such that

120
fellows intern in the Superintendent’s office, provide research support to the district,
and are given access to data in order to conduct evaluations leading to improved student
outcomes. Given my interest in school finance and district policy, I had the opportunity
to fulfill my IES Pre-doctoral Fellowship requirements in Allentown during the 20102011 school year.
The Allentown School District provides an excellent source of data for
investigating resource allocation and equity. First, as a mid-sized, urban school district,
ASD is similar in size and composition to many other districts. In 2008-2009, 366 out
of 13,365 school districts in the U.S. had between 8,000 and 35,000 students and were
classified as being in an urbanized area. This represents 13.2% of all students (National
Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data: School Year 2008-2009).
Further investigation reveals that 200 of these school districts have greater than 40% of
its population reporting as African American and Hispanic (National Center for
Education Statistics, Common Core of Data: School Year 2008-2009). To date, a great
deal of research has focused on very large school districts. For example, of the
published research that investigates resource allocation by studying single districts, the
earliest published study on intradistrict resource allocation used data from Philadelphia
(Summers and Wolfe, 1976); Rubenstein (1998) did an analysis of intradistrict resource
allocation in Chicago; and six major studies look only at resource allocation in New
York City (Berne & Stiefel, 1994; Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, Rockoff, and Wyckoff, 2007;
Iatarola & Rubenstein, 2007; Iatarola and Stiefel, 2003; Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff,
2002; and Schwartz, Stiefel, and Rubenstein, 2008). My literature review revealed only
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one study that focused on mid-sized districts (Miller and Rubenstein, 2008). Given the
large number of similarly situated districts, examining a mid-size urban district offers
the potential of adding new information to existing literature. Second, the smaller size
of the district makes it possible for thorough assessment in a manageable time period.
Additionally, while ASD is considerably smaller than other districts studied, it
shares many other characteristics with these districts, including a diverse population
with a high percentage of students in poverty. This variation in the socio-economic and
racial composition of the schools allows for an in-depth analysis of differential resource
allocation. And although it is only mid-sized, the district is large enough to make
inferences about the association between allocation patterns and student characteristics.
Research Questions
As stated in the introduction, this study will address the following research
questions:
1. How are resources allocated among schools?
2. What is the rationale for resource allocation patterns among schools?
3. Using a comprehensive equity framework which encompasses adequacy and
vertical equity, what are the implications of resource allocation patterns?
4. What would be the financial impact of an alternative approach to resource
allocation aligned with the comprehensive equity framework?70
Resources. As this research is based on the evaluation of how various resources
are distributed among schools, I first describe these “inputs” in greater detail.
70

School-year 2009-2010 data is used answer these research questions.
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Resources considered include: overall expenditures (i.e., operating funds, poverty
spending, ELL spending, discretionary building funds, professional development
funds); expenditures related to human capital (i.e., total salaries, instruction salaries71,
instruction support and professional development salaries, leadership salaries,
operations and maintenance salaries, pupil services salaries); full time equivalents (i.e.,
students per staff, students per teacher, students per administrator, students per
paraprofessional) and class size; individual measures of teacher quality (i.e., teacher
salary72, teacher effectiveness73, teacher efficacy74, average years of teaching
experience, percentage of teachers with less than three years of experience, the
percentage of personnel with a masters degree or above); and school-wide measures of
teacher quality (i.e., growth index in reading75, growth index in math, collective
efficacy76). As stated earlier, my analysis focuses on the elementary and middle school
levels.

71

Instruction salaries are comprised of teacher compensation, aide compensation and substitute
compensation.
72
Average teacher salaries are reported in the following categories: all teachers; core teachers
(Elementary, English, Mathematics, Reading, Science, Social Studies); non-core teachers (Art, Music,
PE, French, German, Spanish, Business, Home Economics, Industrial Arts, Junior ROTC, Other); and,
special population teachers (ESOL, IST, Special Ed, Itinerant Gifted).
73
Teacher effectiveness measures rely on value-added scores calculated for the ASD by SAS EVAAS.
Low teacher effect represents the percentage of teachers in a school in the bottom two quintiles of teacher
effectiveness relative to other teachers in the district. High teacher effect represents the percentage of
teachers in a school in the top two quintiles of teacher effectiveness relative to other teachers in the
district.
74
Three categories of teacher efficacy are considered: classroom management, student engagement, and
instructional strategies.
75
Growth indices are provided by the state in their efforts to determine the “value-add” for each school
to student learning.
76
Collective efficacy is calculated by taking the average of all teacher collective efficacy scores in each
building.
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Question #1. How are resources allocated among schools? My first research
question seeks to understand the current resource allocation pattern and how this
impacts the variation of resources among schools. To answer this question I use
descriptive statistics along with graphs to represent the variations in resources among
schools. Univariate measures of dispersion quantify relationships between inputs and
demonstrate how they are distributed among students. At this point, the composition of
the student body of each school is not taken into account, just the size. To provide
additional context as to the variation among schools in terms of student achievement, I
offer a measure of equivalent outcomes to describe what portion of student test scores
are a result of being from a particular school as opposed to other inputs.
Question #2. What is the rationale for resource allocation patterns among
schools? To answer this question, key informants were interviewed. Using purposive
sampling, as described below, eleven interviewees were chosen based on their
knowledge of resource allocation strategies in the district and/or their role in impacting
these decisions. Open-ended questions were posed to elicit detailed information on the
budget process and the specific procedures in place which account for the disbursal of
funds across schools.
Question #3. Using a comprehensive equity framework which encompasses
adequacy and vertical equity, what are the implications of resource allocation
patterns? My third research question analyzes resource allocation patterns in terms of
the equity framework established earlier in this paper. Vertical equity, equal
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opportunity and adequacy are examined using statistical techniques to test relationships
among resources, student characteristics, and student outcomes.
Question #4. What would be the financial impact of an alternative
approach to resource allocation aligned with the comprehensive equity
framework? My fourth and final research question is designed to test an alternative
approach to resource allocation. I conduct two simulations to test scenarios in which
first vertical equity, and then comprehensive equity, are sought. Modeling vertically
equitable resource allocation relies on weights included in Pennsylvania’s basic
education formula and modeling comprehensive equitable resource allocation relies on
weights included in Pennsylvania’s basic education formula plus weights used to
compensate for prior performance. Results are compared with the 2009-2010 allocation
of resources in ASD.
Qualitative Research
Qualitative research methods, composed of key informant interviews, are used
to tackle research question two: What is the rationale for resource allocation patterns
among schools? This question seeks to understand the motivations for decision-making
at the district level.
Sampling. I conducted eleven interviews with administrators in the ASD,
identified through purposive sampling. According to Patton (2002), purposive sampling
is a powerful sampling method for qualitative research if it is used to select
information-rich cases, “from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central
importance to the purpose of the inquiry,… yield[ing] insights and in-depth
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understanding rather than empirical generalizations” (p. 230). Those interviewed
include: School Board President, Deputy Superintendent, Chief Financial Officer,
Executive Director of Planning and External Funding, Executive Director of
Elementary Education, Director of Special Education, Director of Language
Acquisition, and four building principals. Speaking with administrators serving in a
variety of roles in the district serves to triangulate the information attained. A sample
size of eleven provides ample coverage given the intent of the study (Merriam, 1998).
Interview Strategies and Protocol. I developed guiding interview questions
for key informant interviews using interview strategies recommended by Patton (2002).
Such strategies include carefully avoiding dichotomous questions which can result in
short answers which interrupt the flow of the interview, and asking one question at a
time to allow the respondents to answer all questions fully so that information is more
likely to be consistent across interviews. Guiding interview questions include possible
probes with many questions to be pursued if additional clarification is needed.
Additionally, during the interview process I conveyed professionalism, developed
rapport with the respondents, and, when necessary, redirected subjects who veered off
topic or focused for too long on a particular topic (Merriam, 1998).
Yin (2003) explains that using a case study protocol and following similar
procedures for all interactions ensures reliability of data in qualitative research. Using
consistent and well-documented data collection procedures helps to minimize bias and
ensure that information collected is accurate. To ensure reliability, I developed a
detailed interview protocol for key informant interviews, which includes the specific

126
questions and probes covered in the interviews and procedures for the interview. For
example, I skipped around the interview question topics to follow subjects that
naturally came up in the interviews, rather than sticking rigidly to a particular topic or
order, to enhance the flow of the interview. As I was the only data collector, lack of
reliability due to multiple interviewers was not an issue. The interview protocol is
included in Appendix C.
Analysis Methods. All interviews have been digitally recorded and transcribed
to ensure preservation of the discussions for analysis (Merriam, 1998). Following
transcription, I wrote up reports of each interview, summarizing key points and
recording my insights (Yin, 2003). The reports followed a specific template and
included details of the budget process, perceived motivations for actions, and other
issues raised by the respondents. I devised a coding matrix to indicate how each
informant understood the process whereby funds are allocated to various schools and
programs (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Prior to conducting interviews with identified key informants, I conducted a
pilot with an alternative ASD administrator to test the interview protocol. Based on this
pilot, slight modifications were made to ensure the validity of the instrument. Each
interview lasted approximately one hour. Interviews were conducted over a span of six
weeks during June and July 2011.
Quantitative Research
I have used quantitative research methods to tackle research questions one, three
and four. I assigned measures to the various conceptions of equity outlined in Chapter
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II: horizontal equity, equivalent outcomes, vertical equity, and adequacy. I also used a
measure of horizontal equity post vertical equity to illustrate the variation in resources
among schools after accounting for student need. Lastly, I measured comprehensive
equity, my own approach to a socially just representation of equity.
Horizontal Equity. Horizontal equity statistics are used to describe the
district’s allocation of resources in school year 2009-2010. Horizontal equity statistics
are univariate measures of dispersion which quantify relationships between inputs and
demonstrate how they are distributed among students. These measures include range,
coefficient of variation and the McCloone Index. The coefficient of variation is
calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean of all observations. A finding
of zero (0) indicates that perfect horizontal equity is achieved. Odden and Picus (2008)
define the standard as being 0.1. The McLoone Index is calculated by determining the
ratio of the sum of the values of all observations below the median to the sum of these
observations if they all had the value of the median. A finding of one (1) indicates that
perfect horizontal equity is achieved. Odden and Picus (2008) define the standard as
being 0.95. (0.7 - 0.9 are often found in districts.)
Equivalent Outcomes. Equivalent Outcomes (EO) are achieved if resources are
allocated to students such that their outcomes are equivalent. (As described above, this
notion of equity is theoretically and practically difficult, as it neither ensures a
minimum level of achievement nor accounts for differences in student motivation,
ability, etc. However, it does provide necessary information to evaluate equity.)
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Measure of EO: The Interclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) represents the
proportion of the variance in outcomes between schools. The ICC is derived from the
unconditional 2-level model, which allows the total variation in outcome to be clearly
divided between variation over students and variance on a school level (Raudenbush &
Bryk, 2002).
The Intercept Only (Unconditional Model):
Level 1 (student): Yij = 0j + ij, ij ~ N(0,2)
Level 2 (school): 0j = 00 + 0j, 0j ~ N(0,00)
Combined: Yij = 00 + 0j + ij
Yij = student outcome measure for student i in school j (PSSA
scores will be used as a proxy for proficiency)
0j = mean student outcome for each school
ij = the residual for student i in school j
00 = mean student outcome across schools (i.e., grand mean)
0j = the residual for the 0j equation (representing the difference
between 0j and 00
Interclass Correlation:
 = 00 / (00 + 2)
2 = total variance in outcomes within school that can be
explained by a level-1 model
00 = total explainable variation at level-2 (schools)
Vertical Equity. Vertical Equity is achieved if resources are allocated to
students based on their differing needs. To measure vertical equity in my study, I have
developed a construct with one variable to represent the four variables which the State
uses to determine appropriate weights for funding schools: English language learner
status, economic disadvantage, and special education, and gifted education.77 This is
consistent with my quest to measure overall equity, rather than equity specifically

77

The state had deemed it worthy to provide additional resources through the state funding formula to
districts with students who fall into these categories as researchers have found that these students are
more likely to require additional resources to achieve at proficient levels (Hannaway, 2005).
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related to certain subgroups of students. Given that I have the student composition of
each school, I created a new variable to represent need due to various student
characteristics. The new variable, “NEEDVE,” is derived at each school as follows:
NEEDVE i = {[Enrollmenti + (State’s Weight for ELL students * number of ELL
students i) + (State’s Weight for economically disadvantaged students * number
of economically disadvantaged students i) + (State’s Weight for special
education students * number of special education students i) + (State’s Weight
for gifted education students * number of gifted education students i)] /
Enrollmenti}
NEEDVE in the ith school is a “per student” measure to allow for consistent scaling.78 79
The following weights, based on Pennsylvania’s Costing-Out Study, are used in this
formula:
Table 6. Value or Formula for Factor Related to Student-Based Need
Student-Based Need
Special Education
Poverty
English-Language
Learners
Gifted

Value or Formula for Factor
1.30 x all students enrolled in special
education programs
0.43 x number of students eligible for
free/ reduced-price lunch
1.4978 x number of ELL students
0.2052 x number of gifted students

My aim in measuring vertical equity is to understand the relationship between inputs
and need. I consider a range of financial inputs in this analysis as well as human capital
inputs. (These resources are described earlier in this chapter.) I also consider the
78

This variable will also account for school size, to address cost differences due to economies of scale.
The weights used in this formula are the exact weights used by the state of Pennsylvania in its funding
formula to districts.
79
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relationship between poverty expenditures and the number of students in poverty, ELL
expenditures and the number of ELL students, and special education expenditures and
the number of special education students. Lastly, I consider the allocation among
schools of specific funding streams such as Title I.
The measure I use for vertical equity is the correlation coefficient which
represents the relationship between school need (as defined above) and various school
resources (i.e., per-pupil operating costs, per-pupil school salaries, average teacher
salary, percentage of teachers with less than 3 years experience, percentage of
personnel with masters or above, students per teacher, percentage of teachers in bottom
2 quintiles of effectiveness as measured by PVAAS, percentage of teachers in top 2
quintiles of effectiveness as measured by PVAAS, school effectiveness as measured by
PVAAS, measures of teacher efficacy).
Horizontal equity post vertical equity. Horizontal equity post vertical equity
is a measure I use to describe the unexplained variance after vertical equity is taken into
account. This measure can be used to illustrate the variation in resources (e.g., per-pupil
expenditures, human capital inputs) among schools after accounting for student need as
defined by the State. Horizontal Equity post Vertical Equity (HEVE) is achieved if there
is no variation in resources (e.g., per-pupil expenditures, human capital inputs) among
schools after accounting for student need. The definition follows:
HEVE = (1 - R2) x 100%


HEVE = horizontal equity and R2 = coefficient of determination. If R2
decreases, horizontal equity worsens, as there is more unexplained
variability in the funding of schools. Likewise, if R2 increases, overall
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horizontal equity improves, as there is less unexplained variability in the
funding of schools. Using the equation above, when HE = 0% then
horizontal equity has been achieved (See Toutkoushian and Michael,
2007).


The R2 is derived from the regression equation, Yi = b0 + b1 NEED + ei ,
where Y is the input (resources) per student in the ith school; b0
represents the estimated intercept; NEED represents a measure of need
within the student body of the school; and b1 represents how funding is
weighted according to the student NEED.

Toutkoushian and Michael (2009) use this approach to identify discrepancies of
resource allocation among similarly situated students. (This assumes that weights
included to test vertical equity encompass all differences among students that are tied to
higher costs.)
Adequacy. Adequacy is achieved if resources are allocated to students so that
all students attain a certain similar goal such as proficiency on assessments. Measuring
adequacy only requires looking at outcomes. If we are interested in district level
adequacy or school level adequacy, we can look at the portion of students who test as
proficient on an assessment.80

80

Odden and Picus (2008) have proposed an “educational adequacy” statistic, the Odden-Picus
Adequacy Index (OPAI) (p.76). This statistic, however, is more aptly expressed as a measure of adequate
funding. The OPAI measures how far a school finance system is from achieving adequate funding. It is
similar to the McLoone Index used to measure horizontal equity, but uses an “adequate” spending level
rather than the median (Odden & Picus, 2008; Rubenstein, Ballab, Stiefel, & Schwarz, 2008). The OPAI
takes into account the needs of schools not achieving adequacy and provides a ratio representing the
portion of need met. It adds to this the portion of schools, or school systems, meeting adequacy. The end
result is a measure that indicates how close the entire system is to providing an adequate level of funding
for all schools. An OPAI of 100 indicates that all schools were spending at or above the adequacy
benchmark. As no schools in ASD are adequately funded (using the adequacy benchmark determined in
Pennsylvania’s costing-out study prepared by Augenblick, Palaich and Associates), in ASD the OPAI is
a ratio of the total spending in the district to the total funds necessary to achieve adequacy. My
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Relative Adequacy (or Relative Adequacy Deficit). Given my desire to look at
the variation among schools, I needed a measure of the relative adequacy of schools in
Allentown. I use the variable “distance from proficiency” (1 - % proficient or above) to
represent the adequacy deficit in each school. The disparities among schools’ adequacy
deficit tells us how the district is doing in terms of equivalent outcomes – but the goal is
a specific outcome, or standard, which the state has determined that all students should
meet.
A simple way to express these disparities is with the coefficient of variation
(CV) statistic. The CV is calculated by taking the square root of the variance of the
adequacy deficit divided by the mean adequacy deficit. The CV describes the
dispersion of the variable or, in this case, the dispersion of the adequacy deficit in the
district by school. As the CV increases, the dispersion of the variable is greater
(Rubenstein et. al., 2008).
Comprehensive Equity. Comprehensive Equity is the final construct used to
evaluate equity in the Allentown School District. Comprehensive Equity is achieved if
resources are allocated to students based on their differing needs. The measure used to
test comprehensive equity is methodologically similar to the vertical equity measure.
The difference is in the definition of student need. In addition to the four categories of
students (ELL students, economically disadvantaged students, and special education,
and gifted education students) given weights in the Needs Index, additional weights are

simulation, which will specify the gaps between spending and adequacy, is consistent to this approach to
measuring adequate funding.
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given to students based on prior performance. The new variable, “NEEDCE,” is derived
at each school as follows:
NEEDCE i = {[Enrollmenti + (State’s Weight for ELL students * number of ELL
students i) + (State’s Weight for economically disadvantaged students * number
of economically disadvantaged students i) + (State’s Weight for special
education students * number of special education students i) + (State’s Weight
for gifted education students * number of gifted education students i)+(Weight
for percentage of students scoring “basic” on PSSA* number of students scoring
“basic” on PSSA)+(Weight for percentage of students scoring “below basic” on
PSSA* number of students scoring “below basic” on PSSA)] / Enrollmenti}
NEEDCE in the ith school is a “per student” measure to allow for consistent scaling.81, 82
The following weights, based on Pennsylvania’s Costing-Out Study and New York
City’s weighted funding formula for schools, are used in this formula:
Table 7. Value or Formula for Factor Related to Student-Based Need
Student-Based Need
Special Education
Poverty
English-Language
Learners
Poor Prior
Performance–
“basic”
Poor Prior
Performance–
“below basic”
81

Value or Formula for Factor
1.30 x all students enrolled in special
education programs
0.43 x number of students eligible for
free/ reduced-price lunch
1.4978 x number of ELL students
0.35 x number of students scoring “basic”
on PSSA
0.50 x number of students scoring “below
basic” on PSSA

This variable will also account for school size, to address cost differences due to economies of scale.
The weights used in this formula are the exact weights used by the state of Pennsylvania in its funding
formula to districts.
82
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As with my vertical equity measure, in measuring comprehensive equity I evaluate the
relationship between inputs and need. I consider a range of financial inputs in this
analysis as well as human capital inputs.
The measure I use for comprehensive equity is the correlation coefficient. The
correlation coefficient represents the relationship between school need (as defined
above) and various school resources (i.e., per-pupil operating costs, per-pupil school
salaries, average teacher salary, percentage of teachers with less than 3 years
experience, percentage of personnel with masters or above, students per teacher,
percentage of teachers in bottom 2 quintiles of effectiveness as measured by PVAAS,
percentage of teachers in top 2 quintiles of effectiveness as measured by PVAAS,
school effectiveness as measured by PVAAS, measures of teacher efficacy).
Constructions of School Budgets. The analyses of horizontal equity, vertical
equity, and comprehensive equity rely on an accounting of resources within each
school. In order to have a complete picture of the variation among schools’ financial
resources, I constructed individual school budgets based on operating costs encumbered
in school year 2009-2010. These school budgets include funds from federal, state, and
local revenues (i.e., Title I, IDEA, Title III) but exclude capital expenses and other debt
services. Constructing school budgets required two steps: tracking all expenditure data
by building code in order to determine spending at each school83; and, tracking items
which had been allocated to the central office but were servicing individual schools, or
addressing individual school needs, back to these schools.
83

The financial analysis provided by Cross & Joftus, Inc. included a review of expenditures by school.
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Figure 5 presents a view of the district’s expenditures for school year 20092010 broken out by central and school-reported expenditures.84 While the numbers
differ from those provided in my school level analyses because they include ASD high
schools and alternative schools in ASD schools, the presentation makes it clear that
almost half of all dollars spent in the school district are budgeted centrally, and over
half of those funds are estimated as being spent at schools. Without further
investigation, it is not possible to know the true dollars being spent at each school.

ASD Schools,
$109.4M, 51%

Central Office,
$14.7M, 7%

Estimated
spending at
Schools from
Central, $55.3M,
26%

Debt Service
and Payments
to Non-ASD
Schools,
$33.3M,
16%

Figure 5. ASD Central and School-Related Expenditures (Total $212.6m),
SY2009-2010
Source. Allentown SD, Revenue and Expenditure File, FY09-10 YTD Activity, Cross
& Joftus, Inc.
84

The portion allotted to schools includes high schools and alternative schools in addition to elementary
and middle schools.
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Through an analysis of the central budget, I am able to allocate additional dollars to
each school. Appendix B provides a table of specific revenues that fund programs in
schools. Program area directors worked with me to allocate total dollars to various
schools. Thus, operating funds are a mix of dollars coded to schools and dollars coded
centrally.85
In addition to an adjustment to the operating budget, I adjusted school budgets
for poverty and ELL spending, to include spending which had not been coded at the
school level though funds were flowing through to schools and supporting children at
schools. Poverty spending at the school includes school dollars spent on poverty,
including Title I, as well as centrally budgeted Title I dollars and centrally budgeted
Student Services dollars tied to specific state and federal grants (e.g., Safe Schools/
Healthy Students). ELL spending includes school dollars spent on poverty and Title III
funds that are budgeted centrally.
Simulation. The final piece of my analysis is a simulation to answer the
research question: What would be the financial impact of an alternative approach to
resource allocation aligned with the comprehensive equity framework? To conduct this
simulation, I model two potential changes to the district’s resource allocation policies.
The first policy change entails a systematic distribution of resources similar to that of
the State - and is consistent with the vertical equity model. Specifically, weights are
assigned to students according to the identified needs (i.e., low income, ELL), similar
to the new State funding formula. The second policy change entails a systematic
85

I do not have information on salaries or positions broken out for the centrally coded dollars.
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distribution of resources like that of the State, but with the addition of assigning
weights to students based on their prior performance on State assessments.
I describe the impacts of the new resource allocation policies at the school level
– identifying the schools that would gain resources and the schools that would lose
resources. Unfortunately, I am unable to model the potential impact of a change in
resource allocation policies to the district’s ability to achieve adequacy.
Data Constraints. Although the data amassed from the district and the state,
and the methods employed to analyze this data, are helpful in evaluating resource
allocation among schools, there are a number of ways in which the data and methods
used in this study are insufficient. These include the sample size of the district in which
I conducted my analysis, lack of data on students within schools, and lack of data on
human capital resources.
Due to the small number of schools in the Allentown School District, it is not
possible to conduct the type of analysis most commonly used in the evaluation of
vertical equity in larger districts, whereby the impact of individual student needs (e.g.,
poverty, ELL status, and special education status) can be considered separately as
coefficients in a multiple regression equation. Because of this, as described earlier in
this chapter, I calculate an index of need to evaluate the relationship between resource
allocation and school need. This provides a useful measure of overall school need, but
it does not allow for a disaggregation of particular needs. A related concern, tied to the
use of a needs index in the context of ASD, is that there is not enough variation among
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the school need to identify strong relationships between resource allocation and school
need.
Another constraint on my data is that the information I have about individual
students within schools is very broad. This is true for both student need and student
outcomes. First, my analysis would be enhanced if I could better understand student
need. A prime example of this is my data on school poverty. I use free and reduced
price lunch status as a proxy for poverty. This measure does not necessarily capture the
range of disadvantages (e.g., poor health care, less educated parents) related to low
family income.86 I have no detail on the range of needs and associated costs of special
education students, making special education another area of data deficiency. While I
was able to acquire data on the intensity of need of special education students at the
district level, I did not acquire this information at the school level. I also lack sufficient
indicators of student outcomes. My analysis would be greatly enhanced if I had
stronger measures of academic achievement, beyond PSSA scores, and better measures
of positive outcomes for students, beyond attendance and suspensions.
Additional data on human capital resources would also inform this study, but
are not readily available. Better data on teachers’ impact on students would be
extremely useful.87 Unfortunately, my teacher level value-added measures only capture
a portion of the teachers in any school. Therefore, this measure should be considered
with caution. Another useful measure which is not readily available would be a

86

There is little variation among schools in terms of the percentage of students in free and reduced price
lunch status that receive a reduced price lunch.
87
This could take numerous forms, such as an in depth review of student work.
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measure of principal effectiveness beyond the school-wide growth index. One final
measure of teacher effectiveness that is missing from this analysis is a student review of
teacher quality.88
Although enhanced data would make for a more robust analysis, the findings I
present in the following chapter are compelling, and provide a template for school
districts to use in considering how various financial and human capital resources are
distributed among schools and students.

88

The Student Perceptions of Teacher Effectiveness (SPTE) survey, developed by Ronald Ferguson of
the Civil Rights Project, has been shown to be highly correlated with teacher value-added scores
(Ferguson, 2010).
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CHAPTER 5 – DISTRICT CONTEXT AND QUALITATIVE FINDINGS
Overview
I begin this chapter by describing the Allentown School District to provide
context to the description and analysis of resource allocation. Overall findings present a
complicated picture within the district and it is helpful to understand how this
complexity fits into the larger landscape. I first identify how Allentown struggles due to
financial and societal disadvantages and how the school district has changed over the
last decade. This is followed by a review of the structure of ASD’s budget, including
funding sources and expenditures. I complete this section with an explanation of
resource allocations in the 2009-2010 school year which relies on an analysis of
horizontal equity statistics to describe the variability among schools. The second
section of is chapter relies on qualitative findings to examine how the budgeting
process and resulting resource allocations are perceived by district and school
administrators.
Context
The Allentown School District Has Great Needs. While the Allentown school
district has numerous strengths (e.g., diversity, committed staff), it struggles with
challenges that inhibit successful outcomes for children. The district is significantly
underfunded as a result of the State’s funding structure, which relies heavily on local
support. The map below indicates that Allentown stands out as a distressed area in the
state.
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Figure 6. Regional Analysis of Need
Source: Education Needs Index89
The Educational Needs Index (ENI) identifies the regions in a state that are
undereducated, facing economic challenges, and facing robust population growth and
shifting demographics in categories of youth, young adults, or at-risk minority groups.
Allentown stands out as “most critical.” Poverty indicators support this label.90

89

The ENI project is a joint initiative of the Tennessee Higher Education Commission, the Oklahoma
State Regents for Higher Education, the West Virginia Higher Education Policy Commission, the
National Center for Higher Education Management Systems, and Austin Peay State University.
90
The Educational Needs Index (ENI) is a regional-level study of educational, economic, and population
pressures that influence educational policy and planning at local, regional, and state levels. Regional
indices are based on data from the US Census Bureau’s 2005 Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs).
Three factors make up the ENI: education (i.e., percent 18-64 year olds with a high school diploma,
percent 25-64 year olds with an associate’s degree, percent 25-64 year olds with a bachelor’s degree or
higher, difference in college attainment between young (25-35) and older (45-64)); economy (i.e.,
unemployment rate, percent of population under 65 in poverty, median family income, per capita income,
and percent employment in manufacturing and extractions industries); and, population (i.e., percent of
population ages 0 to 19, percent of population ages 20 to 44, rate of population growth 64 and under,
percent at-risk minority).
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Table 8. Poverty Level, SY2005
Allentown
Percent of population under
65 at or below poverty
24.0
level (2005)
Source: Educational Needs Index

Pennsylvania

National

16.9

18.5

Poverty may be tied to employment prospects for Allentown residents, which are, in
turn, influenced by the education level of the population. Relative to the state and
nation, Allentown has a less educated and less skilled workforce.

Table 9. College Attainment, SY2005
Percent of 18 to 64 year
olds with a High School
Diploma (2005)
Percent of 25 to 64 year
olds with an Associate’s
Degree (2005)
Percent of 25 to 64 year
olds with a Bachelor’s
Degree (2005)

Allentown

Pennsylvania

National

77.3

89.5

85.8

7.4

8.2

8.2

17.4

28.5

28.6

Prospects for college attainment are constrained by high school graduation rates.
ASD’s graduation rate is lower than both state and national averages. To compound
this, of those students who graduate high school, a smaller percentage of students from
the ASD than from neighboring districts plan to further their education.
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Table 10. Graduation Rate (SY2008) and Percent of Students Planning to Further
their Education (SY2007, SY2010)
Graduation Rate91 (2008)
Percent of students
planning to further
their education (2007,
2010)

Allentown
59.2

39.4

Pennsylvania
77.7

National
71.7

68.3

75.0*

Source: Ed Week Diplomas Count 2011; Pennsylvania Department of Education; The
MetLife Survey of the American Teacher, 2010
Note. The percent of students planning to further their education reported for the nation is based on the
2010 MetLife Survey. Numbers for Allentown and Pennsylvania are provided for 2007 by the
Pennsylvania Department of Education.

Change over time. ASD has changed along with the demographics of the local
community, and a reduced tax base from which to raise school revenues has influenced
the district’s transformation. This section describes how aspects of the entire district
have adjusted over the past ten years.
Demographic changes. The profile of the Allentown School District has
changed immensely in the past 20 years, increasing in both poverty and racial/language
diversity. For example, between 1990 and 2008, there was a 9.2% increase in the
number of renter-occupied units and a 13.4% decrease in the number of owneroccupied units in the ASD catchment area. There was a parallel shift in the population
of the student body: in 2004, 71% of students were at, or below, the poverty level. The
number has increased to 85% in 2009.

91

The Cumulative Promotion Index (CPI) method is used to calculate graduation rates. CPI 2008 = (10th
gradersfall2008/9th gradersfall2007 x 11th gradersfall2008/10th gradersfall2007 x 12th gradersfall2008/11th gradersfall2007
x Diploma recipientsspring2008/12th gradersfall2007
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Table 11. Change in Population in Renter-Occupied Units, 1990-2008
Percent of Households in
Renter-Occupied Units
Renter-Occupied Units
Owner-Occupied Units

1990

2000

2008

43%
18,545
24,230

47%
19,748
22,284

49%
20,248
20,973

Source: U.S. Census

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Percent of Students Free Lunch Eligible
Percent of Students Reduced-Price Lunch Eligible

Figure 7. Changes in Poverty: Percentage of Students in the ASD Eligible for Free
and Reduced-Price Lunch, SY2002-2010
Source: PDE: National School Lunch Program. Retrieved from
http://www.education.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_6_2_121936_7487
_509210_43/

In the past four years, the special education population has remained relatively
flat, between 14 and 15%.92 However, in the 1999-2000 school year, the percentage of
students identified as need special education services was 10.7%.93 There has been a

92
93

Historical data is not available for most years.
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Education Report, Finances_SEF9900.
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34% increase in the percentage of special education students served in the ASD
between school year 2000 and 2010.
Table 12. Special Education in ASD, SY2008-2011

2007-2008
2008-2009
2009-2010
2010-2011

# of
special
education
students
2,562
2,524
2,545
2,581

% of all
students
identified
as
requiring
special
educ.
services
14.3%
14.2%
14.3%
14.8%

% of
special
educ.
students
diagnosed
with Autism
5.0%
6.3%
6.8%
7.9%

% of
special
educ.
students
diagnosed
with a
learning
disability
57.6%
56.9%
55.8%
55.4%

Source. PDE: Pennsylvania State Data Center; Special Education Data Report School
Years 2007-2008, 2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2010-2011 (Retrieved from
http://penndata.hbg.psu.edu/BSEReports/Data%20Preview/2010_2011/PDF_Document
s/Speced_Quick_Report_SD392_Final.pdf)
Enrollment. The size of the district has changed along with the demographic
profile. In the 2001-2002 school year, enrollment was just over 16,000 students. It
reached a peak five years later with over 18,000 students and, as of the 2009-2010
school year, was approximately 17,500 students.
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ASD Student Enrollment
18,500
18,000
17,500
17,000
16,500
16,000
15,500
15,000

Figure 8. ASD Student Enrollment, SY2002-2010
Source. ASD Enrollment Report
Changes in human capital. The number of professional personnel in the district
also increased. This is largely driven by the increase in classroom teachers. State
reports indicate that the number of students per classroom teacher has decreased from
18.8 in 2001-2002 to 15.7 in 2009-2010.
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Full-time Professional Personnel
1,600
1,400
1,200

1,411

1,438

2008-2009

2009-2010

1,292
1,153

1,165

1,154

2004-2005

2005-2006

2006-2007

1,000
800
600
400
200
2007-2008

Figure 9. ASD Professional Personnel, SY2005-2010
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Education – Professional Personnel Summary of
Public Schools.
Note. Professional personnel include administrators, classroom teachers, coordinators, and others, as
reported by district to the state. Breakdown of personnel is provided for SY2007-2008-2009-2010: in
SY2007-2008, 72% of full-time professional personnel were classroom teachers; in SY2008-2009, 79%
of full-time professional personnel were classroom teachers; and, in SY2008-2009, 77% of full-time
professional personnel were classroom teachers.
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Total FTE Teachers
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Figure 10. ASD Total Full-Time Equivalent Teachers, SY2000-2010
Source. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics,
Common Core of Data (CCD), Local Education Agency Finance Survey (F-33), FY
2007, Version 1a., U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey (2005,
2006, 2007, and 2008).

Teacher average salary has also increased between 2004-2005 and 2009-2010.
The increase in number of staff in the 2007-2008 year included the addition of less
experienced (and less-paid) teachers, resulting in a lower average salary for the district
for a short time.
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Average Years of Experience
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Figure 11. ASD Average Years of Teacher Experience, SY2005-2010
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Education – Professional Personnel Summary of
Public Schools.

Average Salary
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Figure 12. ASD Average Salary for Professional Personnel, SY2005-2010
Source. Pennsylvania Department of Education – Professional Personnel Summary of
Public Schools.

150
Student outcomes. The data available on student outcomes is limited, but
information on proficiency in math and reading (as measured by student test scores on
the PSSA’s) and graduation rates, provide some insight as to how students in the
district have fared over the past ten years.
PSSA Results (District-Wide)

Percent Proficient and Above (Math)
80

(Math)

70
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50
40
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20
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Grade 8

2008

2009

2010

Grade 11

Figure 13. Percent Proficient and Above on PSSA (Mathematics), SY2001-2010
Source. Pennsylvania Department of Education – District Report Cards.
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Figure 14. Percent Proficient and Above on PSSA (Reading), SY2002-2010
Source. Pennsylvania Department of Education – District Report Cards.

2010
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Graduation Rates
ASD Graduation Rates
75%
70%
65%
60%
55%
50%
45%
40%

Allen High School

Dieruff High School

District

Figure 15. ASD Graduation Rates, SY2002-2009
Source. Pennsylvania Department of Education – District Report Cards.
As seen in the previous figures, test scores and graduation rates have improved
overall, but at the district level ASD still struggles to make adequate yearly progress.
As targets have risen, Allentown’s designation as a failing district has held since 20062007.
Table 13. District Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) Status, SY2003-2010
YEAR
2009-2010
2008-2009
2007-2008
2006-2007
2005-2006
2004-2005
2003-2004
2002-2003

District AYP Status
Corrective Action 2(third year)
Corrective Action 2(second year)
Corrective Action 2(first year)
Corrective Action 1
Making Progress
School Improvement 2
School Improvement 1
Warning
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ASD budget. This section provides an overview of the ASD budget. I begin
with a review of expenditures and revenues. I then briefly describe the budgeting
process for school year 2009-2010 based on document analysis and information from
my interviews with the district’s Chief Financial Officer and the Executive Director of
Planning and External Funding. I focus on the resource allocation process in 2009-2010
so that my qualitative and quantitative data analysis is consistent. This is followed with
a review of the funding gap between the district’s financial resources and the resources
it would need to prepare all students to meet proficiency standards according to the
State’s analysis.
Expenditures. As seen earlier in this chapter, there have been increases in
personnel and average salaries over the past decade. Taken together, these changes
explain the rise in personnel services expenditures over time. As funding for personnel
has increased, so have the district’s total expenditures. Figure 16 indicates an overall
increase of 175%, with non-instructional expenses growing at an even faster rate (214%
total increase) than instructional expenses (162% total increase).
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Figure 16. ASD Instructional and Non-Instructional Expenditures, SY2002-2010
Source. Pennsylvania Department of Education Reports: Finances AIE 9495-0910;
Finances AFR ExpDetail 0102-0910.
Note. As defined by PDE, Instruction includes all those activities dealing directly with the interaction
between teachers and students and related costs94, which can be directly attributed to a program of
instruction. Teaching may be provided for students in a school classroom, in another location such as a
home or hospital, and in other learning situations such as those involving co-curricular activities. It may
also be provided through some other approved medium such as television, radio, telephone and
correspondence. Included here are the activities of aides or classroom assistance of any type (clerks,
graders, teaching machines, etc.) that assist in the instructional process. Do not record administrative
instructional support costs here.

In 2001-2002, personnel services (salaries and benefits) made up 75% of the
entire district budget. This had decreased to 66% in 2009-2010. Interestingly, benefits,
made up 19% of the personnel services expenditures in 2001-2002, increased to 26% in
2006-2007 and 2007-2008, and moved back down to 23% in 2009-2010.

94

PDE describes related costs as including instructional expenditures for salaries, contracted services,
travel expenses, equipment rental, supplies, books, maintenance costs directly attributable to instructional
equipment and other expenses such as sabbatical leaves.
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Figure 17. ASD Salaries, Employee Benefits, and Non-Personnel Expenses,
SY2002-2010
Source. Pennsylvania Department of Education Report: Finances AFR ExpDetail 01020910.
Note. Non-personnel expenses include purchased professional and technical services, purchased property
services, supplies, property, other objects, and other uses of funds.

State allocations for special and gifted education services have also grown over
the last decade, with a 220% increase in expenditures from 2001-2002 to 2009-2010. In
2001-2001, special education expenditures made up approximately 12% of the budget.
In 2009-2010, special education expenditures crept up to 15% of the budget. Additional
local funds also contribute to special and gifted education expenditures.95

95

Local expenditures on special education expenditures are not reported – or readily available.
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State Special and Gifted Education Allocations
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Figure 18. ASD Special and Gifted Education Expenditures, SY2002-2010
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Education reports: Finances SEF0102; Finances
SEF0203; Finances SEF0304; Finances SEF0405; Finances SEF0506; Finances
SEF0607; Finances SEF0708; Finances SEF0809-0910-1011
Funding sources. Revenues to the district are a mix of local tax levy, and state
and federal grants and entitlements. For the 2009-2010 school year, the district raised
over $211 million in revenues: 35.6% in local revenues, 53.2% in state revenues, and
10.7% in federal revenues.96 Figure 19 below provides an overview of revenues to the
district between school year 2004-2005 and school year 2009-2010, divided by local,
state and federal dollars.

96

PDE website.
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ASD Revenues
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Figure 19. Local, State and Federal Revenues, SY2005-2010
Source: ASD Annual Financial Reports
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Figure 20. Percent of Total Revenues, by Source, SY2005-2010
Source: ASD Annual Financial Reports
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Local revenues have no requirements attached, and are referred to as general
fund dollars. State and federal revenues often do have requirements as to how grant
funds should be used. There are two types of grants: categorical grants or formuladriven grants, such as Federal Title I and Pennsylvania’s Accountability Block Grant,
to which the district is entitled to if they meet certain criteria (e.g., serving students
living in poverty) and fill out the applications correctly, and competitive grants for
which the district must compete (e.g., the Federal School Improvement Grant).
The district receives the greatest portion of its total budget from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (53.2% in SY2010). These funds are the result of
appropriations enacted by the Pennsylvania Legislature and signed into law by the
Governor. They include both subsidies and grants. The district saw a significant
increase in funds beginning in 2008-2009 as the result of a change in the State’s
funding formula providing additional state funds to under-funded districts. As a result
of this change, state allocations to school districts began being referred to as
“Accountability to Commonwealth Taxpayers” (ACT) funds. There was a 13.47%
increase in State funding for the Allentown School District in 2009-2010. Three major
programs come under the umbrella of PA-ACT funds: the state’s Basic Education Fund
(BEF) - the major allocation of state funds to districts; the Accountability Block Grant
(ABG); and, the Educational Assistance Program (EAP). The ABG program is
available to school districts to support “proven programs to improve educational
achievement of students” (PDE website). School districts may use the ABG funds for
pre-kindergarten, full-day kindergarten programs, and/or reduced class size in grades
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kindergarten through grade three. The EAP funds tutoring programs for at-risk students.
The Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE) oversees additional state funding of
programs for which school districts may be reimbursed.97
The state’s Basic Education Fund (BEF), a categorical grant tied to student
enrollment and student need, makes up the largest share of state revenue in the district
(76% of state revenues to ASD in SY2010). This revenue is designed to help districts
meet their adequacy and equity goals and its use, for the most part, is unrestricted. The
BEF allocation to ASD more than doubled between the 2003-2004 and 2010-2011
school years. While the annual increases began when Governor Rendell took office,
they grew at a larger rate beginning in the 2008-2009 school year, after the PA General
Assembly passed a state budget that increased all basic education funding by $275
million and included a new state funding formula based on the recommendations of the
PA legislature’s costing-out study.

97

These programs include: facilities improvement, transportation services, career and technical
instruction, health services, and migratory children.
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(includes stimulus dollars in 2009-2010 and 2010-2011)
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Figure 21. Basic Education Funding, SY2004-2010
Source: ASD Annual Financial Reports

Table 14. Basic Education Funds, SY2004-2011
Year
SY2004
SY2005
SY2006
SY2007
SY2008
SY2009
SY2010
SY2011

BEF
State
Funded
37,491,079
42,844,964
46,158,463
55,592,389
62,658,329
74,839,643
74,857,792
76,408,137

BEF
Stimulus
Funded
0
0
0
0
0
0
10,061,554
9,869,732

BEF
Total
Amount
37,491,079
42,844,964
46,158,463
55,592,389
62,658,329
74,839,643
84,919,346
86,277,869

BEF
Increase

% Incr.

5,353,885
3,313,499
9,433,926
7,065,940
12,181,314
10,079,703
1,358,523

14.28%
7.73%
20.44%
12.71%
19.44%
13.47%
1.60%

The Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE) places the following
restrictions on yearly increases in BEFs: at least 80% of funds must be dedicated to
newly created, eligible programs or to expand eligible programs that are already in
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existence in the school district. Also, districts such as Allentown, with schools in school
improvement and/or corrective action, must submit plans which spell out the intended
uses of all new state dollars. Table 15 lists all the areas in which districts could allocate
resources, and describes how the ASD spent their new ACT dollars in 2008-2009. A
review of spending initiatives of other large districts in the state (excluding
Philadelphia) revealed great variation in the choices districts made in allocating ACT
funds in terms of focus. Unlike Allentown, other districts invested more in literacy and
math coaching, intensive instruction for struggling students during the school day, and
early education. Districts were consistent, however, to the extent that much of the new
funding went to cover salaries and benefits.
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Table 15. ASD Allocation of PA-PACT Funds, SY2009
Allentown School District's Allocation of New State Funds:
(ACT Funded Initiatives: 2008-2009 ACT funding =$531 per pupil)
Evidence-based supports and
1.Assistant principals (elementary school)
one-time costs (20.0%)
2.Psychology interns
3.Technology and textbooks
Other educational support
services (3.3%)

1.Home school visitor
2.Psychologist
3.Parent coaches
4.Parent scholars
5.School health services chairperson

Full day kindergarten

1.Teachers

(5.6%)

2.Paraprofessionals
3.Supplies and materials
4.Off-site rental

High school reform (7.5%)

1.Teacher salaries
2.Online dual enrollment, college level program
3.Textbooks
4.Educational software
5.PSAT costs
6.Statistics curriculum development and staff training
7.Professional development consultants

Intensive instruction for
struggling students

8.Technology supplies to facilitate teacher online
learning
1.Special education co-teachers
2.Modular classroom
3.Read 180 technological support

Literacy and math coaching
(7.8%)
Other new curricula/course
offerings (28.1%)

1.Literacy and math coaches
1.ESL, elementary support, gifted support teacher
2.Textbooks, materials
3.District curriculum evaluation/development; reading
edge start-up
4.College and career coaches

Other professional
development (10.0%)

1.Education and behavior coaches
2.PD consultation
3.PD travel expenses

Teacher Training (4.8%)

1.Training in math, reading, writing and tech
2.RtI consulting (with resources)
3.Professional development tracking
4.Materials, books, copying, travel, rentals
5.Professional memberships

Tutoring before/after school,
weekends (2.7%)

1.Tutors

School library services
(1.1%)

1.School library media specialist, paraprofessionals

2.Materials
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During the periods when new resources were invested in Allentown, the district
began to show gains in student outcomes; graduation rates began to increase, as did
student results on the Pennsylvania System of School Assessment (PSSA) scores.
However, it is important to note that the infusion of new funds from the state was
offset, in part, by a reduction in local revenue.98
Federal revenues make up the smallest portion of the district’s budget. The
largest federal categorical grant program to school districts is Title I, designed to
improve academic achievement of disadvantaged99 children. Other federal dollars,
which provide support for numerous programs, include: 21st Century Schools (i.e., Safe
and Drug Free Schools and Communities, 21st Century Learning Communities); Title
III (language instruction for limited English proficient and immigrant students);
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (to cover costs incurred in
educating children in accordance with the IDEA); Child Nutrition Projects; and,
Medical Assistance reimbursements.
The Title I program is intended to support disadvantaged children in meeting
state standards in reading and mathematics. Schools with 50% or more of students
identified as living in poverty may use the Title I dollars school-wide to improve
educational programs; all schools in ASD meet this criterion. Title I grant dollars cover
expenses at both the schools and the district level, with approximately 80% of the
98

In SY2001, local taxes made up 53.2% of all revenue; in SY2010, local taxes made up 32.4% of all
revenue.
99
Title I of the Elementary & Secondary Education Act describes disadvantaged children as “lowachieving children in our Nation's highest-poverty schools, limited English proficient children, migratory
children, children with disabilities, Indian children, neglected or delinquent children, and young children
in need of reading assistance.”
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dollars being spent in schools.100 School principals have primary responsibility for
spending Title I dollars in their building. Title I dollars, however, are less flexible than
school budget dollars as they must be divided among staff development, parental
involvement, and academic improvement. The allocations devoted to each of these
areas are mandated by federal formula, and dollars cannot be moved from one area to
another. Within these designated areas, however, the school principals usually have
control.
In addition to categorical grants, the district applies for, and has been successful
in winning, competitive grants. The Executive Director for Grants and External
Funding submits grant proposals on behalf of the district, with the stated intention to go
after grants that are consistent with the district’s mission. Certain grants are likely to be
tied to specific buildings (written to address the needs of certain buildings - i.e.,
security), but buildings generally have little control of how these grant dollars are spent.
The Executive Director explained, “[Program Directors] don’t take their grants and say,
‘Hey, Central [Elementary School], you get $100,000. You can figure out what you
want to do with it.’ They … plan for those grants district-wide.”
School Improvement grants have brought federal dollars to the Allentown
School District. In the 2009-2010 school year, the district applied for and was awarded
over $3 million due to poor student achievement at three elementary schools (Mosser,

100

Title I allocations to schools are derived from formulas based on student poverty.
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Sheridan, and Union Terrace) and one middle school (South Mountain).101 These grants
are based on a school’s performance on state assessments (AYP status) and, therefore,
fluctuate from year to year. As a result, this money cannot be used for ongoing
expenses, such as staff. Dollars from school improvement grants must be consistent
with the student improvement plan. Also, although the building principal is involved in
determining how these dollars are spent, the district must sign off on his/her allocations.
The state is also required to sign off on these plans, but the building principals I
interviewed were unaware of this requirement. A great deal of volatility is built into the
budget because of these grants. For example, one school that made Adequate Yearly
Progress this year will lose $80,000 because it is no longer in “student improvement.”
The Executive Director described some smaller grants with which her office had been
involved. “We worked with [the ESOL Director's] office [on a refugee grant]. It was for
about $51,000, which is really small for us. But it was, I’d say, a little bit of a passion
for a couple of us that we really wanted to do it. Which is what happens in the schools,
you know, when teachers have a passion for something.”
Structure of budget. Funds that support school buildings within the Allentown
School District can be thought of as coming from three pots. The largest pot of
financial resources (at 67.3% of entire district budget) covers the expenses of teachers
and support staff. The second pot of money comes from program areas in the central
office and funds some staff, services, and materials in buildings, including students
services (e.g., cameras), curriculum (e.g., coaches, books, training materials), English
101

The district received $15 million in School Improvement grants in school year 2010-2011.

166
as a Second Language (ESOL) (e.g., training, teachers), and most special education
services.102 These program area budgets are composed of grants and general revenues.
The final pot of money is a small allotment of dollars to school principals to spend in
their schools. These dollars can be used for any number of items including books and
professional development. These discretionary school budget dollars are from general
revenues.
Personnel budget. Although the personnel budget makes up the largest portion
of funds to individual school buildings, principals have very little influence over
staffing issues. The technical work of determining the size of the workforce in each
school is carried out by the human resources department. Principals are neither
responsible for staffing budgets nor determining the numbers of teachers and support
staff in their building. (Even when site-based management was in effect in Allentown
in the 1990’s, principals had no control over personnel.) Staffing formulas are based on
a district-wide policy on pupil/teacher ratio approved by the School Board, which the
human resources office uses to generate the number of staff to be added or subtracted at
each school, based on the projected enrollment for the coming year.103 Currently, the
ratio for elementary schools is 25 students per teacher, but it can go up to 27. Once that
limit is reached, another teacher is added. In elementary school, the most prevalent
staffing issue is usually excessively large class sizes; in high school, the problem is
instead whether or not classes should be held if there only a few students sign up – such

102

Additional funds that address the needs of special education students come out of principals’
discretionary budgets.
103
Staffing formulas vary by school level (elementary vs. middle school vs. high school).
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as an AP Chemistry class with four students. Since the district policy is that the number
of teachers in each building is based on student enrollment, any additional teachers
beyond the prescribed ratios are most likely tied to a grant or special education.
A central office administrator provided details on how staffing budgets are
prepared: “It used to be pretty academic. Let's say we anticipate salaries go up four
percent. So, whatever we spent on payroll last year, let's add four percent to it. That’s
our new budget.” Staffing normally remains the same from year to year unless there is a
new program, or there is new grant money available. Then you add staff “on top of
what you’ve been doing”, which may require hiring new staff. Ratios are also used to
determine how ELL teachers are allocated to schools. This is a difficult task, as there
are students in different grades, with different competencies, that must be served. The
result is that some schools end up with higher pupil/teacher ratios than others. Finally,
staffing budgets also include the associated benefits: health insurance, workman’s
compensation, retirement benefits and Social Security. All costs are based on staffing
numbers.
Program area budgets. Program area budgets, often funded primarily through
grants, are not presented (or conceived of) at the school level. Generally, program area
directors make their purchases for the entire district, and do not consider school-level
allocations. Every department (i.e., special education, student services, curriculum) puts
together their own budget reflecting their needs. At times though, building principals
negotiate with program area directors to get more support for their buildings, but this is
only true of some principals. One principal interviewed discussed how she would seek
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central funds. She offered an example of how she would deal with the need for a school
camera:
“School safety would be something where, if I had the money, I could try to
purchase another camera. But, I certainly would go to [the Director of Student
Services] first and say: ‘Hey, for the safety of our students, really could use
another monitor and camera in the back of the building.’”

Principals’ “discretionary” budgets. The final portion of school-level funding
is a mix of discretionary dollars allocated to each building and Title I funds, which have
strict requirements for use attached. The discretionary school budget is small,
approximately $135 per student, and covered by general funds. The Title I budget is
covered by federal funds.
Funding for individual school budgets is determined each year by the Chief
Financial Officer (CFO) and the Superintendent. In the 2008-2009 school year and
prior, dollars were allocated to schools solely based on student enrollment in each
school, regardless of need of student body or level of schooling (e.g., middle school or
elementary school). In the 2009-2010 school year (the year in which data is used for the
quantitative analysis) all building principals were asked to build their entire budget.104
The school budgeting process begins early in the year. Schools are given their
allocation in early-mid October and must determine how the dollars will be spent by the
end of the month. Developing this budget for the following year in two weeks is

104

In school year 2010-2011, under a new administration, the district allocated resources based on a
weighted formula that took into account student needs including poverty, ELL status, and special
education status. Principals were then required to develop a budget based on their allotted dollars.
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difficult for principals given many unknown elements, the largest of which is student
enrollment.
The Federal Title I grant dollars cover expenses at both the schools and the
district level, with approximately 80% of the dollars being spent in schools.105 School
principals have primary responsibility for spending Title I dollars in their building. Title
I dollars, however, are less flexible than school budget dollars as they must be divided
among staff development, parental involvement, and academic improvement. The
allocations to each of these areas are mandated by federal formula, and there can be no
movement of dollars from one area to another. Within these designated areas, however,
the school principals usually have control.
The funding gap. The Allentown School District is severely underfunded. This
is aggravated by inadequate resources available to address the needs of disadvantaged
students. ASD has the largest gap in terms of adequate resources compared to the vast
majority of other schools district in the State. According to the PA Legislature’s 2007
Costing-Out Study, in 2005-06 the average cost to educate a student in ASD and reach
proficiency was $13,741. At the time, ASD was spending $8,291, and these numbers
have changed very little since then. As can be seen in Table 16 and Figure 22, the gap
between “adequate funding” and total expenditures is large.

105

Title I allocations to schools are derived from formulas based on student poverty.
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Table 16. General Fund Fiscal Gap Analysis, SY2009-2011
Actual
Expenditures
$202,399,473
$212,752,983
$233,136,794

2008-2009
2009-2010
2010-2011

Adequacy
Target
$234,147,093
$250,506,435
$261,204,964

Difference
$31,747,620
$37,753,452
$28,068,170

Source: ASD Financial Report
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$250,000,000
$200,000,000
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Figure 22. General Fund Fiscal Gap, SY2009-2011
Source: Allentown School District Financial Reports 2010-2011, 2009-2010, 20082009

This context is provided to make clear that all students in the ASD, regardless of which
school they attend, are not being provided with adequate resources.
Current resource allocation in Allentown. With support from the consulting
firm Cross & Joftus, I was able to obtain district and school level expenditure and
personnel data for the ASD. Because my interest lies in school level data, I focused my
efforts on determining the magnitude of various resources going to schools. As
mentioned earlier, due to the district’s small size, only elementary and middle schools
are considered in the analysis.
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To conduct this analysis, I have identified a range of measurable resources that
are likely to influence student learning. These resources can be categorized into
expenditures and human capital resources. Expenditures include total operating funds,
operating funds intended to be directed to address the needs of students in poverty, and
operating funds intended to be directed to address the needs of ELL students.
Expenditures also include salaries, including aggregate and specific responsibilities
(i.e., instruction, support and professional development, leadership, operations and
maintenance, and pupil services). Human capital resources include various measures of,
or proxies for, teaching quality. The indicators identified for this study include average
salaries for core, non-core, and special population teachers 106, professional
development, FTEs (with measures of students per staff, students per teacher, students
per administrator, and students per paraprofessional). Closely tied to the review of
FTEs at the school level is a review of average class size at each school. Additional
measures of teaching quality include teacher effect (based on teacher-level value added
scores), teacher self-efficacy (for classroom management, student engagement, and
instructional strategies), average years of teaching experience, the percentage of
teachers in a building with less than three years of experience, the percentage of
teachers in a building with more than four years of experience, and the percentage of
teachers with a masters or above. Finally, three school-wide measures of teaching
106

Core teachers include elementary, English, mathematics, reading, science, and social studies teachers;
non-core teachers include art, music, physical education, French, German, Spanish, business, home
economic, industrial arts, JROTC, and other teachers; and, special populations teachers include ESOL,
IST, special education, and itinerant gifted teachers.
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quality are also considered: the schools growth indices for math and reading and
collective efficacy.
Table 17 provides horizontal equity statistics (i.e., means, standard deviation,
range, coefficient of variation, and McLoone index) for the resources studied.
Highlighting indicates that the results fall outside the Odden-Picus standard for
horizontal equity (Odden & Picus, 2008).
Table 17. Horizontal Equity Statistics for Elementary Schools in ASD, SY2010
Elementary Schools
Mean

SD

Range

Coef
of Var

McLoone
Index

7,947
916
427

921
271
215

2,970
1,099
804

0.12
0.30
0.50

0.92
0.84
0.63

132

12
210

56
798

0.09
0.36

0.95
0.85

259

59

194

0.23

0.82

5,084
4,043

608
492

2,034
1,827

0.12
0.12

0.89
0.90

186
404

51
105

180
367

0.28
0.26

0.81
0.86

210

67

283

0.32

0.83

240

80

276

0.33

0.89

63,795
63,843

5,354
10,484

17,910
29,286

0.08
0.16

0.94
0.89

60,835
63,029

4,248
4,198

13,129
13,899

0.07
0.07

0.94
0.94

9.7
15.9

1.2
1.7

5.1
5.2

0.13
0.11

0.90
0.94

Financial Resources
Operating Funds (PPE)
Poverty Spending (PPE)
ELL Spending (PPE)
Discretionary Bldg Funds
(PPE)
Federal Title I (PPE)
Teacher Support
Professional Development
PPE)
Human Capital Salaries
Total Salaries (PPE)
Instruction Salaries (PPE)
Instruction Support/PD
Salaries (PPE)
Leadership Salaries (PPE)
Operations/Maintenance
Salaries (PPE)
Pupil Services Salaries
(PPE)
Average Teacher Salaries
Core Teachers
Non-Core Teachers
Special Populations
Teachers
All Teachers
Full Time Equivalents
(FTEs)
Students per staff
Students per teacher

587
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Students per administrator
309.8
57.1
207.5
0.18
0.86
Students per
paraprofessional
75.0
33.8
110.6
0.45
0.71
Average class size (w/o
100% SPED)
23.6
1.7
5.8
0.07
0.93
Individual measures of Teacher Quality
Low teacher effect
(district gain)
28%
19%
70%
0.67
0.74
High teacher effect
(district gain)
40%
24%
100%
0.61
0.53
Teacher Efficacy-Classroom
Mgmt
7.5
0.4
1.4
0.05
0.95
Teacher Efficacy-Student
Engagement
7.2
0.4
1.2
0.06
0.95
Teacher EfficacyInstructional Strategies
7.6
0.4
1.5
0.05
0.96
Avg. years of teaching exp. 11.1
2.7
8.9
0.24
0.83
% of teachers w/ less than
3 yrs exp.
10%
4%
11%
0.39
0.81
% of personnel w/ Masters
or above
43%
11%
44%
0.25
0.88
School-wide Measures of Teacher Quality
Growth Index (Math)
10.9
3.6
13.4
0.33
0.72
Growth Index (Reading)
8.9
4.1
12.5
0.46
0.61
Collective Efficacy
526
43
150
0.08
0.97
Note: Shading in yellow indicates near horizontal equity; shading in purple indicates horizontal inequity;
and, shading in red indicates extreme horizontal inequity.
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Table 18. Horizontal Equity Statistics for Middle Schools in ASD, SY2010
Middle Schools
Mean

SD

Range

Coef
of Var

McLoone
Index

872
435
194

0.05
0.19
0.31

0.96
0.82
0.75

37
264

0.10
0.17

0.93
0.84

49

0.18

0.92

862
876
168

0.07
0.09
0.19

0.94
0.91
0.85

51

0.07

0.95

57

0.07

0.97

6,410
13,384
7,857
6,634

0.05
0.10
0.06
0.05

0.97
0.92
0.94
0.95

1.3
2.1
90.3

0.07
0.07
0.15

0.96
0.98
0.85

56.7

0.26

0.80

1.5

0.03

0.97

27%

0.57

0.70

39%

0.56

0.73

0.6

0.04

0.96

0.4

0.04

0.97

0.2
3.9

0.01
0.19

0.99
0.82

Financial Resources
Operating Funds (PPE)
8,940
403
Poverty Spending (PPE)
1,088
204
ELL Spending (PPE)
269
82
Discretionary Bldg Funds
(PPE)
158
15
Federal Title I (PPE)
747
127
Teacher Support
Professional Development
(PPE)
113
21
Human Capital Salaries
Total Salary (PPE)
5,712
374
Instruction Salaries (PPE)
4,686
406
Leadership Salaries (PPE)
361
70
Operations/Maintenance
Salaries (PPE)
283
21
Pupil Services Salaries
(PPE)
382
26
Average Teacher Salaries
Core Teachers
60,831 2,785
Non-Core Teachers
58,635 5,610
Special Populations Teachers 60,349 3,641
All Teachers
60,293 3,163
Full Time Equivalents (FTEs)
Students per staff
8.4
0.5
Students per teacher
13.6
1.0
Students per administrator
276.7
42.1
Students per
paraprofessional
92.4
24.3
Average class size (w/o 100%
SPED)
20.1
0.6
Individual measures of Teacher Quality
Low teacher effect (district
gain)
20%
11%
High teacher effect
(district gain)
31%
17%
Teacher Efficacy-Classroom
Mgmt
7.0
0.3
Teacher Efficacy-Student
Engagement
6.0
0.2
Teacher EfficacyInstructional Strategies
7.6
0.1
Avg. years of teaching exp.
9.6
1.8
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% of teachers w/ less than 3
yrs exp.
18%
6%
14%
0.31
0.83
School-wide Measures of Teacher Quality
Growth Index (Math)
8.6
1.5
3.5
0.18
0.84
Growth Index (Reading)
10.9
3.7
7.8
0.34
0.74
Collective Efficacy
416
38
71
0.09
0.92
Note: Shading in yellow indicates near horizontal equity; shading in purple indicates horizontal inequity;
and, shading in red indicates extreme horizontal inequity.

Equity statistics, described in chapter four, provide a means of measuring how
resources are distributed among schools. Equity statistics are provided for elementary
schools (n=14) and middle schools (n=4) where available. Odden and Picus (2008)
provide standards against which to evaluate these equity statistics107. Using these
standards, resources are seen as either horizontally equitable, meaning resources are
distributed equivalently among schools, or horizontally inequitable, meaning resources
are not distributed equivalently among schools. Given the small sample of schools in
the ASD, I have expanded upon this definition for the purpose of my analysis. All those
resources with a coefficient of variation which falls between 0.1 and 0.2 and a
McLoone Index which falls between 0.8 and 0.9 are considered to be close enough to
be considered as horizontally equitably distributed. Differentiations are also made
between horizontal inequity and extreme horizontal inequity. Equity statistics are
highlighted accordingly in the tables 17 and 18.
In considering horizontal equity statistics it is important to note that one would
not expect certain resources, such as expenditures to address the needs of students in
poverty or expenditures to address the needs of ELL students, to be allocated on a
107

Odden and Picus (2008) have determined that a coefficient of variation of 0.1 or less, and a McLoone
Index of 0.9 or greater indicates horizontal equity.
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strictly per pupil basis. Rather, these expenditures, by definition, are intended to
provide compensatory funds for specific students with higher needs. This point is
considered further in Chapter 6, in which vertical equity is measured (as part of the
equity framework discussed earlier in this paper) to determine how resources are
distributed to each school according to the needs of the students in the school.
Many of the resources considered in my analysis of the ASD fall within the
range, or just outside the range, defined by Odden and Picus (2008) as equitably
distributed based on horizontal equity statistics. These resources include: operating
funds, poverty spending and Federal Title I (middle school only), building discretionary
funds, professional development funds (middle school only), total salary, instructional
salary, salary for instructional support, leadership, operations/maintenance, and pupil
services (middle school only), average salaries (for all categories of staff), students per
staff, students per teacher, students per administrator, class size, average years of
teacher experience (middle school only), teacher self-efficacy and collective efficacy,
the Growth Index, representing the school’s “value-add” (middle school only).
Resources that were not found to be equivalently distributed among schools on a per
pupil basis include: expenditures dedicated to address the needs of students in poverty
(elementary school only), Federal Title I (elementary school only), expenditures
dedicated to address the needs of ELL students, professional development (elementary
school only), salaries tied to instructional support (elementary school only), leadership
salaries (elementary school only), operations and maintenance salaries (elementary
schools only), pupil services salaries (elementary schools only), students per para-
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professional, teacher effectiveness, average years of teaching experience(elementary
schools only), the percentage of teachers with less than three years of experience
(elementary schools only), the percentage of personnel with a masters degree or above
(elementary schools only), and the Growth Index.
These findings are consistent with much of the literature on horizontal equity,
whereby overall operating funds and salaries are equivalent among schools on a per
pupil basis, but mask inequities such as considerable variations among schools on a
range of teaching quality measures, including the percentage of inexperienced teachers
in a school and educator effectiveness, measured both at the individual teacher level as
well as the school level.
Variability among school outcomes. Another measure of district equity
described in Chapters 2 and 4 is equivalent outcomes. As stated, equivalent outcomes
are achieved if resources are allocated to students such that their outcomes are
equivalent. This construct is included to provide more information about variability
among schools. Conducting an analysis using an unconditional 2-level model provides
a means of determining the variation in student test scores which is the result of
attending a particular school. In my analysis of equivalent outcomes among ASD
elementary schools, I find that the large majority of variability in student outcomes is
not the result of attending a particular school. Rather, it is due to variability among
students. This finding is consistent with the literature on the impact of schools on
student outcomes (Konstantopoulos, 2006).
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Table 19. Measure of Equivalent Outcomes for ASD Elementary Schools, SY2010
Allentown School District – Grades 3, 4, 5
Percent of variability that lies among
schools
Percent of variability that lies within
schools

PSSA
Math

PSSA
Reading

7%

5%

93%

95%

Describing the process of resource allocation in Allentown
The discussion above broadly describes how school budgets are understood by
administrators in the district. While there is generally consensus as to how dollars flow
to schools and what funding sources provide the revenues to the district, there is less
agreement on, and understanding of, the decision-making processes around resource
allocation and the resulting distribution of resources to schools. Interviews with school
district administrators yielded insights into the implementation of the distribution of
resources among schools and shed light onto the variability in resources at the school
level. Six major findings are presented and discussed based on this research:


Resource allocation in the ASD is a black box – decisions are not transparent to
school officials and administrators;



Communication among central office administrators and school level
administrators is deficient;



No overarching mission or vision to guides resource allocation policy; 4) at the
district level, teachers are not considered to be a resource;



The need to augment resources drives school funding decisions; and,



There is little focus on discrepancies in inputs among schools.
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The first two findings address the lack of knowledge and understanding around
district resource allocation and subsequent findings address the district’s focus
on resource allocation.
Lack of transparency. Resource allocation among schools appears to be a

black box to many administrators in the ASD. Among the building principals, there is a
lack of transparency as to how much each school has – and what influenced these
numbers. This lack of knowledge is shared by central office staff, including the Chief
Financial Officer and the Director of Human Resources.108 A common sentiment was
expressed by a senior central office administrator:
“I’d just like more transparency with - I don’t mean the general fund. I get that,
it's very transparent. I’m talking about Title, SIG, School Improvement. We've
got too many people controlling budgets right now. And I don’t, I’m not saying
that I should even know. I’m saying that, I just, I don’t get it. And if I don’t get
it, who does? I don’t mean that, I’m just saying in my position I don’t get it,
then who really is understanding this?”

Lack of transparency seems to exist for multiple reasons. First, people seem to
accept the status quo and do not question how business is conducted. During my tenure
at the ASD, I saw that new employees were discouraged from changing protocols to
increase transparency. Second, district policies are often vague or non-existent – and
decisions are made on an ad hoc basis. For example, no one in the district, including the
Chief Financial Officer, seemed to know how large categories of support staff (e.g.,
secretaries, nurses, or paraprofessionals) are allocated to schools. Finally, neither
human resource data, nor financial data, is readily available. Obtaining an accurate
108

Most likely, this is true of teachers and students as well.
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count of all employees, and their locations, was extremely difficult for the 2009-2010
school year.109 Also, information on overall spending at the school level is neither
collected nor reviewed by the school district on a regular basis and, for the most part,
expenditures are consolidated and only available for review at the district level. The
budget is extremely convoluted, making it difficult to understand where money is being
spent. A number of district personnel echoed this assessment.110
A result of the “black box” of resource allocation is that stakeholders are
unaware of inequities. For example, the School Board President assumes that schools
get equivalent resources, and that budgetary differences arise only because principals
choose to allocate these resources in different ways. He provided an illustration:
“At one point, the funds for high school graduation had to be taken out of the
high school budgets, and Allen High School [had] always spent more money.
They were the first to … introduce videos and …other things. And people
noticed the inequality. But it wasn't really inequality. It was how the principals,
how innovative they are, how they chose to spend that money. Well now,
graduation has converted to a central office expense. So, and I’m sure … that
the services are all pretty much the same.”

This assumption of equitable resource allocation is likely shared by other
School Board members, as district administrators, including the CFO, could provide no
examples of School Board members lobbying for specific schools. And, when
intradistrict equity issues arise in the community, they are most often about the two
high schools, and how they compare – as demonstrated above.
109

My own efforts at trying to determine the buildings in which teachers and support staff are working
bear this out. Staff reductions, primarily due to changes in state policy, required an intensive review and
reconciliation of payroll and human resource documents. There is a movement in the district to change
this, beginning with greater position control.
110
This was born out by my struggles in creating holistic budgets for each elementary and middle school.

181
Poor communication between central office and schools. The lack of
information among stakeholders in the district is reinforced by poor communications
among the various players in the district. There are few systems in place to disclose
information, so details are often shared informally. As a result, central office decisions
are not always translated accurately to the schools. Additionally, there are limited
means by which principals can provide feedback and influence budgetary decisions.
My interviews provide considerable evidence of poor communications between the
central office and schools, as similar questions elicited very different responses
particularly about the role of district administrators in grant development and the
principals’ discretionary budget.
One reason that principals do not understand resource allocation is that they
have not been involved in the decision-making process to any meaningful extent.
Principals perceive that there is little consultation between themselves and the different
program areas.111 One principal said, “People in central office make these decisions and
you wonder, how did you make that decision? You know … they just kind of live in
their own little rose-colored world. A lot of them…were never principals. So they don’t
really understand a building.” Another principal provided this example:
“Title I spent money on these laptop cards. [They] never talked to us. Maybe
three years ago. They arrived and I'm like ‘OK. What do I do with these? Where
do I put them?’ We figured that out, where to put them. The laptops are
outdated. Most of them don't hold a charge. Tons of money was spent on that. I
don't think it should have been. I wanted computers for the one room that didn't
have any. We could have used laptops in there. But no one talked to us. Smart
boards arrived; gigantic smart boards. We don’t have a library. Ours is sitting
down in the custodian's office; nowhere to put it.”
111

Principals also questioned the extent to which central office staff communicated with each other.
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The former Director of Elementary Education agreed with the principals,
explaining that her position did not entail advocating on behalf of the principals or
getting involved in the development and allocation of various grants. She explained that
program area budgets are driven by program areas, such as curriculum. Principals are
involved only to the extent that they have participated in conversations over the year,
and so their concerns may or may not have been heard.
Central office administrators acknowledged the principals’ concerns but
expressed somewhat different views. The Executive Director explained that some
grants, such as the technology grants, did not “get communicated as well as they should
have.” But she also suggested that the blame should be shared. “So some of that is us
and some of it is … principals are involved and busy [with]… the day to day
management. So they might say, ‘Ah, go ahead, that's sounds good.’ … and then all of
a sudden, OK, well here come your … smart boards.” This problem was highlighted by
the principals interviewed.
Although they account for only a small portion of school budgets, principals
brought up their discretionary funds to illustrate the central office’s control. The
process for allocating these funds among school programs begins with the preparation
of school budgets based on the allotted dollars presented to each school. Then there is
some back and forth with requests from central office to make changes or justify plans.
While everyone agreed on the first steps, principals have a different understanding than
central office administrators as to what happens after budget requests are submitted.
One principal interviewed did not appreciate the level of scrutiny proffered by the CFO.
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“It does bother me that I have to ask a financial officer permission to transfer
money from one code to another in order to purchase more trade books. … That
does bother me. I think I should just be able to do it. He doesn't know anything
about education. But you have to ask him permission. It wasn't always like that.
You just filled out a transfer form and send it down.”

There is consensus among the principals interviewed that central office
maintains control over line items. As stated by one principal: “The bottom line is that
the downtown people decide what that budget item will be. It could be near what we
put in. It could be a lot less. It could be more.”
This view was not corroborated by central office administrators, who explained
that once building budget dollars are allocated to schools, principals have discretion
with regard to determining how dollars are spent within the school. Only one
administrator mentioned an exception to the policy of principal discretion over school
budgets:
“The only time in the last couple of years that I got involved with the school
budgets was when we knew were getting cut back in our basic education
funding. And we took a look at some of the school budgets to see if there was
any way that a grant might be able out with some of the areas of the school
budgets. A perfect example is one year, when we had PA-Pact112 money, we
could use that for some textbooks. So [we did that] instead of using the school
budget money,”

The CFO is often caught between principals and the central office during the
budgeting process. When asked about the role of the business office in oversight of
school budgets, the CFO explained that he went through the school budgets and looked
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PA-Pact funds were allocated from the State to districts as the result of a change in the State funding
formula. Under funded districts were the recipients of new funds tied to their students’ needs. It was
required that 80% of all new funds be used on “new” initiatives developed to improve student outcomes.
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though everything. He also went to other central district administrators to ask for their
recommendations, asking, “Is this a worthy expenditure?” He did acknowledge that he
can be critical, but that he is not in the buildings enough to know what the best
allocations are. The CFO pointed out that the review was not detailed. “You know, so
there was still a lot of things in play that we're working on, so we didn’t get caught up
in the minutia of the 2 million dollars that were spread out.” Furthermore, the CFO
shared his opinion that principals should control how the dollars in their schools are
spent. “I think the schools need some ability to say, hey, I’m going to spend it this way.
…. Give them some latitude with how they’re going to run their building. So it's just
not, we had bigger fish to fry.”
As noted earlier, there is concern among some central office administrators that
the principals are not up to the task of budgeting. One interviewee made the allegation
that, prior to the implementation of the zero-based budget process, “secretaries …
would do those budgets.” Principals disagreed with this characterization. One principal
described the following process: “They gave us a number and then we can divide that
up among different budget codes as we believe it will fit for our school. Like I can
decide how much I'm putting in textbooks, how much I'm putting in technology, how
much I'm putting into art.”
The allocation of PA-Pact funds provides another vivid example of the
dysfunction in the relationship between school level administrators and central office
administrators. None of the principals interviewed were involved in decisions regarding
the allocation of these funds. They were also unaware of the link between benefits
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and/or resources directed to their schools and the new PA-Pact dollars; one principal
said that she thought the dollars might be tied to district-wide initiatives, like literacy
and math coaches. Contrary to these reports, the CFO said that it had been necessary to
involve the principals because of the strict requirements tied to the new funds. “A year
ago we went through and met with every principal over their budget. So principals …
had a voice.” The conclusions that can be drawn from the interviews with both district
administration, principals, and program leaders is that the former Superintendent and
the Executive Director of Grants had the most authority in determining how PA-PACT
funds were spent, but that there seemed to be no systematic process to involve people in
decisions regarding their use. One district administrators said, “It depended on the day.”
No district agenda to guide resource allocation policies beyond horizontal
equity. The default for resource allocation in the ASD is horizontal equity as staffing
ratios drive funds and staff to schools. However, beyond this, the district does not have
a clear focus to guide resource allocation. Additionally, human capital (e.g., teacher
efficacy) is not allocated among schools with any sense of a need to provide all schools
with either equivalent resources or resources tied to the needs of the school. Without a
district agenda to guide their thinking and action, there is a sense of haphazardness
among administrators when discussing financial and human resources planning.
Beyond staffing ratios to address class size, and requirements built into Title I grants,
there are no district-wide policies designed to address resource allocation. Also, while
many decisions are made with the general intention of serving all students, evaluation
of expenditure data for confirmation is rare. As discussed, many of the dollars that are
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spent in specific schools are not tracked to these schools, making it difficult to have a
true sense of school operating funds. Furthermore, new grants that come to the district
are piled on top of existing budgets. These grants may be disbursed to address specific
needs and/or to address deficits. When funding dries up, the district often continues to
fund the program. There is also a lack of data on human capital resources at each
school. Information on teachers, administrators, and support staff are not readily
available for review, making it difficult to address the deficiencies in teacher quality
among schools.
A central office administrator described the district as being myopic at times,
driven by the immediate crisis. “[We] throw money at it, do this. Get this teacher over
there, get this extra person.” The result is “[mission] creep.” With no clear district-wide
mission to address resource allocation, some principals are able to fill the void by
successfully advocating for their schools – and some are better at it than others.
“And some of it is about principals and how good a politician they are, and
campaigners they are, for things. Because that's the way I saw my role as a
principal… It's my job to get resources [for my school] just like it is the
superintendent's job to get resources in this district. You get everything you can
get coming this way. I mean, you just do as long as it's not … unethical or
immoral or illegal. You do everything you can do to make a favorable situation
for your distinct or your building.”

Examples of how district policies (or, at times, lack of district policies) impact
school-level resource allocation include: how principals spend their discretionary funds;
how special education funds are allocated to schools; how professional development is
allocated to schools; and, how teachers are hired in the district.
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Principal budgets. There is no district requirement that schools spend their
budget equivalently in any area, such as books, on the theory that the principal is in the
best position to know what is needed in the school. Because of this, the manner in
which principals allocate their school budget dollars, and what priorities drive these
allocations, vary. One principal mentioned that he tried to put as much money into
student materials and professional development as possible. Another principal
explained how she worked with her staff to come up with a budget:
“First and foremost, I look at what does my data tell me about the needs of my
children? What is the district asking me to do curricula-wise? What are the
needs of my staff to implement that curriculum? So I have this and then it
becomes a meeting with teachers and saying, ‘OK. Look at your needs as a
teacher in order for you to run a highly effective classroom.’ And then I go to
my specialized areas and say the same things, ‘what are your needs?’ And then I
go into the classroom area, then I go to … my literacy coach, … and that's how
we develop it. Making sure that everybody understands that this is driven by
kids' needs and the mission of where we want this building to go.”

Some of the principals expressed a sense of inequity with regard to how school budget
dollars could be spent. A female principal provided an example of one way in which
principal autonomy seemed to vary by school. She explained:
“It might be a little different when you meet with some of the guys. You know,
they have like flat screens in their office and it's quite interesting. ... Yeah. I
don't know that I could get that. Well, first of all, maintenance wouldn’t even
come hang it for me. ... It's a very macho world out there; very male oriented;
gender-biased. Definitely.”

Special education. Another area of the budget not guided by a strong district
vision is the provision of special education services. Part of the confusion is due to the
structure of the special education program, whereby principals are responsible for
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some, but not all, services. One principal reported that the central office determined
what special education would look like in his/her building. He explained, however, that
if a teacher needed something, “I certainly find the place in the budget to take it out of.”
According to the Director of Special Education, special education is an area for which
principals seem to go to central office to lobby for more resources. Special education
services are funded by a mix of school and special education area budgets;
approximately three-quarters or more of the special education staff is paid for out for
the general fund. In addition to lobbying for special education grant dollars, principals
can use their school budgets to purchase materials for their special education students
without the oversight of the district’s special education director.113 “Sometimes they are
not the best of programs, but some salesman came by and gave them a sample. And
they don’t know enough about that field ….” The Director of Special Education also
pointed out that principals can allocate dollars in their school budgets to special
education; but they also have the authority to move these dollars out of special
education to other areas. The Special Education Director explained that district
personnel, including building principals, are often unsupportive of special education
students regardless of legal requirements. She provided an example: no one from the
Special Education office had been included in building renovation discussions even
though the special needs students would be heavily impacted and those making
decisions were ill-informed regarding the special education students’ needs.

113

A few years ago there was discussion of setting up a centralized system were all special education
budget requests would have to get approval from the Special Education Director. Although favored by
the Special Education Director, it never went into operation.
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Professional Development. Professional development is another area that is
difficult to track to schools, or personnel within schools, because some of the funding
comes from “school budgets” and some comes from central office. The central office
generally funds a larger portion of all professional development offered. The magnitude
of professional development provided by the central office has varied from year to year.
One principal explained: “Central office has discretion regarding certain professional
development. For example, they choose a program, like an Ohio State system on guided
reading, and then they debit the (school) account.” Schools also have some control over
professional development to the extent they use their discretionary funds. As with
special education, principals are able to choose professional development programs.
This adds to the variability among schools. There is no sense among principals or
central office administrators of how professional development is tied to the district’s
larger mission, and therefore, principals are left to their own devices.
Teacher hiring. The teacher assignment process provides an excellent example
of district level policies working against equitable resource allocation. In the 2009-2010
school year, the principal was responsible for identifying potential candidates,
conducting all interviews, and checking references. Human Resources Department
(HR) would send principals a long list of candidates from which to choose.
Alternatively, teacher candidates could send resumes directly to the principal of the
school in which they wanted to work, or the principal could choose from candidates
attending a job fair. Although these practices seemed to represent general practice,
there were times over the years when teachers were transferred between schools. One
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principal explained that over the course of his career, “sometimes HR just put people in
there. Also, if there was only one candidate for a position [during the school year], you
had to take that person.” Another principal felt that the unions had a great deal of
control over the process because they could work with the central office to insist upon
seniority privileges. Conversely, another principal interviewed said that principals had a
great deal of discretion. They could interview as many or as few people for a position
as they liked. Then they made a decision and the school board, and central office,
rubber stamped it.114, 115
Teachers are not considered a resource. While schools may recognize
teachers as individuals with different abilities in the classroom, the district approaches
them in a different way. Hiring practices, professional development, and teacher
evaluation requirements treat teachers as interchangeable rather than as resources which
can differentially impact student outcomes. Additionally, as with school level budgets,
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At no time were principals involved in discussing salaries with teachers. Salary negotiation has always
been conducted with the HR department. Furthermore, principals never consider the financial impacts of
a new hire when determining to whom an offer should be made. One principal explained, “I want the best
person for the job and if they won't take it [due to financial considerations], then I’ll find somebody
else.” Central office administrators echoed this point made by principals, that hires were based on “best
fit” rather than financial impact. One central office administrator dismissed this approach. He said, “I
don’t think you could find a strategy that if we can get rid more quickly of our older teachers and get
younger ones that save us a bunch of money. I will say that when I was negotiating with the teachers this
year because of the economic condition, we did build in retirement incentives with that in mind. When
you see retirement incentives built in, that's usually the motivation. But from an instructional point of
view, from a missional point of view, from an effectiveness point of view, [this is the wrong tack to
take.]”
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The teacher assignment process changed in the 2010-2011 school year, moving to a centralized
system designed to ensure that well-qualified candidates are hired at all schools. The current system
includes an initial centralized screening process conducted by the Department of Human Resources. The
Deputy Superintendent explained that candidates are awarded points “for various criteria that research
demonstrates can make you a strong teacher.” This new screening process includes a writing test and an
interview conducted by a team of administrators. The Department ranks candidates for each position and
provides principals with a short list of candidates (usually three) from which to choose. Principals can
then conduct interviews with these eligible candidates.
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little information is available on teachers and their effectiveness, making it difficult to
study and address the variability in teacher characteristics among schools.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, teacher hiring practices in the 2009-2010
school year are not consistent with a district mission to ensure the equitable distribution
of teachers. The fact that principals had a great deal of discretion in hiring allows for
large differences in teaching quality among school faculties.116 It is important to note
that district policies are not solely responsible for the allocation of teachers among
schools or students among schools. Teachers often choose to work in environments in
which they feel they might be most successful, however they personally define that
success. The district has no policies in place, such as incentives for working in hard-tostaff schools, to address teacher choice.
Professional development is another area in which the district could exert some
influence in ensuring the equitable distribution of teachers. However, there is no effort
on behalf of the district to provide professional development to teachers to address
inequities in teacher effectiveness. Most often it is at the teachers’ discretion as to
whether or not to participate and any particular professional development program. To
the extent it exists, mandatory, district-wide, professional development is usually
unrelated to improving classroom practice.
With regard to staffing, the CFO acknowledged that there were significant
differences in human resources costs among the schools, primarily as a result of high
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A move to a more centralized hiring system, with specific requirement for all candidates, helps to
level the playing field. New hiring practices in the 2010-2011 school year does begin to support a more
equitable distribution of teachers.
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turnover in certain schools leading to a younger, lower paid staff. He explained,
“You're hiring all those new teachers at 45,000 dollars. Some schools, they've just been
there every year, clicking, making their way up to the 70,000 dollars.” Interestingly,
district administrators do not consider staffing costs to be strictly related to teacher
quality. In fact, the allocation of teacher quality was not considered to be an issue of
concern in the district, the assumption being that all hires were of an appropriate level
of quality. The possibility that some teachers are more effective than others was not
addressed.
The need to augment resources drives school funding decisions. The ASD is
severely underfunded and the need to augment resources drives many school funding
decisions. School budgets are composed of a patchwork of funding streams, generally
tied to state and federal programs, and each designed to accomplish a certain goal. The
goals for the various programs which may overlap, but are often not totally aligned.
The range of (often extensive) requirements attached to the use of various funds is a
manifestation of this misalignment. These requirements are in place to ensure that
policy objectives are attained. However, as the district and the schools within the
district may have different aims, the requirements of funding streams often seem
arbitrary to school administrators.
The best example of this is Title I, a major revenue stream to schools. This
funding source carries strict mandates that hamper the efforts of the school principals to
meet their particular goals. This is not surprising, as Title I requires specific set asides
for spending (i.e., staff development, parental involvement, and academic
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improvement), which often frustrate principals as they may see a greater need in a
certain area (e.g., professional development rather than parental engagement) or they
wish to spend dollars to support children on staff. One principal remarked:
“So, I must spend 3,100 dollars on parent involvement, even if I don’t need it.
And the same with PD; then, academic improvement. I can add to …[parental
involvement and professional development], but I can't take away from those
two. So that's a lot of money for staff development unless you're hiring an
expensive consultant, which we don't do here. You know, we have a lot of
expertise right here.”
Another principal said, “I would give up all these books that are here for a good
teacher who can take or find the resources and work miracles with them. OK? And
sometimes that’s the problem with funding because they're categorical and you can't
necessarily use them for human resources.”
A third principal, at first frustrated with the requirement to spend a certain amount
of dollars on professional development, used her Title I dollars to provide staff
development in the summer when it did not interfere with teachers’ classroom
responsibilities. While this principal was strategic in her use of Title I dollars, her
solution is unique as each individual school comes up with a different plan on how to
spend their Title I professional development money. The capacity of school principals
to use Title I funds most effectively to improve student outcomes seems to vary. In fact,
when discussing the impact of Title I across the district, one District Administrator said,
“I do think too much independence breeds inconsistency [in] what's being done.”
Another example of financial resources driving district decision making is the
design of a plan to spend new state funds. In the 2009-2010 school year, new state
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revenues were to be disbursed among schools. These additional funds, a result of the
new state funding formula, were intended to supplement existing resources to “improve
outcomes for students.” The district was given authority to devise an acceptable plan
for spending the money, guided by specific criteria. The Executive Director of Grants
& External Funding explained that the use of PA-Pact funds “was determined by a
committee. … Our superintendent pulled a whole bunch of us in and we studied the
rules. We did what we were allowed to do very carefully. … funds were supposed to be
directed to new initiatives.” According the district’s Chief Financial Officer, it was
ultimately decided that the money be used “to make the district whole.” The new
dollars served to “even things out – to make up for the grants that were just going to
some buildings.” Another district administrator was frustrated with the focus of the new
funds on the secondary schools. Since the elementary schools had received new
resources over the past few years, both were likely speaking of the same issue. Despite
the result, the process was guided by the objective of spending the money in
compliance with the grant’s requirements.
Patchwork funding makes for a messy budget, as the budget office and the external
grants and development office must evaluate the district’s revenues and determine how
to fit the pieces together so that schools have the necessary resources. This requires a
great deal of maneuvering to integrate outside grants into the larger budget. Sometimes,
for example, grants cover teachers’ base rate and the district picks up the differential. In
other instances, federal and state grants are used in any number of ways to fill holes
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when possible; for example, the district figured out how to use State EAP money to pay
for extended day kindergarten and tutoring.
The physical and demographic realities of the district also drive decisions regarding
the allocation of grant funds. For example, extended day kindergarten programs were
placed in buildings with the capacity to hold the additional classrooms, and ESL
programs are situated in schools with larger non-English speaking student populations.
The Deputy Superintendent explained that the requirements of the grant dictate how the
dollars are allocated. "Some of that is not because people are hoarding or trying to
control as much ‘cause they understood the guidelines and limitations of the money,
what the intent is…. And it is the grant people who understand the parameters of the
grants.” The final result presents a complicated picture that leaves little room for the
principals’ agendas.
A senior central office administrator had an additional insight: the Superintendent
can drive the agenda for seeking funds and allocating them among schools and
programs. In Allentown, this influence superseded a pre-determined structured process
that included district personnel or a decision-making process based on evidence – from
inside and outside the district.
There is little focus on discrepancies in inputs among schools. Allentown is
similar to many school districts in that its goals clearly address overall student
outcomes (adequacy), but do not speak to how resources can be used to impact these
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outcomes.117 This focus on student outcomes is felt throughout the district, while there
is no focus on equitable resource allocation.
The early findings of my resource assessment conducted of 2009-2010 expenditures
revealed discrepancies among schools in both overall budgets and staffing. Central
office administrators were neither alarmed nor surprised by these findings; in fact, they
seemed to expect them.118 They were also quick to explain that the reason for the
inequities was the “system” rather than individual players. The Deputy Superintendent
elaborated this point:
“I think there's an intent to be as fair as possible. But I think there are so many,
such a variety of sources of funding and conditions: some schools having the
benefit of receiving [certain] grants, other schools having the benefit of
[receiving] other grants. Different size[d] grants compounds that and makes it
so that it's close to impossible. …. Theoretically you should do it in some
equitable fashion. But … even then you say, ‘you know what? We could give
this school over here with no grant a dollar more because this one has a grant.
And they'd still be fat and happy and this would be a little better off.’ So it's
very complicated.”
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ASD Board Goals are available on the school district’s website, at www.allentownsd.org.
Administrators were able to identify a number of programs and services that were unequally
distributed across the schools. For the most part, administrators were able to provide explanations for the
disparities. The CFO suggested that technology was unevenly distributed because the district was
“putting on band-aids here and there.” Another central office administrator explained that specific
programs, such as Safe Schools, Healthy Students, have a greater presence in some schools than others
because the district was trying to address specific needs of the students. Administrators also spoke about
staff professional development and as a resource that is not distributed by formula (e.g., number of
teachers) or student need. Rather, most professional development is offered to teachers and only those
who choose to participate receive the benefit. The Director of ESOL spoke about how she offered
training to all teachers in best practices for dealing with English language learners, but many did not
participate.
Further questioning let to the acknowledgement of additional resources that are not allocated to
schools based on any system of equity. A number of titled positions, including paraprofessionals,
secretaries, custodians, and security guards, fell within this category. An administrator said that while the
numbers of teachers were equitably distributed among schools, the experience level of teachers is not
exactly fairly distributed. She remarked, “I think that [at] some of our poorer performing schools …
there's constant teacher turnover.”
118
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The principals had mixed reactions to questions about the distribution of resources in
the district. Two principals had no idea how resources were allocated among schools –
and claimed to be unaware of what resources other schools got. One admitted, “I never
really thought about it, to be honest with you.” Another principal was quick to point out
the uneven distribution of resources, especially support staff. She gave the following
examples:
“This is a school of … 575 kids and I was told I would have one and a half
special education teachers. Leigh Parkway has about 250 kids and they're
getting one full-time. We're over twice as big. And I'm only getting 50% more?
It makes no sense to me. Title I Reading, we only ever had one. Some of the
schools had two and no one could ever, ever, ever give me an answer why….
Some schools have had two literacy coaches. We’ve only ever had one. Some
around our size or a little bigger. But we’ve only ever had one.”

This principal had the sense that she was penalized because her teachers were doing
great work and her students were doing well. Another school principal was not
bothered by the fact that schools got more resources based on their AYP status
(meaning failing schools got more support); she felt this to be an appropriate allocation
of resources.
Yet another principal said that he had an advantage because his school has a strong
Parent Teacher Association (PTA).
“Personally I do not have an issue because I know how lucky I am at this
school. I have a PTA with a very nice budget that helps us out because they
don’t have Title I funds, so don’t have the grant money. I do have the benefit of
the PTA and they help pay for programming you know to bring you know,
musical programs or art programs in that other schools might have had grant
money to do.”
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When pushed, all principals pointed to one elementary school as receiving a larger
share of resources than the others. (Opinions on whether this was a fair allocation were
mixed.) Other administrators in the district, however, felt that this elementary school
was considerably under-funded, given the large number of high-need students attending
this school relative to other elementary schools in the district. One administrator
recalled this school’s principal screaming, “‘Wait a minute! I know I’m the poorest
performing and I don’t have the same staffing that other schools do. So how is that
right? And how can you hold me accountable when … [I don’t have the resources].’”
When asked if they received adequate funds to run their schools, the principals
interviewed offered a variety of views. One principal was satisfied with the resources
allotted to his school. Also, he believed that he had the authority to use the resources as
he saw fit to benefit his students.
“I try to look at the big picture. And Allentown being an urban district with …
poverty [at] 77%, whatever it is. I believe that funds are allocated fairly because
the schools that need it the most should get it. What I get is adequate for our
school. Would I like more? Yes, all right [INAUDIBLE] but basically
everything is good. Because of the state budget and the Allentown and the
federal budget[s], we are going to have less support, there's less, I won't have
the Title I teachers like I had last year. And everybody is going to say the same
thing to you. Those are the ones who can take the small groups, do the intensive
instruction. We're not going to have those. That's going to impact scores.”

Another principal reiterated her view that allocations among schools are fair.
“I mean I really do. I just have to be honest that I don’t worry about what other
buildings are getting or not getting. I just trust that everybody is getting what
they need. I've always looked at the process as fair. I look at people as fair. I
don’t look at the business office or the supervisors as being unfair or supporting
one school over another. If they do, I don't feel it. I’m not aware of it. Maybe
they do, I don't know. … I don’t have time to really worry about that, to be
honest. But I've always looked at … [central office administrators], people in
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charge of grants and money as being fair. I've never [had a] reason to think they
weren't.”

Other principals interviewed were less generous towards the central office and its
support of the schools. One commented, “Don’t cut our resources because we've done
well -- and you're going to put them somewhere else. Which is what they did. They cut
our reading teachers. My reading teacher gave all my kids, who were barely on grade
level or a little below, an additional guided reading lesson every day. Now I don't have
her.”
Only two central office administrators, the Director of Special Education and the
Director of ESOL and World Languages, expressed strong distress over inequities in
the district. Their focus, however, is on individual students and not schools. The
Director of Special Education feels that resources allocated to serve special education
students are not adequate to address their needs. Similarly, the Director of ESOL and
World Languages expressed her disappointment that appropriate resources are not
directed to ELL students. She was especially frustrated that district officials come to
her for assistance in justifying the district’s need for grants based on the percentage of
Latino students in the district, but then funnel this money into programs that do not
support Latino students. She complained,
“Often [the ELL students] got the leftover biology books or whatever was left
that no one wanted instead of saying, ‘this is our demographic. We need to buy
biology books which are helpful for ELLs. And then, if we need AP materials,
buy those too - but the majority of our money should go to building the kids up
who need a language boost rather than just throwing our resources where we
feel like.”
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In my interviews with principals, none expressed the feeling that the amount of
their (building budget) allocation was unfair or inadequate relative to other schools.
Interestingly, the CFO reported that principals do not ask for larger budgets, perhaps
because “people just learn to live with what they get.” The principals corroborated this
point; one principal was typical in saying, “I just get a number.” It also seems that
principals do not discuss their budget allotments amongst themselves. The CFO thought
that this was due to the culture of the school district. Another principal remarked,
however, that she felt that sharing this information might put her at a disadvantage.
Community involvement. Another factor that greatly impacts the focus on
equity is the lack of community input and control. The public discourse around funding
schools in Allentown is barely evident. This is true for the greater Allentown
community as well as for the parents of students in the district.
The majority of Allentown residents, including parents, play a very small role in
the governance of the school district. This leaves power in the hands of those less
sympathetic to public education and to the needs of district students. In the election of
school board members, for example, “you're lucky [if] you have enough people to fill
the slots.” An interviewee described the electorate as “older, often without children, and
concerned about taxes and [maybe] whether there are enough books [in the schools] if
they're concerned about anything.” He went on to say that “the level or scrutiny for
school board candidates is rather low.” One administrator pointed out that, “If you look
at the composition of the school board versus the demographic in this school, it's very
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interesting. …. I would hesitate to say that …if our board represented our community,
the system would run differently. ….”
Many of the families with children in the Allentown School District do not play an
active role in school governance. One central office administrator said,
“[All parents], and … I think the ELL parents particularly, are very accepting
and they don't question- which is a problem. … If some of the things happened
to my child that happened to these kids, I mean just financially, I mean let's not
even go into individual differences, I’d be at board members screaming. But
they feel that they don't speak the language and to get up in a public forum…,
they just don't complain. And they don't vote.”119
Only one area program director mentioned soliciting community input for decisions
regarding district resources. The ESOL Director said, “We always meet with our parent
group…. we discuss what we're doing with them. And if they have any suggestions, of
course we take it in.” Since there is generally a very limited amount of discretionary
money, the true impact of such suggestions is similarly limited.
Summary of qualitative findings. The findings presented above present a
picture of how resource allocation decisions are made in Allentown. This picture is,
overall, complicated and somewhat haphazard. Firstly, resource allocation can be
likened to a black box, in that the district lacks standard practices to disseminate and
explain information regarding resource allocation, resulting in a lack of transparency in
the budgeting process and leaving stakeholders with no ability to react to funding
decisions. There is also an unproductive relationship between the central office and
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This was the first year (2010-2011) that the community got involved with school budgeting.
Committees were set up to provide input as to what programs should be cut or reduced to deal with the
large budget shortfall. This was designed to address community unrest related to impending cuts. [It was
a political move that did not protect the Superintendent.]
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school-level administrators, which thwarts cooperative practices that build on the
strengths and knowledge of all participants in the budgeting process. The district seems
to lack a clear equity goal to guide resource allocation beyond per pupil staffing ratios–
though stakeholders, administration, program directors, and principals may have their
own. Even with a clearly stated equity goal, numerous external and internal problems
would prevent its realization. Also, the district does not consider teachers to be a
resource that is differentially allocated to schools. Another important finding is that the
district is driven by the need to raise revenue, and the availability of funds and
restrictions on their use guide school funding decisions. Finally, very few stakeholders
in the district pay attention to discrepancies among schools as there is a much greater
focus on outcomes that inputs. This is reinforced by a lack of community involvement
meaning that there is little political support to ensure that students are getting what they
need to succeed. All this leads to real discrepancies among schools within the district.
This chapter begins with an overview of the ASD, and describes resource
allocation in terms of horizontal equity. Although horizontal equity appears to be the
predominant framework for allocating resources in the district, there are numerous
instances in which horizontal equity is not achieved among elementary and middle
schools (i.e., leadership salaries, FTEs for administrators and paraprofessionals, teacher
effectiveness, average years of teaching, novice teachers, school-wide value added). A
review of student outcomes by school provides additional perspective, revealing that
much of the variability in student outcomes is due to variability among students rather
than attending a particular school.
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Following this analysis, a review of interviews with district and building
administrators brings to light a number of constraints which hamper district
administrators. First and foremost, there is a severe lack of resources to distribute
across the entire district. Beyond this large hurdle, district policy is not designed to
address student needs when allocating resources. This has meant that funding decisions
are often made based on a desire to augment the budget, putting grant compliance at the
center of the district’s agenda for resource allocation. In addition, district policies
related to human capital management are at odds with an equitable distribution of
resources. Furthermore, lack of transparency and a weak relationship between building
and central office administrators impede progress towards greater equity. Finally, few
stakeholders inside or outside the district focus their attention on discrepancies among
schools. All this plays a part in the inequity of the district’s resource allocation.
The following chapter draws from a wealth of data on expenditures and human
capital resources gathered from the district’s budget, human resources, accountability,
student services, and grants offices. In it, I add to the description of resource allocation
in Allentown presented above to consider intradistrict equity using both the vertical
equity framework and the comprehensive equity framework presented in Chapter Two.
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CHAPTER 6 – QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Overview
This chapter provides an analysis of equity within the ASD. This analysis builds
on the equity frameworks set forth earlier in this dissertation, presenting evaluations of
adequacy, vertical equity and, lastly, comprehensive equity, which incorporates
concepts of adequacy and vertical equity. In order to further test measures of equity, I
conduct a simulation of resource allocation to study the school-level implications of a
change in resource allocation consistent with both vertical equity and comprehensive
equity. Finally, the impact of the 2009-2010 ASD resource allocation is reviewed, with
additional analysis provided to clarify the relationships among school resources, school
need, school-level student outcomes.
Equity Findings
Comprehensive equity integrates both adequacy and vertical equity to ensure
that all students obtain the skills and competencies required to participate in a
democracy and be economically and socially self-sufficient and to ascertain that,
beyond the minimum standards attained, all students are similarly situated to progress
according to their competencies and desires. Though the focus of this dissertation is at
the district level, this framework can be used as a tool for evaluating resource allocation
at various levels – federal, state, district, and school. The following section considers
equity among schools within the Allentown School District using the comprehensive
equity framework.
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The description of resource allocation in Allentown earlier in the previous
chapter presents findings on horizontal equity in ASD. While horizontal equity appears
to be the predominant framework for allocating resources in the district, there are
numerous instances at the elementary and middle schools in which this goal is not
achieved (i.e., leadership salaries, FTEs for administrators and paraprofessionals,
teacher effectiveness, average years of teaching, novice teachers, school-wide value
added). Comprehensive equity requires that resource distribution meet a higher
standard than horizontal equity, which calls for having all schools receive equivalent
resources based on census alone. My analysis looks at three distinct measures of equity:
adequacy (and relative adequacy), vertical equity, and comprehensive equity - a
combined measure that assumes that resources should be allocated to ensure that all
students reach a minimum threshold of competency and to address student needs that
are morally arbitrary (e.g., poverty and ELL status).
Adequacy. Adequacy is achieved when all students meet a predetermined
threshold. For this analysis, I compare schools against use the definition of adequacy
embraced by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. A limitation of this approach is that
the data available provides proxies for “adequacy” that may not tell the whole story of a
students’ achievements and ability to be successful economically, socially, and function
as a successful citizen. In lieu of the perfect measure, I use what is readily quantifiable
and collectable, including a number of outcome measures that are available from the
school district and/or state. The first of these outcome measures is test score results on
the state assessment. As this assessment has been designed to measure student
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competency as predetermined by the state, it serves as a viable proxy for academic
achievement, and is intended to be a rough stand-in for economic success. The design
of No Child Left Behind legislation further supports my contention that the state
assessment is an appropriate measure, as the state and districts use the assessment to
support the identification of students who are not “proficient” – or “not meeting
adequacy requirements.”
Additional measures of adequacy include measures that are designed to fulfill
other goals of public education, such as ensuring social success. Three pieces of data
are readily available to provide measures of social success: in-school suspensions, outof-school suspensions and attendance. Although these data are insufficient to address
the complete range of outcomes related to the goals of public education, they do
provide a starting place. Additional data on student outcomes regarding social success
and citizenship would be more difficult to gather, but could be collected through
student surveys and other qualitative measures.
Academic Achievement. For the purposes of this study, the primary measure of
adequacy is the proportion of students who meet a pre-determined standard, such as
scoring “proficient or above” on an assessment. The following figures provide data on
elementary and middle schools and the percentage of their students deemed adequate.
Figures 24 and 25 identify students by poverty, ELL, and special education status.
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Figure 23. Percentage Proficient and Above on PSSA (Math and Reading), by
School, SY2010
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Figure 24. Percentage Proficient and Above on PSSA (Math), by School and
Subgroup, SY2010
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Figure 25. Percentage Proficient and Above on PSSA (Reading), by School and
Subgroup, SY2010

Clearly, there is much variation among schools with regard to the academic success of
their students. There is also variation among different subgroups of students within the
school district. There could be many reasons for these inequities, some related to
student characteristics (e.g., preparation, parental support) and some related to school
inputs. Adequacy requires that the school address all the needs of the children to ensure
that they attain proficiency.
Another way to measure adequacy is to take into consideration “relative
adequacy.” Relative adequacy is achieved if the adequacy deficit in each school
(average distance from proficiency) is equivalent. Measures of relative adequacy
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include range - the difference between the value of the smallest and the largest
adequacy deficit - and the Coefficient of Variation (CV) - the standard deviation
divided by the mean of all adequacy deficits. This measure would be a useful tool in
evaluating and comparing multiple school districts.
Table 20. Adequacy Deficit for ASD Academic Achievement, SY2010
Academic Achievement Adequacy Deficit – Math
(2009-2010)
All
Spec.
Econ.
students
Educ.
ELL
Disadvantage
Elementary Schools
Range
38.70
65.00
66.70
56.00
CV
0.30
0.26
0.26
0.40
Middle Schools
Range
11.50
31.40
25.90
23.30
CV
0.11
0.18
0.16
0.23
Academic Achievement Adequacy Deficit – Reading
(2009-2010)
All
Spec.
Econ.
students
Educ.
ELL
Disadvantage
Elementary Schools
Range
32.80
28.60
33.30
29.50
CV
0.21
0.10
0.11
0.18
Middle Schools
Range
7.90
15.20
39.70
19.10
CV
0.07
0.08
0.24
0.17

An analysis of how the adequacy deficit is distributed among schools reveals a
large difference between the percentage of students reaching proficiency in the school
closest to and furthest from meeting the adequacy target. Also, the gap between current
proficiency levels and the adequacy target is differentially distributed among schools.
Further, when looking at subgroups of students, achievement of Hispanic students and
ELL students stand out as being most uneven across schools. Differential outcomes
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may be driven by purposeful grouping of students (e.g., IEP). Further research could
address this concern.
The following figure provides another measure of adequacy which is calculated
by the state. Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) is a measure of the number of the
students in each school who meet a predetermined benchmark which the state has
deemed to represent an adequate level of academic proficiency. This figure may be
misleading, however, as the larger elementary schools, due to their size, are more likely
to be required to report on subgroups of students that are prone to struggle with the
state assessment (e.g., ELL students).
AYP status (1 - 4)
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Figure 26. AYP Status, SY2010
Note. Level 1 = Making AYP; Level 2 = Making Progress; Level 3 = Warning; Level 4
= Corrective Action
Additional outcome measures considered for adequacy. Schools are expected
to serve purposes beyond ensuring academic achievement, including preparing children
for their adult lives as political, economic, and social beings. It is useful to consider
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such purposes when determining adequacy, but this is difficult in most districts, as the
available data is sparse. The only reliable outcomes data that the ASD collects is
attendance and suspensions. The following table provides measures of dispersion to
demonstrate the variation among schools, most notably with in-school and out-ofschool suspensions.
Table 21. Adequacy Deficit for ASD Non-Academic Achievement, SY2010
Non-Academic Achievement Adequacy Deficit(2009-2010)
AYP status In-school
Out-of-School
% absences
(1-4)
suspensions
Suspensions
(ADA/ ADM)
Elementary Schools
Mean (SD) 1.71(1.14) 9.29(13.57)
35.86(41.46)
0.94(0.01)
Range
3.00
45.00
150.00
0.03
CV
0.66
1.46
1.16
0.01
Middle Schools
Mean (SD) 4.00(0.00) 1018.75(417.77) 479.50(359.07)
0.93(0.00)
Range
0.00
1010.00
703.00
0.01
CV
0.00
0.41
0.75
0.00

Additional adequacy measures provide a means of evaluating student outcomes
that go beyond academic achievement. The outcomes measures collected by the ASD
that do not directly tie to academic achievement are suspensions and absences. Figures
28 and 29 depict the how these outcomes measures vary by school. In the 2009-2010
school year, Central Elementary School had a much higher percentage of suspensions
than other elementary schools and Harrison-Morton Middle School had a much higher
percentage of suspensions than other middle schools. Alone, this data does not explain
what is happening in the school. For example, it is not possible to discern from this data
if the children in the school are more prone to serious behavior problems or if the
school’s discipline policy is more severe. It is also impossible to know the impact of
suspending these students without looking at previous and future data. On the other
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hand, the data does provide an initial indication of a potential problem that deserves
investigation.
Elementary Schools: Suspensions as Percent of Enrollment Days
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Figure 27. In-School and Out-of-School Suspensions as a Percent of Enrollment
Days (Elementary Schools), SY2010
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Middle School: Suspensions as Percent of Enrollment Days
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Figure 28. In-School and Out-of-School Suspensions as a Percent of Enrollment
Days (Middle Schools), SY2010

School absences provide another means of evaluating schools. Students are
much more likely to be successful, academically and socially, if they attend school
regularly. There may be legitimate reasons for differences in absences among schools
but, in instances where the variation is large, further investigation is warranted.
Although there is some variation in school absences by school, the variation is small.
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Figure 29. In-School and Out-of-School Suspensions as a Percent of Enrollment
Days (Elementary Schools), SY2010

Vertical Equity. Allentown achieves vertical equity if resources are allocated to
schools based on the differing needs of the students in the school. As described in
Chapter 3, vertical equity is evaluated through the creation of an index of needs at each
school. An index for each building was created to account for the number of students in
poverty (as determined by Free and Reduced Price Lunch status), the number of ELL
students, and the number of students with disabilities. I identify these particular needs –
poverty, ELL status, and special education status –because they are considered by the
Pennsylvania Department of Education in allocating funds to all districts within the
state. In fact, this index is derived from the same weights that the state had used to
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allocated public dollars.120 This needs index is correlated with various school resources
to elucidate the relationship between a school’s need (as determined by the composition
of the student body) and the quantity and/or quality of inputs into the child’s education.
I consider the same resources when establishing the extent of horizontal equity
in the Allentown School District as in the analysis of vertical equity. As stated above,
these resources can be categorized into expenditures and human capital resources.
Expenditures include total operating funds, operating funds intended to be directed to
address the needs of students in poverty, and operating funds intended to be directed to
address the needs of ELL students. Expenditures also include salaries, aggregate as well
as for specific responsibilities (i.e., instruction, support and professional development,
leadership, operations and maintenance, and pupil services). Human capital resources
include various measures of, or proxies for, teaching quality. The indicators identified
for this study include average salaries for core and non-core teachers, professional
development, FTE’s (with measures of students per staff, students per teacher, students
per administrator, and students per paraprofessional). Closely tied to the review of
FTE’s at the school level is a review of average class size at each school. Additional
measures of teaching quality include teacher effect (based on teacher-level value added
scores), teacher self-efficacy (for classroom management, student engagement, and
instructional strategies), average years of teaching experience, the percentage of
teachers in a building with less than three years of experience, the percentage of
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These weights were put forth in the Costing-Out Study Report funded by the PA legislature and
adopted by the Rendell administration.
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teachers in a building with more than four years of experience, and the percentage of
teachers with a masters or above. Finally, three school-wide measures of teaching
quality are also considered: the schools growth index for math and reading and
collective efficacy.
Vertical Equity Analysis. Two analyses were conducted to evaluate vertical
equity: one among elementary schools (n=14) and one among middle schools (n=4).
Due to the small sample size, there are fewer statistically significant results than might
otherwise be expected; this effect is exaggerated in the analysis of middle schools.
Statistically significant positive correlations would indicate that there is a measurable
relationship between resources and school need, and as need increases, so do resources.
Statistically significant negative correlations would indicate that there is a measurable
relationship between resources and school need, but as need increases, resources
decrease.
Table 22. Needs Index for Elementary and Middle Schools in Allentown, SY2010
School
Lehigh Parkway
Ritter
Muhlenberg
Union Terrace
Sheridan
Roosevelt
Jackson
Washington
McKinley
Dodd
Cleveland
Mosser
Central
Jefferson

Needs Index
1.35
1.40
1.41
1.42
1.42
1.45
1.46
1.50
1.51
1.51
1.51
1.53
1.54
1.54
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Table 23. Vertical Equity among Elementary Schools in ASD, SY2010

Resources Allocated among Schools
Financial Resources

Elementary Schools
Horizontal
Equity post
Correlation
Vertical
Coefficients
Equity

Operating Funds (PPE)
.24
Poverty Spending (PPE)
.15
ELL Spending (PPE)
.48**
Discretionary Bldg Funds (PPE)
-.41*
Title I Funds (PPE) – all schools
-.11***
Title I Funds (PPE) – excluding
Sheridan
.92***
Teacher Support
Professional Development (PPE)
.00
Human Capital Salaries
Total Salary (PPE)
.29
Instruction Salaries (PPE)
.38*
Instruction Support/PD Salaries
(PPE)
.01
Leadership Salaries (PPE)
-.22
Operations/Maintenance Salaries
(PPE)
-.05
Pupil Services Salaries (PPE)
.22
Average Teacher Salaries
Core Teachers
-.22
Non-Core Teachers
.30
Special Populations Teachers
-.30
All Teachers
-.22
Full Time Equivalents (FTEs)
Students per staff
-.50**
Students per teacher
-.56***
Students per administrator
.08
Students per paraprofessional
-.21
Average class size (w/o 100% SPED)
-.08
Individual Measures of Teacher Quality
Low teacher effect (district gain)
.35
High teacher effect (district
gain)
-.56***
Teacher Efficacy-Classroom Mgmt
-.50**
Teacher Efficacy-Student
Engagement
-.23
Teacher Efficacy-Instructional
-.36

94%
98%
77%
83%
99%
100%
100%
91%
86%
100%
95%
100%
95%
95%
91%
91%
95%
75%
69%
99%
95%
99%
88%
69%
75%
95%
87%
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Strategies
Avg. years of teaching exp.
-.47**
% of teachers w/ less than 3 yrs
exp.
-.10
% of personnel w/ Masters or above
-.22
School-wide Measures of Teacher Quality
Growth Index (Math)
-.01
Growth Index (Reading)
.11
Collective Efficacy
-.56***

78%
99%
95%
100%
99%
68%

Note. *** p<.05, **p<.10, *p<.20

Table 24. Vertical Equity among Middle Schools in ASD, SY2010
Middle Schools

Resources Allocated among Schools
Financial Resources
Operating Funds (PPE)
Poverty Spending (PPE)
ELL Spending (PPE)
Discretionary Bldg Funds (PPE)
Title I Funds (PPE)
Teacher Support
Professional Development (PPE)
Human Capital Salaries
Total Salary (PPE)
Instruction Salaries (PPE)
Leadership Salaries (PPE)
Operations/Maintenance Salaries (PPE)
Pupil Services Salaries (PPE)
Average Teacher Salaries
Core Teachers
Non-Core Teachers
Special Populations Teachers
All Teachers
Full Time Equivalents (FTEs)
Students per staff
Students per teacher
Students per administrator
Students per paraprofessional
Average class size (w/o 100% SPED)

Correlation
Coefficients
.39
.54
.34
.87*
.57***

Horizontal
Equity
post
Vertical
Equity
85%
71%
89%
24%
68%

-.74

45%

.37
.57
-.94**
-.91**
-.24

86%
68%
12%
17%
94%

-.04
.09
-.67
-.17

100%
99%
55%
97%

-.82*
-.57
-.86*
-.15
-.47

33%
68%
26%
98%
78%
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Individual Measures of Teacher Quality
Low teacher effect (district gain)
-.20
High teacher effect (district gain)
-.17
Teacher Efficacy-Classroom Mgmt
-.56
Teacher Efficacy-Student Engagement
-.89*
Teacher Efficacy-Instructional
Strategies
-.61
Avg. years of teaching exp.
-.75
% of teachers w/ less than 3 yrs exp.
.90**
School-wide Measures of Teacher Quality
Growth Index (Math)
.33
Growth Index (Reading)
.62
Collective Efficacy
-.77

96%
97%
69%
22%
63%
44%
19%
33%
62%
41%

Note. ***p<.05, **p<.10, *p<.20

Of the various financial resources allocated to schools, there are only two
statistically significant findings: ELL spending is strongly, positively correlated with
school need, r(12) = .48, p < .10; and the principal’s discretionary funds are negatively
correlated with school need, r(12) = -.41, p < .20. Categories of salaries were reviewed
to determine their relationship with school need and instructional salaries (making up
the bulk of school funding) are found to be positively correlated with school need, r(12)
= .38, p < .20. Interestingly, the number of students per staff, and the number of
students per teacher are each strongly, negatively correlated with school need, r(12) = .50, p < .10 and r(12) = -.56, p < .05. As many students per staff or per teacher is not
desired, a negative correlation is a good sign, indicating that high needs schools are
more likely to have fewer students per staff and per teacher. This finding conflicts with
the correlation coefficient for class size and school need, which reveals no statistically
significant finding, and does not even indicate a clear direction. The fact that “teachers”
are not all “classroom teachers” might explain this finding.
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Teaching quality is also a resource distributed among schools considered in this
analysis. The teaching quality of individual teachers and the teaching quality of the
entire school are investigated, with noteworthy results. Individual measures of teaching
quality include effectiveness, self-efficacy, experience, and credentials. High teacher
effectiveness, as measured by value-added scores, and school need are strongly
negatively correlated, r(12) = -.56, p < .05. This indicates that the most impactful
teachers are less likely to be in high needs schools. Additionally, teacher self-efficacy
with regard to classroom management is strongly, negatively correlated with school
need, r(12) = -.50, p < .10. This indicates that teachers more certain of their classroom
management skills are less likely to be in high needs schools. Also, average years of
teaching experience is strongly negatively correlated with school need, r(12) = -.47, p <
.10. This indicates that schools in which teachers have more years of teaching
experience are less likely to be high needs schools. A school-wide measure of teaching
quality, collective efficacy is strongly negatively correlated with school need, r(12) = .56, p < .05. This indicates that greater collective efficacy is less likely to be seen in
high needs schools.
Analysis of the correlations between needs and resources in ASD middle
schools is difficult due to the very small sample size; there are very few correlation
coefficients which are statistically significant. Of all financial resources allocated to
schools, the principal’s discretionary budget stands out as being very strongly,
positively correlated with school need, r(12) = .87, p < .20. Leadership salaries and
operations and maintenance salaries are negatively correlated with school need, r(12) =
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-.94, p < .10 and r(12) = -.91, p < .10. This indicates that administrators and facility
staff salaries are lower in schools with higher needs. The number of students per staff
and the number of students per administrator are each strongly negatively correlated
with school need, r(2) = -.82, p < .20, r(2) = -.86, p < .20. As explained above, a
negative correlation is a good sign in this case, since it means that high needs schools
are more likely to have fewer students per staff and per administrator. Two indicators of
teaching quality show statistically significant correlations with school need: teacher
self-efficacy with regard to student engagement and the percentage of new teachers
(those with less than three years of experience). Teacher self-efficacy with regard to
student engagement and school need are strongly negatively correlated, r(2) = -.89, p <
.20¸ indicating that teachers more certain of their ability to foster student engagement
are less likely to be in high needs schools. The percentage of new teachers in a school
and school need are strongly positively correlated, r(2) =.90, p < .10, indicating higher
percentages of new teachers in high needs schools.
Another means of evaluating vertical equity (and comprehensive equity) entails
looking at horizontal equity statistics after taking into account school need. The
construction of the needs index allows for each school to have a weighted student
count. This, in turn, can be used to considering the allocation of operating funds among
schools with differing requirements due to the composition of the student body. Table
25 and Figure 30, which provide horizontal equity statistics and a graphical depiction of
the allocation of operating funds, again reveal inequities among schools.
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Table 25. Review of Horizontal Equity Statistics for Operating Funds per Weighted
Student, SY2010

Elementary Schools
Mean
SD
Range
CV
MI
Middle Schools
Mean
SD
Range
CV
MI

Operating Funds per
Vertical Equity
Weighted Student Count

Operating Funds per
Comprehensive Equity
Weighted Student Count

$ 4,397
$ 3,298
$ 13,170
0.36
0.61

$ 11,372
$ 2,575
$ 7,626
0.23
0.86

$ 1,829
$ 475
$ 1,057
0.26
0.76

$ 8,531
$2,155
$ 4,787
0.25
0.94

$7,000
$6,000
$5,000
$4,000
$3,000
$2,000
$1,000
$0

Operating Funds per Vertical Equity Weighted Student Count
Operating Funds per Comprehensive Equity Weighted Student Count

Figure 30. Operating Funds per Weighted Student Count, SY2009-2010
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Considering specific needs. I conducted additional analysis to unpack the needs
index by considering the number of students in a building identified in a given category
(i.e., poverty, ELL status, and special education status) and the corresponding financial
resources allocated to each school to specifically address the needs of these students.
Simple calculations provide expenditures per student in poverty, per ELL student, and
per special education student. As seen in Table 26, horizontal equity statistics
demonstrate that expenditures per student in poverty and expenditures per special
education student are not allocated equivalently across schools. (For expenditures per
student in poverty, this lack of equivalency is more pronounced in elementary school
than middle school.) Also, expenditures per ELL student in elementary schools stand
out as being highly variable among schools.
Table 26. Review of Horizontal Equity Statistics for Expenditures per Student in
Poverty, Expenditures per ELL Student, and Expenditures per Special Education
Student, SY2010
Expenditures
per student in
poverty

Expenditures
per ELL
student

Expenditures per
special ed.
student

Elementary Schools
Mean
$ 1,126
$ 4,397
$ 11,372
SD
$ 276
$ 3,298
$ 2,575
Range
$ 986
$ 13,170
$ 7,626
CV
0.25
0.36
0.23
MI
0.89
0.61
0.86
Middle Schools
Mean
$ 1,333
$ 1,829
$ 8,531
SD
$ 220
$ 475
$2,155
Range
$ 485
$ 1,057
$ 4,787
CV
0.16
0.26
0.25
MI
0.84
0.76
0.94
Note. Lehigh Parkway is not included in the statistics under Expenditures per ELL student. Only 3.2% of
students at this school are ELL status. This outlier skews the results. (The CV = .75 and the MI = .83
with Lehigh Parkway included in the calculation.)
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Figure 31 provides information on average poverty spending in each school for
every student in poverty. Similarly, Figures 32 and 33 provide information on average
special education spending in each school for every special education student and
average ELL spending in each school for every ELL student.
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$1,200
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$400
$200
$-

Figure 31. Expenditures per Student in Poverty, SY2010
Note. High expenditures per student in poverty at Sheridan elementary school is due to
its high Title I budget ($820 per student).
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Figure 32. Expenditures per Special Education Student, SY2010
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$10,000
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Figure 33. Expenditures per English Language Learner Student, SY2010
Note. Only 3.2% of students at Lehigh Parkway are designated as being ELL status.

My final analysis looks at the relationship between expenditures per high needs
student and the percentage of high needs students. This provides a means of evaluating
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the extent to which higher need schools are more or less likely to receive supports to
address their needs. Correlations between expenditures for students in poverty and the
percentage of students in poverty were positive, but not significant (ES: r(12) = .21;
MS: r(2) = .80). This was also the case for expenditures for special education students
and the percentage of special education students (ES: r(12) = .38; MS: r(2) = .21).
Lastly, while there was a non-significant, slightly negative correlation between
expenditures for ELL students and the percentage of ELL students in middle school
(r(2) = -.08), there was a significant positive correlation between expenditures for ELL
students and the percentage of ELL students in elementary school, r(14) = .42, p <
.20.121 Only in the case of ELL in elementary schools can an argument be made that
schools with greater need due to the portion of ELL students served are more likely to
receive funds tied to ELL.
School budgeted dollars versus centrally budgeted dollars. As discussed
earlier, analyzing school budgets within districts can be extremely difficult as many
expenditures are conducted centrally, even though they are intended to address the
needs of specific schools. This means that there is no accounting for where a large
portion of resources go. In their analysis of ASD expenditures, Cross & Joftus
identified over $63 million (34% of the entire district budget and 37% of the funds
directed to specific schools) that were not tied to specific schools in FY 2009-2010.
With input from district administrators, I expanded Cross & Joftus’s analysis and was

121

Lehigh Parkway elementary school was removed from this analysis due to its outlier status.
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able to identify the schools in which an additional $34 million were spent.122 My
analysis of horizontal equity and vertical equity includes all funds to schools, including
both those budgeted specifically at the schools and those budgeted centrally.
In conducting this analysis, I was concerned that centrally-budgeted dollars may
be more or less equitably allocated to schools, and that this would be hidden by my
aggregate analysis. To address this concern, I include in my analysis the correlation
between total expenditures, school expenditures, and centrally-budgeted school
expenditures and the school need index. For elementary schools, I find a nonstatistically significant positive correlation between school expenditures and the school
needs index, r(12)=.25. The correlation coefficient is smaller for centrally-budgeted
expenditures, r(12)=.16. This finding shows more variation among school-budgeted
dollars per pupil than centrally-budgeted dollars per pupil in elementary schools. At the
middle school level, the correlation coefficients, while not statistically significant, are
stronger. A positive correlation is shown between school expenditures and the school
needs index, r(2)=.53, and a negative correlation is shown between centrally-budgeted
school expenditures and the school needs index, r(2)=-.38. There is a much larger
discrepancy among school-budgeted dollars per pupil and centrally-budgeted dollars
per pupil in middle school than elementary school. Overall, the impact of centrallybudgeted dollars on vertical equity is mixed.
Delving into this further requires an investigation of the relationship between
specific student needs and centrally-budgeted expenditures to address these needs.
122

This includes expenditures directed to the high schools and alternative schools which are not
considered in my analysis.
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Table 27 provides horizontal equity statistics to evaluate centrally-budgeted
expenditures per student in poverty, centrally-budgeted expenditures per special
education student, and centrally-budgeted expenditures per ELL student. In elementary
schools, centrally-budgeted expenditures per student in poverty and centrally-budgeted
expenditures per ELL student are indisputably not equivalently allocated to schools.
This is less evident for centrally-budgeted expenditures per special education student.
Middle schools reveal a different picture, with greater variation among schools for
centrally-budgeted expenditures per student in poverty and centrally-budgeted
expenditures per special education student.
Table 27. Centrally-Budgeted Expenditures per Student in Poverty, per Special
Education Student, and per ELL Student, SY2010
Centrallybudgeted
expenditures
per student in
poverty
Elementary Schools
Mean
$242
Range
$594
CV
0.72
MI
0.85
SD
$173
Middle Schools
Mean
$306
Range
$291
CV
0.40
MI
0.81
SD
$123

Centrallybudgeted
expenditures
per special ed.
student

Centrallybudgeted
expenditures
per ELL student

$5,456
$3,643
0.22
0.93
$1,211

$265
$778
0.73
0.85
$194

$2,837
$2,900
0.44
0.70
$1,252

$103
$60
0.26
0.76
$27

As with the review of poverty, special education, and ELL spending, Figures
34-36 provide information on average spending in each school for every student in a
given classification (i.e., poverty, special education, ELL), but look specifically at the
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dollars that are allocated from the central budget.
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Figure 34. Centrally-Budgeted Expenditures per Student in Poverty, SY2010
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Figure 35. Centrally-Budgeted Expenditures per Special Education Student,
SY2010

231
$1,000
$900
$800
$700
$600
$500
$400
$300
$200
$100
$0

Figure 36. Centrally-Budgeted Expenditures per English Language Learner
Student, SY2010

Correlation coefficients provide another means of evaluating the relationship
between dollars budgeted at the school and school need and dollars budgeted centrally
and school need. As seen in the table below, for elementary schools there are
statistically significant, positive relationships between the percentage of students in
poverty, the percentage of special education students, and the percentage of ELL
students and both school budgeted expenditures and centrally budgeted expenditures
dedicated to address the needs of these students. However, the correlation between
students in poverty and centrally-budgeted poverty spending is weak, r(12) = .05,
p<.05. At the middle school level, while positive, the correlation between ELL students
and both school budgeted and centrally budgeted ELL spending are not significant.
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Furthermore, the correlation between special education students and centrally-budgeted
special education spending is weak, r(2) = .03, p<.05.
Table 28. Correlation Coefficients relating School-Budgeted and Centrally-Budgeted
Expenditures to High Needs Students, SY2010
Schoolbudgeted
expenditures

Centrallybudgeted
expenditures

Elementary Schools
Students in poverty
Special Education students
ELL students
Middle Schools
Students in poverty
Special Education students
ELL students

.73**
.79**
.64**

.05**
.76**
.60**

.73**
.79*
.66

.60**
.03**
.66

Note. ** p<.05, * p<.10
Comprehensive Equity. The final equity measure is comprehensive equity,
which incorporates both adequacy and vertical equity as a means of understanding the
implications of resource allocation for students according to which school in the district
they attend. Specifically, comprehensive equity can be used to determine whether
resources are distributed such that schools composed of students with greater needs
(including both students that are not on track to meet standards AND students that
“cost” more due to poverty, ELL status, or Special Education status) receive greater
resources to address those needs.
This measure is constructed in the same way as the vertical equity measure,
through the use of correlation coefficients to identify relationships between school need
(using a needs index) and resources allocated to the school. The innovation to the
measure of vertical equity in the comprehensive model is the development of the needs
index. The needs index for comprehensive equity includes a weight for prior
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performance by accounting for the number of students who demonstrated inadequate
performance in the recent past. Then, as with the vertical equity needs index, the
comprehensive equity needs index takes into account the number of students in poverty
(as determined by Free and Reduced Price Lunch status), the number of ELL students,
and the number of students with disabilities within a school building. The difference
between comprehensive equity and vertical equity is that comprehensive equity takes
into account the fact that schools with greater numbers of struggling students will need
greater resources. In essence, it seeks to address the goal of having all students achieve
“adequacy” at the same time as compensating for students’ “disadvantages.” This
construct provides a means of evaluating intradistrict equity as defined in the equity
framework.
Once again, the resources considered in the analysis of comprehensive equity
are the same as those considered when establishing the extent of horizontal and vertical
equity in the Allentown School District.
Comprehensive Equity Analysis. Two analyses were conducted to evaluate
comprehensive equity: one among elementary schools (n=14) and one among middle
schools (n=4). Again, the small sample size results in fewer statistically significant
findings.

234
Table 29. Comprehensive Equity among Elementary Schools in ASD, SY2010

Resources Allocated among Schools
Financial Resources
Operating Funds (PPE)
Poverty Spending (PPE)
ELL Spending (PPE)
Discretionary Bldg Funds (PPE)
Title I Funds (PPE)- all schools
Title I Funds (PPE) – excluding
Sheridan
Teacher Support
Professional Development (PPE)
Human Capital Salaries
Total Salary (PPE)
Instruction Salaries (PPE)
Instruction Support/PD Salaries (PPE)
Leadership Salaries (PPE)
Operations/Maintenance Salaries (PPE)
Pupil Services Salaries (PPE)
Average Teacher Salaries
Core Teachers
Non-Core Teachers
Special Populations Teachers
All Teachers
Full Time Equivalents (FTEs)
Students per staff
Students per teacher
Students per administrator
Students per paraprofessional
Average class size (w/o 100% SPED)
Individual Measures of Teacher Quality
Low teacher effect (district gain)
High teacher effect (district gain)
Teacher Efficacy-Classroom Mgmt
Teacher Efficacy-Student Engagement
Teacher Efficacy-Instructional
Strategies
Avg. years of teaching exp.

Elementary Schools
Horizontal
Equity
post
Correlation
Vertical
Coefficients Equity
.17
.15
.59***
-.32
-.08***

97%
98%
65%
90%
99%

.88***

100%

-.16

97%

.17
.23
-.16
-.34
.02
.37*

97%
95%
97%
88%
100%
86%

-.39*
.37*
-.34
-.37*

85%
86%
88%
86%

-.38*
-.51**
.23
-.05
-.28

86%
74%
95%
100%
92%

.21
-.42*
-.65***
-.41*

96%
82%
58%
83%

-.53**
-.60*

72%
65%
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% of teachers w/ less than 3 yrs exp. -.02
% of personnel w/ Masters or above
-.47**
School-wide Measures of Teacher Quality
Growth Index (Math)
.22
Growth Index (Reading)
.39
Collective Efficacy
-.65***

100%
78%
95%
85%
58%

Note. *** p<.05, **p<.10, *p<.20

Table 30. Comprehensive Equity among Middle Schools in ASD, SY2010
Middle Schools

Resources Allocated among Schools
Financial Resources
Operating Funds (PPE)
Poverty Spending (PPE)
ELL Spending (PPE)
Discretionary Bldg Funds (PPE)
Title I Funds (PPE)
Teacher Support
Professional Development (PPE)
Human Capital Salaries
Total Salary (PPE)
Instruction Salaries (PPE)
Leadership Salaries (PPE)
Operations/Maintenance Salaries (PPE)
Pupil Services Salaries (PPE)
Average Teacher Salaries
Core Teachers
Non-Core Teachers
Special Populations Teachers
All Teachers
Full Time Equivalents (FTEs)
Students per staff
Students per teacher
Students per administrator
Students per paraprofessional
Average class size (w/o 100% SPED)
Individual Measures of Teacher Quality
Low teacher effect (district gain)
High teacher effect (district gain)

Correlation
Coefficients

Horizontal
Equity post
Vertical
Equity

.39
.55
.32
.87*
.58*

85%
70%
90%
24%
67%

-.74

45%

.38
.57
-.93**
-.92**
-.24

86%
68%
13%
16%
95%

-.03
.09
-.66
-.17

100%
99%
56%
97%

-.82*
-.56
-.86*
-.14
-.48

33%
68%
27%
98%
77%

-.20
-.18

96%
97%
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Teacher Efficacy-Classroom Mgmt
-.56
Teacher Efficacy-Student Engagement
-.89*
Teacher Efficacy-Instructional
Strategies
-.62
Avg. years of teaching exp.
-.74
% of teachers w/ less than 3 yrs exp.
.90*
School-wide Measures of Teacher Quality
Growth Index (Math)
.33
Growth Index (Reading)
.60
Collective Efficacy
-.78

69%
20%
62%
45%
19%
89%
63%
40%

Note. ***p<.05, **p<.10, *p<.20

Of the various financial resources allocated to elementary schools, there is only
one statistically significant finding: ELL spending is strongly, positively correlated with
school need, r(12) = .59, p < .05. Categories of salaries were reviewed to determine
their relationship with school need and only pupil services salaries are found to be
positively correlated with school need, r(12) = .37, p < .20. Unlike the relationship
between the vertical equity needs index that does not take into account prior
performance and average teacher salary, the comprehensive equity needs index is
negatively correlated with average teacher salary, r(12)=-.37, p < .20. This indicates
that average teacher salaries are lower in schools with greater needs. Interestingly, the
number of students per staff, and the number of students per teacher are each strongly,
negatively correlated with school need, r(12) = -.38, p < .20 and r(12) = -.51, p < .10.
Since many students per staff or per teacher is not desired, a negative correlation is a
good sign; high needs schools are more likely to have fewer students per staff and per
teacher. As is the case with vertical equity, this finding conflicts with the correlation
coefficient for class size and school need, which reveals no statistically significant
finding, but indicates a similar direction. (A stronger disparity is found when prior
performance is excluded from the needs index.)
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This analysis investigates the teaching quality of individual teachers and the
teaching quality of the entire school as resources which are allocated among schools.
Individual measures of teaching quality include effectiveness, self-efficacy, experience,
and credentials. High teacher effectiveness, as measured by value-added scores, and
school need are strongly negatively correlated, r(12) = -.42, p < .20. This indicates that
the most impactful teachers are less likely to be in high needs schools. Additionally,
teacher self-efficacy with regard to classroom management, student engagement, and
instructional strategies are all strongly, negatively correlated with school need, r(12) = .65, p < .05, r(12) = -.41, p < .20, r(12) = -.53, p < .10. This indicates that teachers more
certain of their skills are less likely to be in high needs schools. (This finding is more
pronounced when considering students’ prior performance.) Additionally, average
years of teaching experience is strongly negatively correlated with school need, r(12) =
-.60, p < .10. This indicates that teachers with more years of teaching experience are
less likely to be high needs schools. A school-wide measure of teaching quality,
collective efficacy, is strongly negatively correlated with school need, r(12) = -.65, p <
.05. This indicates that greater collective efficacy is less likely to be seen in high needs
schools. (Again, this finding is more pronounced when considering students’ prior
performance.)
Analysis of the correlations between needs and resources in middle schools is
especially difficult due to the very small sample size; there are very few correlation
coefficients which are statistically significant. The findings for comprehensive equity at
the middle school level are almost completely aligned with the findings for vertical
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equity. Of all financial resources allocated to schools, the principal’s discretionary
budget stands out as being very strongly, positively correlated with school need, r(12) =
.87, p < .20. Leadership salaries and operations and maintenance salaries are negatively
correlated with school need, r(12) = -.93, p < .10 and r(12) = -.92, p < .10. This
indicates that administrators and facility staff salaries are lower in schools with higher
needs. The number of students per staff and the number of students per administrator
are each strongly negatively correlated with school need, r(2) = -.82, p < .20, r(2) = .86, p < .20. As explained above, a negative correlation is a good sign in this case as it
means that high needs schools are more likely to have fewer students per staff and per
administrator. Two indicators of teaching quality show statistically significant
correlations with school need: teacher self-efficacy with regard to student engagement
and the percentage of new teachers (those with less than three years of experience).
Teacher self-efficacy with regard to student engagement and school need are strongly
negatively correlated, r(2) = -.89, p < .20¸ indicating that teachers more certain of their
ability to foster student engagement are less likely to be in high needs schools. The
percentage of new teachers in a school and school need are strongly positively
correlated, r(2) =.90, p < .10, indicating higher percentages of new teachers in high
needs schools.
Table 31 provides a summary of the evidence on the extent to which resource
allocation is equitable according to my comprehensive equity measure. The right
column indicates the school level, elementary or middle, in which the evidence for each
particular resource falls.
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Table 31. Summary of Evidence on Equity in ASD, SY2010
Evidence of equity
ELL spending per pupil is likely to be
greater in high needs schools
Instructional salaries per pupil is
likely to be higher in high needs
schools
Pupil services salaries per pupil is
likely to be higher in high needs
schools
Average non-core teacher salaries are
likely to be higher in schools with
greater needs
The principal’s discretionary budget is
likely to be higher in high needs
schools
Pupils per staff ratios are likely to be
lower in high needs schools
Pupils per teacher ratios are likely to
be lower in high needs schools
Pupils per administrator ratios are
likely to be lower in high needs schools
Evidence of strong misalignment with equity
The principal’s discretionary budget is
likely to be lower in schools with
greater needs
Leadership salaries per pupil are likely
to be lower in schools with greater
needs
Operation and maintenance salaries per
pupil are likely to be lower in schools
with greater needs
Average teacher salaries are likely to
be lower in schools with greater needs
Average core teacher salaries are likely
to be lower in schools with greater
needs
The most effective teachers are less
likely to be in high needs schools
Teachers more certain of their skills
(with regard to classroom management,
student engagement, and instructional
strategies) are less likely to be in
high needs schools
Teachers more certain of their classroom
management ability are less likely to be
in high needs schools
Teachers more certain of their ability
to foster student engagement are less
likely to be in high needs schools
Teachers with more years of teaching
experience are less likely to be high

Vertical
Equity

Comprehensive
Equity

ES

ES

ES
ES
ES
MS

MS

ES, MS

ES, MS

ES

ES

MS

MS

ES
MS

MS

MS

MS
ES
ES

ES

ES

ES
ES
MS

MS

ES

ES
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needs schools
Novice teachers are more likely to be in
high needs schools
Teachers with masters degrees or above
are less likely to be in high needs
schools
Greater collective efficacy is less
likely to be seen in high needs schools

MS

MS
ES

ES

ES

As can be seen in this table, there are many resources for which there is either
no evidence of comprehensive equity or evidence that there is strong misalignment with
comprehensive equity.
Average teacher salaries. As noted in Chapter 2, previous studies on the distribution of
average salaries among schools have revealed a mal-distribution of average salaries,
with higher average salaries in schools with lower needs. Unlike these studies, my
research finds no statistically significant negative correlations between average teacher
salary and school need when only poverty, ELL status and special education status are
used to define school need. When prior test scores are included in the definition of
school need, however, a statistically significant negative correlation is found for core
teachers, special population teachers, and all teachers.
Table 32 provides horizontal equity statistics and correlation coefficients for
human capital resources to schools in the ASD.
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Table 32
Table 32. Horizontal Equity Statistics and Correlation Coefficients for Human Capital
Resources in the ASD, SY2010

Total salary (PPE)
Avg. tch sal(all)
Avg. tch sal(core)
Avg. tch sal(non-core)
Students per teacher
Avg. class size
Avg. teaching exp
% of novice teachers
% teachers with
Masters or higher

HE (CV)
ES
MS
0.12
0.07
0.07
0.05
0.08
0.05
0.16
0.10
0.11
0.07
0.07
0.03
0.24
0.19
0.39
0.31
0.25
**

VE (corr)
ES
MS
+0.29 +0.37
-0.22 -0.17
-0.22 -0.04
+0.30 +0.09
-0.56 -0.57
-0.08 -0.47
-0.47 -0.75
-0.10 +0.90
-0.22 **

CE (corr)
ES
MS
+0.17 +0.38
-0.37 -0.17
-0.39 -0.03
+0.37 +0.09
-0.51 -0.56
-0.28 -0.48
-0.60 -0.74
-0.02 +0.90
-0.47 **

Note: ** indicates that the data is not available. Equity statistics highlighted in yellow indicate “nearly
horizontally equitable” and equity statistics highlighted in purple indicate “horizontally inequitable.”
Highlighted correlation coefficients indicate statistically significant results.

Average salaries are distributed in accordance with horizontal equity, but not
vertical or comprehensive equity as average teacher salaries are lower in high needs
schools. This is driven by core teacher salaries given their large numbers. However,
correlation coefficients indicating inequity are dampened by average non-core teacher
salary which is positively correlated with need, most notably in elementary school.
Further investigation provides additional insight into this finding. Figure 37
offers a view of the distribution of teacher salaries within the two highest and lowest
need schools, based on the needs index used to measure comprehensive equity. On
average, Jefferson Elementary School and Central Elementary School, the higher-needs
schools, have lower teacher salaries than Muhlenberg Elementary School and Lehigh
Parkway Elementary School, the lower-needs schools. However, there is considerable
variation in all schools. Another important note is that Lehigh Parkway is one of the
schools with the highest percentage of teachers with less than three years experience.
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Figure 37: Distribution of Average Teacher Salary within the Two Highest and
Two Lowest Need Schools, SY2010

School budgeted dollars versus centrally budgeted dollars. The possibility that
centrally-budgeted dollars, as opposed to school budgeted dollars, might be driving
inequities remains a concern when considering comprehensive equity. An analysis of
the correlation between total expenditures, school expenditures, and centrally-budgeted
school expenditures and the school need index reveals findings similar to those in the
vertical equity analysis. In this analysis for elementary schools I find a non-statistically
significant positive correlation between school expenditures and the school needs
index, r(12)=.20. The correlation coefficient is smaller for centrally-budgeted
expenditures, r(12)=.15. The correlations coefficients, while not statistically
significant, are stronger at the middle school level. There is a positive correlation
between school expenditures and the school needs index, r(2)=.50, and a negative
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correlation between centrally-budgeted school expenditures and the school needs index,
r(2)=-.35. Again, this finding indicates that centrally-budgeted expenditures are not
allocated to schools is such a way as to take school need into account.
Because the school district does not consider expenditures directly tied to
students’ past performance, it is not possible to conduct an analysis that looks at the
relationship between student needs (in a building) based on prior performance and
resources allocated to buildings.
Horizontal equity post vertical equity. As part of the evaluation of vertical
equity and comprehensive equity, this analysis attempts to contextualize the findings by
providing a measure which quantifies how much of the relationship between the needs
indexes and the various resources investigated explains the total variation among
resources to schools. Originally conceived to study interdistrict equity to identify
discrepancies of resource allocation among similarly situated school districts, the
horizontal equity post vertical equity (HEVE ) measure conveys unexplained variance
after vertical equity is taken into account (Toutkoushian and Michael, 2009).
Tables 24 and 25 present horizontal equity post vertical equity results. By
construction, 0% ≤ HEVE ≤ 100%, and horizontal equity post vertical equity is achieved
when HEVE = 0%. Across the board, HEVE is quite high, revealing considerable
variation among schools that is not explained by the studied relationships. Only for
those statistically significant correlation coefficients is a higher percentage of variation
among schools explained. This result is consistent with my qualitative findings which
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indicate that allocation decisions are not driven by school need alone, but rather a
mixture of policy, administrative, and personal objectives.
Implications of ASD resource allocation
My analysis of Allentown’s resource allocation reveals definite inequities
among schools. To understand the impact of these inequities on students, it is helpful to
look more closely at what additional resources are buying, and similarly, how a
reduction in resources impacts different parts of the budget.
Influence of additional resources. It is useful to consider the relationship
between operating funds and salaries, since salaries make up the largest part of school
resources. Figure 38 illustrates a very strong correlation between the two (elementary
schools: r(12)=.97; middle schools: r(2)=.93).
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Operating Funds and Total Salary (PPE)
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
-

Operating Funds* (PPE)

Total Salary (PPE)

Figure 38. Operating Funds and Total Salary (PPE), SY2010
Note. Includes dollars budgeted at school level as well as dollars budgeted at central, but spent at school
level. The discrepancy between total salary at schools and operating funds at schools is exaggerated due
to the fact that salary data is not included in centrally budgeted dollars.

One can also consider the relationship between operating funds and other
inputs. For example, there are strong negative relationships between operating funds
per pupil and students per staff, r(12)=-.89 in elementary schools. When other teaching
quality resources are tested, however, the correlations are much weaker.
Spending decisions. The data suggests that schools with lower overall financial
resources (operating funds) differ from schools with higher overall financial resources
in how dollars are spent.
Elementary Schools. On average, school level spending in the fourteen
elementary schools in Allentown is $7,947 per pupil – with a high of $9,871 per pupil
to a low of $6,901 per pupil. As much of a school’s budget goes to teacher salaries
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(with teachers making up a large percentage of the workforce), it is no surprise that
extremely strong correlations exist between operating funds and total salaries and
instructional salaries; the school with the highest per pupil operating funds also has the
highest per pupil total salary; and the school with the lowest per pupil operating funds
also has the lowest per pupil total salary. Per pupil salary is driven by both the number
of staff in the schools and the salaries of these staff. In Allentown, there are very strong
(negative) correlations between operating funds and students per staff, students per
teacher, and class size, indicating that operating funds are covering more staff, more
teachers, and smaller class sizes. There is also a relationship between per pupil
operating funds and average salaries, though not nearly as strong as with class size
measures or salaries expenditures.
The lowest funded elementary school in the district spends among the least of
all the elementary schools on students in poverty and ELL students. Likewise, the
school with the highest per pupil operating funds spends more per pupil for students in
poverty and for ELL students.
None of the measures of teacher quality, including individual measures and
school-wide measures, show strong correlations with operating funds. So, while schools
may be funding teachers in line with their resources, there is no indication that they are
funding efforts tied to teaching quality in line with their resources. It is interesting to
note, however, that teacher efficacy is lowest in the two schools with the lowest per
pupil funding.
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Middle Schools. Harrison-Morton MS has noticeably fewer financial resources
than the other three middle schools. Across the entire range of resources considered in
this study, a number of important inputs were aligned with total operating funds,
meaning that HMMS got the smallest portion of all the middle schools. These resources
include: discretionary building funds per pupil, total salary per pupil, instructional
salaries per pupil, and pupil services salaries per pupil. When considering additional
inputs to classroom environment which are thought by to influence student outcomes
(i.e., average salaries for core and non-core teachers, students per staff, students per
teacher, students per paraprofessional, and class size), HMMS also has the “least”
resources (e.g., lowest teacher salaries, largest class size). Additionally, a review of
teaching quality measures indicates that the highest percentage of ineffective teachers
and the lowest percentage of highly effective teachers, reside in HHMS. Finally,
HHMS, as a school, reports the lowest score on the state’s growth index, calculated to
indicate a school’s value-add to student learning. Interestingly, of all middle school
teachers, teachers at HHMS report the highest self-efficacy with regard to instructional
strategies.
Expenditures on staff, teachers in particular, are lowest at a school with fewer
resources. Lower average salaries and few educators per student help to explain this
phenomenon. One might expect that measures of teacher effectiveness and the school’s
overall growth index would, in fact, be lower at a school where fewer resources are
dedicated to teachers. However, my findings do not bear this out.
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A Weighted Formula Approach – Implications for ASD. In the previous
section I examined the variation of resources among schools by looking at the
relationship between school need and resource allocation and found that ASD resource
allocation, in school year 2009-2010, does not align with a vertical equity framework
(based on State weights) or a comprehensive equity framework (based on state weights
and weights for prior performance). Now I take another approach: I compare how funds
are allocated to schools in school year 2009-2010 to how funds would be allocated to
schools had the district based their disbursement of funds to schools on vertical and
comprehensive equity frameworks. In essence, I conduct a simulation of what school
funding would look like if the district adopted my approach to resource allocation.
School level impact. For the purposes of this simulation, only operating funds
for elementary schools and middle schools are considered. This is due to data
constraints, as the resource allocation study does not consider resources allocated to
high schools, or the needs of their students. The following tables offer two approaches
to simulating a weighted funding formula in the Allentown School District. In Table 33,
all dollars spent in elementary and middle schools are re-allocated to elementary and
middle schools based on the schools’ need, given enrollment and characteristics of the
students in each school. Table 34 separates dollars spent on elementary schools and
middle schools and re-allocates all elementary school dollars to elementary schools and
all middle school dollars to middle schools, again based on enrollment and the
characteristics of the students in each school. Both tables provide simulation results for
Vertical Equity, using the state’s weights to evaluate the allocation of resources based
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on need, and Comprehensive Equity, using the state’s weights along with weights for
prior performance. Per pupil expenditures for each school are provided to make
comparisons more useful.
Simulation findings offer a hint as to what resource allocation might look like if
a weighted formula were employed in ASD, rather than the current approach to
resource allocation which is much less deliberate in distributing funds and human
capital equitably among schools. In Table 33, where dollars are re-allocated from
elementary and middle schools combined, middle schools lose more dollars than they
gain under both Vertical Equity and Comprehensive Equity weighted funding
scenarios, losing more under Vertical Equity. Under the Vertical Equity weighted
funding scenario, ten schools lose funds, with Jefferson Elementary School losing the
greatest per pupil amount at $1,582, and eight schools gain funds, with Washington
Elementary School gaining $1,171 per pupil and Central Elementary School gaining
$1,056 per pupil. This is slightly different from the Comprehensive Equity weighted
funding scenario, in which nine schools lose funding, with Jefferson Elementary School
again losing the greatest in per pupil operating dollars at $1,501 per pupil, and nine
schools gaining funds, with Central Elementary School reaping the greatest rewards at
$1,513.
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Table 33. Simulation of Weighted Funding - Combined Expenditures for Middle and
Elementary School, SY2010

Elementary Schools
Central ES
Cleveland ES
Dodd ES
Jackson ES
Jefferson ES
Lehigh Park ES
McKinley ES
Mosser ES
Muhlenberg ES
Ritter ES
Roosevelt ES
Sheridan ES
Union Terrace ES
Washington ES
Middle Schools
Harrison-Morton
MS
Raub MS
South Mountain MS
Trexler MS

Vertical Equity

Comprehensive Equity

Operating
Funds
(PPE)

Operating
Funds (PPE)
with
Weighted
Budget
using state
weights

Diff.

Operating
Funds (PPE)
with
Weighted
Budget using
state
weights +
weights for
prior
performance

Diff.

7,218
8,796
7,249
8,483
9,871
8,308
9,317
7,766
7,920
6,901
7,132
8,093
7,294
6,916

8,275
8,142
8,129
7,863
8,289
7,280
8,114
8,226
7,565
7,526
7,787
7,643
7,623
8,087

1,056
(654)
880
(621)
(1,582)
(1,027)
(1,203)
460
(355)
625
655
(450)
329
1,171

8,731
7,724
8,134
7,684
8,370
7,112
8,349
8,170
7,287
7,418
7,755
7,431
7,627
7,851

1,513
(1,072)
885
(799)
(1,501)
(1,196)
(968)
404
(633)
517
623
(661)
333
935

8,340
9,122
9,212
9,084

8,523
9,054
8,510
8,711

183
(68)
(702)
(374)

8,519
9,355
8,492
8,825

179
233
(720)
(260)

Table 34 looks at re-allocating funds within each level of schooling. This is
consistent with my analysis of vertical equity and comprehensive equity with ASD as I
examine the variability among elementary schools and middle schools separately.
Under the Vertical Equity weighted funding scenario, nine schools lose funds, with
Jefferson Elementary School losing the greatest per pupil amount at $1,715, and nine
schools gain funds, with Washington Elementary School gaining $1,041 per pupil.
Under the Comprehensive Equity weighted funding scenario, again with equal
“winners” and “losers,” Jefferson Elementary School loses the greatest in per pupil
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operating dollars at $1,592 per pupil, and Central Elementary School receives an
additional $1,418 per pupil. When considering Comprehensive Equity weighted
funding, Lehigh Parkway comes in second place in reduction in operating funds. This,
however, may be partially due to the school’s small enrollment. Two other schools with
small enrollment, Cleveland Elementary School and McKinley Elementary School, also
lose significant operating funds as a result of both these weighted funding formulas.
While school size may help to explain inequitable resource allocation, it, by no means,
explains the whole story.
Table 34. Simulation of Weighted Funding- Expenditures for Middle Schools and
Elementary Schools Considered Separately, SY2010

Elementary Schools
Central ES
Cleveland ES
Dodd ES
Jackson ES
Jefferson ES
Lehigh Park ES
McKinley ES
Mosser ES
Muhlenberg ES
Ritter ES
Roosevelt ES
Sheridan ES
Union Terrace ES
Washington ES
Middle Schools
Harrison Morton
MS
Raub MS
South Mountain MS
Trexler MS

Vertical Equity

Comprehensive Equity

Operating
Funds
(PPE)

Operating
Funds (PPE)
with
Weighted
Budget
using state
weights

Diff.

Operating
Funds (PPE)
with
Weighted
Budget using
state
weights +
weights for
prior
performance

Diff.

7,218
8,796
7,249
8,483
9,871
8,308
9,317
7,766
7,920
6,901
7,132
8,093
7,294
6,916

8,141
8,011
7,998
7,736
8,155
7,163
7,984
8,093
7,443
7,405
7,662
7,519
7,500
7,957

923
(786)
749
(747)
(1,715)
(1,144)
(1,334)
327
(477)
504
529
(573)
206
1,041

8,637
7,640
8,046
7,601
8,279
7,035
8,259
8,081
7,208
7,337
7,671
7,351
7,544
7,766

1,418
(1,156)
797
(882)
(1,592)
(1,273)
(1,058)
315
(712)
436
539
(742)
250
850

8,340
9,122
9,212
9,084

8,793
9.340
8,779
8,986

453
218
(433)
(98)

8,697
9,551
8,669
9,009

357
429
(543)
(75)
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The ‘difference’ column in these tables represents the change in funding per
school necessary to achieve compliance with the weighted funded formula in my equity
framework. Clearly, the district would need to make considerable changes to school
level funding were a weighted formula implemented.
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The following figures provide graphical depictions of the changes in funding at
the school level resulting from a change in the distribution of operating funds to
schools.

$10,500
$10,000
$9,500
$9,000

R² = 0.0598

$8,500
$8,000
$7,500

R² = 1

$7,000
$6,500
$6,000
$5,500
1.32

1.37

1.42

1.47

1.52

SY2010 Operating Funds (PPE)
Operating Funds (PPE) - using the vertical equity weighted approach
Linear (SY2010 Operating Funds (PPE))
Linear (Operating Funds (PPE) - using the vertical equity weighted approach)

Figure 39. The Financial Impact of a Vertical Equity Weighted Formula
Approach
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The Financial Impact of a CE Weighted Formula Approach
for ASD Elementary Schools
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Figure 40. The Financial Impact of a Comprehensive Equity Weighted Formula
Approach
These figures reveal a great deal of variability among each school’s per pupil
operating funds. Even with this variability, Figure 39 is more in line with ASD resource
allocation than Figure 40.
Impact of current ASD budget allocation on equity. Considering the
relationship between school needs, resource allocations, and student outcomes provides
another way to analyze the impact of ASD’s allocation of resources among schools.
Relationship between need and student outcomes. The literature on the
relationship between student need and student outcomes consistently finds strong
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positive correlations (Ludwig, Ladd & Duncan, 2001), and the data provided by the
Allentown School District is consistent with this research. Figure 41 illustrates the
relationship between school need (based on my comprehensive equity needs index) and
student outcomes (as measured by the percentage of students that are proficient in
math).
% Proficient or above (Math)
Elementary Schools
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Figure 41. Relationship between Schools' Comprehensive Needs Idenx and the
Percentage of Students in the School that Score at Proficient or Above on the
PSSA (Math)

The research on outcomes also reveals that, although demographic
considerations are strongly correlated with student outcomes, the progress a student
makes while in school is not pre-determined by demographics. Rather, the learning
environment, often characterized as the teacher effect, is the strongest indicator of
student growth (Hanushek, 1997; Sanders & Rivers, 1996).
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Relationship between need and resources. While there is a strong correlation
between student need and student outcomes, there is virtually zero correlation between
student need and school level expenditures in the ASD.
Operating Funds (PPE)
Elementary Schools
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Figure 42. Relationship between Schools' Comprehensive Needs Index and Per
Pupil Operating Funds in Each Building, SY2010

This finding reflects statements of district administrators, who generally
assumed that funds were distributed primarily on a per pupil basis, with the exception
of Title I and Special Education Funds.
Relationship between resources and student outcomes. Figure 43 demonstrates
zero correlation between school level resources and student outcomes. This is not to say
that money doesn’t matter; as mentioned earlier, all these schools are severely
underfunded. What this figure does illustrate is that, overall, dollars do not appear to be
directed to schools to address concerns related to student performance.
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Figure 43. Relationship between School-based Operating Funds and Percent
Proficient and Above on the PSSA (Math), SY2010

The data to explain what this figure would look like if dollars were tied to need
does not exist. We do know, however, that while resources are necessary to support
student achievement, they are not sufficient, as reported by administrators throughout
the district. When one considers alternative inputs (e.g., teacher effectiveness, teacher
self-efficacy), somewhat stronger correlations are found between resources and student
outcomes. Figures 44-49 consider inputs which were significantly correlated with need.
The strongest correlations between school need and resources are teacher efficacy with
regard to classroom management (r2 =.42), average years of teaching experience (r2
=.35), and teachers’ collective efficacy (r2 =.42).
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Average Teacher Salary
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Figure 44. Relationship between each School's Comprehensive Equity Needs Index
and Each School's Average Teacher Salary, SY2010
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Figure 45. Relationship between Each School's Comprehensive Equity Needs
Index and Each School's Students per Staff and Students per Teacher Ratios,
SY2010
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Figure 46. Relationship between Each School's Comprehensive Equity Needs
Index and Each School's Percentage of Effective and Highly Effective Teachers,
SY2010
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Teacher Efficacy
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Figure 47. Relationship between Each School's Comprehensive Equity Needs
Index and Each School's Average Teacher Efficacy (Classroom Management,
Student Engagement, and Instructional Strategies), SY2010
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Average Years of Teaching Experience
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Figure 48. Relationship between Each School's Comprehensive Equity Needs
Index and Average Years of Teaching Experience in Each School, SY2010
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Figure 49. Relationship between Each School's Comprehensive Equity Needs
Index and School-Wide Collective Efficacy in Each School as Reported on Survey
of Teachers, SY2010

Summary
The findings presented in this chapter investigate how one mid-sized, urban
school district allocates resources among its schools and students. The analysis
evaluates equity in the district according to a comprehensive view of equity that
encompasses adequacy (that all students be afforded the opportunity to meet a standard
that will ensure their ability to sustain themselves economically and socially, and to be
able to participate in our democracy as informed citizens) and vertical equity (that
students are not penalized for morally arbitrary disadvantages).
This chapter assesses three versions of equity: adequacy, vertical equity, and
comprehensive equity. A summary of major findings follows:


Many schools do not achieve adequacy.

264


Academic success of students varies greatly among schools. Different
subgroups of students within the school district also achieve varying levels of
academic success.



The gap between current proficiency levels and the adequacy target is
differentially distributed among schools in Allentown. Further, among student
subgroups, achievement of Hispanic students and ELL students stand out as
being most uneven across schools.



The suspension rate among elementary and middle schools varies greatly.



Some resources are allocated in accordance with vertical equity



ELL spending per pupil is likely to be greater in high needs elementary schools



Instructional salaries per pupil are likely to be higher in high needs elementary
schools



The principal’s discretionary budget is likely to be higher in high needs middle
schools.



Pupils per staff ratios are likely to be lower in high needs schools.



Pupils per teacher ratios are likely to be lower in high needs elementary schools.



Some resources are not allocated in accordance with vertical equity



The most effective teachers are less likely to be in high needs elementary
schools.



Teachers with more years of teaching experience are less likely to be in high
needs elementary schools.



Novice teachers are more likely to be in high needs middle schools.
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Greater teacher collective efficacy is less likely to be seen in high needs
elementary schools.



Expenditures per student in poverty and expenditures per special education
student are not allocated equivalently across schools.



Expenditures per ELL student in elementary schools are highly variable among
schools.



Centrally budgeted expenditures per student in poverty are not equitably
distributed among schools.



Centrally budgeted expenditures per special education student are not equitably
distributed among schools.



Centrally budgeted expenditures per ELL student are not equitably distributed
among schools.



Some resources are allocated in accordance with comprehensive equity



ELL spending per pupil is likely to be greater in high needs elementary schools.



The principal’s discretionary budget is likely to be higher in high needs middle
schools.



Pupils per staff ratios are likely to be lower in high needs schools.



Pupils per teacher ratios are likely to be lower in high needs elementary schools.



Some resources are not allocated in accordance with comprehensive equity



Average teacher salaries are likely to be lower in elementary schools with
greater needs.

266


The most effective teachers are less likely to be in high needs elementary
schools.



Teachers more certain of their skills are less likely to be in high needs
elementary schools.



Teachers with more years of teaching experience are less likely to be in high
needs elementary schools.



Novice teachers are more likely to be in high needs middle schools.



Greater teacher collective efficacy is less likely to be seen in high needs
elementary schools.



There is considerable variation among schools that is not explained by vertical
or comprehensive equity



A change in policy to accommodate a weighted funding formula based on the
comprehensive equity framework would result in an increase in funds for half
the elementary schools and half the middle schools, and a decrease in funds for
the remaining elementary and middle schools

Based on the results of these analyses, and a comparison of allocations determined
by using weighted funding formulas and actual 2009-2010 school year allocations, I
conclude that the Allentown School District does not achieve comprehensive equity.
Although the district is engaged in efforts to improve outcomes for students, my
research shows that, in many instances, these efforts are not distributed among students
in a way that supports students according to their specific needs.
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION
The primary goal of my dissertation was to conduct a case study of a mid-sized
urban school district to evaluate equity among schools. The analyses for my dissertation
build on the development of a comprehensive equity framework created to evaluate
equal educational opportunity. This framework satisfies a view of equity in which
students have access to resources such that their subsequent opportunities are equalized
(Berne & Stiefel, 1984; Rawls, 1971). This perspective does not move away from a
focus on student outcomes but instead supports student outcomes by incorporating a
means of addressing the relative needs of students such that all students are able to have
greater opportunities for and attain higher levels of success.
Using the comprehensive equity framework as a guide, I conclude that the
Allentown School District does not allocate resources among its schools equitably. The
allocation of human capital resources stands out as most incompatible with the
comprehensive equity framework. Using various teacher characteristics (i.e., salary,
experience, effectiveness, self-efficacy, collective efficacy) as proxies for teacher
quality, I find higher teacher quality within a school to be positively related to greater
need among the student population. Specifically, average teacher salaries are likely to
be lower in elementary schools with greater needs; teachers with more years of teaching
experience are less likely to be in high needs elementary schools; novice teachers are
more likely to be in high needs middle schools; the most effective teachers are less
likely to be in high needs elementary schools; teachers more certain of their skills are
less likely to be in high needs elementary schools; and, greater teacher collective
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efficacy is less likely to be seen in high needs elementary schools. Even as these
findings show significant inequities among schools, it is important to note that these
inequities are not systematic, but haphazard in nature.
I further tested the extent to which equal educational opportunity exists in
Allentown by simulating a weighted funding formula based on the comprehensive
equity framework. Implementation of this resource allocation strategy would have
resulted in an increase in funds for half the elementary schools and half the middle
schools, and a decrease in funds for the remaining elementary and middle schools.
Some of this “misallocation” is likely due to economies of scale, as two of the three
schools that would gain the most money are in the top three in student enrollment and
three of the four schools that would lose the most money (over $1,000 per student) have
enrollments below the district average for elementary schools123. However, enrollment
size does not explain why Washington Elementary School stands out as lacking
financial resources, with lower than average teacher salaries and the highest class size
in the district. Despite this, Washington has the highest teacher efficacy and collective
efficacy in the district and high growth index in math and above the district average in
reading. Also, enrollment size does not explain why Jefferson Elementary School
stands out among elementary schools as being richer in financial resources and having
higher average teacher salaries and smaller class sizes. Jefferson is also above average
in their teacher efficacy and collective scores and in their school wide growth index.
Taking a broader view and recalling ASD’s “adequacy funding gap,” Jefferson’s level
123

The average enrollment in ASD elementary schools in SY2010 is 573.
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of funding may be appropriate, and schools with fewer and/or lesser inputs are
inadequately resourced.
Qualitative research supports my conclusion that the ASD does not allocate
resources among its schools equitably, as district practices related to the allocation of
resources help explain the misalignment between school-level student needs and
financial and human capital resources. Notably, addressing the differential needs of
schools plays no part in driving resource allocation in the ASD. Considerations of
vertical and comprehensive equity among schools do not influence budget priorities or
human resource policies. Also, information on both the financial position of schools,
and the variation among teaching quality in schools, is not readily available and,
consequently, is unknown to key stakeholders. A weak relationship between building
and central office administrators aggravates this situation. Lastly, with scant
information available to them, few stakeholders inside or outside the district focus their
attention on discrepancies among schools.
Implications
This case study has implications beyond the Allentown School District in two
major ways. First, it builds on the extant literature on intradistrict resource allocation,
corroborating some previous findings and adding new human capital “resources” to the
range of inputs considered in resource allocation. Second, this case study provides
district and state policy makers with a viable approach to evaluating resource allocation
within school districts.
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Adding to the research. For the most part, the equity findings from my
dissertation research are consistent with the findings of other studies and reports, not
only examinations of intradistrict equity, but examinations of interdistrict equity, as
well. However, there are notable differences. A comparison of my findings to those of
other policy-makers and researchers bears this out.
As states are constitutionally responsible for ensuring that all students are
provided with an adequate education, many analyses of equity consider distributions of
funds from the state to school districts. A number of these equity reviews focus on
expenditures and/or revenues, and do not separately consider human capital resources.
Quality Counts, Education Week's annual report on state-level efforts to improve public
education, provides indicators annually of the status of education finance at the state
level. This report presents two school finance indicators which evaluate horizontal
equity: the coefficient of variation and the McLoone Index, providing measures for
each state as well as an average across all states.124 The most recent publication
included school finance indicators based on 2009 data. The following table presents
horizontal equity statistics for the ASD based on my calculations alongside horizontal
equity statistics for Pennsylvania, and the U.S. average included in the Quality Counts
report.

124

Hawaii is not included in this analysis as the state has only one school district.
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Table 35. Comparison of Equity Statistics from Quality Counts 2012 and the ASD
Allentown School
District
ES
MS
Coefficient of
Variation
McLoone Index

United
States
ES+MS+HS+Central
PA

0.12

0.05

0.15

0.17

0.92

0.96

0.91

0.91

Note: The CV and MI provided for the ASD are based on per-pupil expenditures for operating funds and
elementary and middle schools are presented separately. The Pennsylvania and U.S. measures are based
on per-pupil expenditures obtained from the U.S. Department of Education’s 2008-2009 Common Core
of Data and U.S. Census Bureau's Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data for 2009, and
include funds that fall outside the category of operating funds. Also, the Quality Count report considers
funds at the district level, and therefore combines all school levels as well as central administration.

As seen in Table 35, horizontal equity statistics are similar across the state and
the district. In this comparison, ASD middle schools stand out as being more
horizontally equitable when considering per pupil expenditures. Looking at the entire
country, the Quality Count reports that only three of 49 states achieve horizontal equity
based on the level of variability in funding across all districts; 36 of 49 states fall within
a range which approaches horizontal equity, and ten of 49 states are far from horizontal
equity. However, when the definition of horizontal equity is based on the number of
districts spending well below the mean in the state, 33 of 48 states achieve horizontal
equity and 15 of 49 states fall within a range which approaches horizontal equity.
In another review of interdistrict equity, Baker, Sciarra, and Farrie (2010)
investigate the fairness of the distribution of state funds by looking at both the absolute
dollars disbursed to school districts, as well as the ratio of high poverty to low poverty
revenue per pupil. When analyzing states’ vertical equity using this ratio, 13 of 48
states were found to be progressive, six of 48 states were found to be regressive, and 12

272
of 48 states, no relationship between poverty and variation in spending was found.125
While there are no statistically significant results among the remaining 17 states, a large
number of these states appear more similar to the regressive states. These findings are
similar to findings in the ASD, where statistically insignificant correlations indicate that
resource allocation is asystematic.
Analysis of the vertical equity of financial resources in two states, Indiana and
Kentucky, provide additional examples of state-level equity studies to consider
alongside the district-level equity study in Allentown. The state of Indiana considers
five factors in determining how to allocate funds to districts: the percentage of adults
who did not graduate from high school; the percentage of single-parent families; the
percentage of population below the poverty level; the percentage of students receiving
free lunch; and, the percentage of students with limited English proficiency.
Toutkoushian and Michael (2007) compute bivariate correlations between these vertical
equity factors and per-pupil revenues. The researchers propose that, by looking at these
correlations over time, policy makers could determine if vertical equity is improving in
the state.
Statistically, it was not possible to disaggregate vertical equity factors in
Allentown due to the number of schools in the district. Therefore, I created an index of
need for evaluating vertical equity. Because of the large numbers of economically
disadvantaged students in the ASD, poverty (measured by the percentage of students
receiving free and reduced price lunch) has the greatest influence on my Needs Index.
125

These findings are all statistically significant.

273
Thus, it is reasonable to compare Indiana’s correlation between poverty and revenues.
Using 2007 data, Toutkoushian and Michael’s (2007) find a correlation of +0.61
between the percentage of students receiving free lunch and revenues. This can be
compared to the correlation between operating funds and the Needs Index in the ASD
which is +0.24. While both are positive, these metrics indicate that the state of Indiana
is allocating resources more equitably to economically disadvantaged populations than
is the ASD.
A study of equity in Kentucky, conducted by Picus, Odden, and Fermanich
(2004), analyzed vertical equity by computing horizontal equity statistics for the state
by weighting district enrollments to account for the additional needs of subgroups of
students. This approach is similar to the weighted funding approach utilized in my
simulations of resource allocation in the ASD. The coefficient of variation computed
for Kentucky in the 1999-2000 school year was +0.10 and the McLoone Index was
+0.96. When computing similar horizontal equity calculations on weighted student
enrollment in the ASD in the 2009-2010 school year, the coefficient of variation was
+0.11 and the McLoone Index was +0.91. Vertical equity findings in the ASD are far
closer to those in Kentucky than in Indiana. Additional research is necessary to validate
the usefulness of comparing equity among districts in a state to equity among schools in
a district. However, the intention of serving all students fairly guides equity analyses at
multiple levels.
Considerations of equity have gone beyond the study of overall expenditures,
and include more targeted studies of the allocation of personnel expenditures. One
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means of evaluating how the ASD measures up to others in terms of the equitable
allocation of personnel expenditures would be to examine the debates around Title I
comparability. A report issued by the U.S. Department of Education finds that “more
than 40 percent of Title I schools had lower personnel expenditures than non-Title I
schools in the same district” (Heuer & Stullich, 2011, p.1).126 As discussed in Chapter
Two, while Title I currently requires that schools be comparable prior to receiving
compensatory federal funds, this requirement can be met with measures that are far less
stringent than the equivalent allocation of total personnel expenditures. According to
Heuer and Stullich (2011), if the rules were to change, and Title I comparability
required that district resource allocation minimally be horizontally equitable,
approximately 18 to 28% of all Title I schools would be out of compliance, depending
upon the specific requirements for comparability.
If compliance with Title I comparability were to require an “average-toaverage” measure, whereby the average per pupil spending on personnel of all “high
needs” schools is compared to the average per pupil spending on personnel of all
schools in the district, then the ASD would be in compliance. However, if the
requirement is that the average per pupil spending on personnel in each “high needs”
school individually meets the average per pupil spending on personnel of all schools in
the district, then the ASD would not be in compliance. This would remain true even if

126

For school districts in which all schools are classified as Title I schools, this report assumes that these
districts would still be required to conduct this comparability analysis, in order to ensure that lower
poverty schools are not further disadvantaged by lower spending on personnel expenditures.
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the threshold were higher and each “high needs” school individually had to meet only
90% of the average per pupil spending on personnel of all schools in the district.
Based on a simulation conducted to evaluate the impact of revising the Title I
comparability requirement, the Department of Education report finds that “low
spending Title I schools and higher-poverty schools would see their per-pupil
expenditures rise by an average of four to fifteen percent” (Heuer & Stullich, 2011,
p.1). In the ASD, three of seven higher needs elementary schools would see an average
increase of 11%. It is important to note that in Allentown not all schools with higher
needs are under-spending relative to the district average. This appears to be consistent
with the findings of the Department of Education report, as only 28% of all Title I
schools would be out of compliance with the strictest revisions to the comparability
requirement.
At the district level, studies of equity have looked at horizontal equity, vertical
equity, and adequacy. My literature review provides more detail, but a brief synopsis of
34 studies of intradistrict equity reveals that overall expenditures are often distributed
according the principles of horizontal and vertical equity, with equivalent or greater
financial resources being allocated to schools and students with greater needs. Although
there is some indication that vertical equity exists in many of the districts studied, there
is a question as to the sufficiency of the additional resources directed to disadvantaged
schools and students to achieve vertical equity. My study of horizontal equity in
Allentown was consistent with this research. Operating funds per pupil were allocated
relatively equivalently among elementary and middle schools. Also, I found a weak, yet
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positive, relationship between school need and operating funds per pupil, r(14) = 0.24.
This relationship was not statistically significant.
Another finding among many of the studies of intradistrict resource allocation is
that human resources, as opposed to financial resources, are less likely to be distributed
equitably. Disparities in teacher quality – as defined by measurable indicators such as
years of experience, certification status, and content and pedagogical knowledge – are
most often perversely related to school and student characteristics (i.e., schools with
more disadvantaged students often have more teachers with less experience, fewer
qualifications). A number of these measures of teacher quality were evaluated in
Allentown and the findings were similar to those of the 34 studies. For example,
average years of teaching experience is negatively correlated with school need,
indicating that less experienced teachers are more likely to be in schools with students
with greater needs. Additional measures of teacher quality, not considered in the 34
studies but evaluated in the ASD, include teacher effectiveness, as measured by valueadded scores, and teacher efficacy, as determined by the survey responses of teachers.
These measures provide additional evidence that human capital resources, or teacher
quality, is not distributed across schools in the district in alignment with vertical equity
or comprehensive equity.
While the large majority of studies on intradistrict equity evaluate equity in
large districts, Miller and Rubenstein (2007) provide an analysis of equity in four midsized districts in New York State. The table below looks at the areas of overlap in the
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studies to compare findings in the ASD alongside the findings presented in the study of
New York districts.
Table 36. Comparison of Bivariate Correlation Coefficients from ASD study and
NYS study
District
District
District
District
Mean(SD)
ASD

A
B
C
D
of A-D

Average
Salary
-0.367**
-0.255
-0.619*
0.020
-0.306(0.265)
-0.219

Pupil-teacher
ratio
-0.135
0.018
0.549
0.154
0.147(0.293)
-0.561**

Avg. teacher
experience
-0.278*
-0.366
-0.508
-0.596*
-0.437(0.142)
-0.469*

Note. **p<0.05; *p<0.10

As seen in Table 36, the correlation coefficient indicates that the distribution of
average salary in Allentown is negative but not statistically significant. Therefore, there
may be a week inverse relationship between average salary and school need. This ASD
finding is close to the mean of four mid-sized districts evaluated, and quite similar to
two of them considered individually. Similarly, average teacher experience in the ASD
is distributed in the same way as it is in all four districts in the Miller and Rubenstein
study. When considering pupil-teacher ratio, however, a major difference arises
between the ASD and the four New York districts. It appears that the ASD is more
successful in addressing vertical equity as there are fewer students per teacher as the
school need increases. That being said, the distribution of average class sizes, with a
correlation of +0.08, does not follow. In fact, we see that there is virtually no
relationship between school need and class size. Having additional teachers in some
buildings does not impact the school’s class size.
Situating Allentown’s resource allocation among other mid-sized districts, in
addition to larger districts and states, provides greater context for understanding school-
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level equity. The work I have done in Allentown adds to this existing knowledge base
by providing an additional study of resource allocation. It also provides a framework
for policy makers to use as they consider where to add and where to cut resources.
Providing a framework. As an IES pre-doctoral fellow in Allentown, I worked
with the Superintendent and central office administrators to support the district through
better use of data. ASD proved to be an interesting site to conduct my study. While the
small size of the district prevented the use of sophisticated statistical methods, I was
able to learn a great deal about how districts operate. In the 2009-2010 school year, the
district served almost 18,000 students in 22 buildings with a budget of $212.6 million.
Outcomes for the students were mixed, but often weak, with a low graduation rate and
too many students earning low scores on state assessments. This environment is not
unique; many school districts struggle with high needs students and inadequate
resources.
Another commonality between ASD and other school districts is that their data
systems have not been designed to evaluate resource allocation. This is consistent with
the fact that most school districts have not been acculturated to use data to inform
policy making. As a researcher in the district, I took on the task of investigating
resource allocation. The data I used in this study includes reports and documents from
both the ASD and the Pennsylvania Department of Education. It also includes newly
computed measures on teacher quality: survey results from a large majority of ASD
teachers and teacher level value-added scores provided by the district through its
contract with the state’s value-added provider, SAS EVAAS. Additional data was
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compiled by the consulting firm Cross & Joftus, Inc., who conducted a complementary
investigation of district resources. My research also relies on interviews with school
level and district level administrators to provide context and a greater understanding of
how and why resource allocation decisions were made.
As a result of my analysis, I was able to demonstrate the value of accessible
information and provide actionable data to district administrators. It is my hope that the
systems I helped to develop will be used in the future to inform the district’s agenda.
As school districts gain access to data systems which are more integrated, and
more comprehensible, the use of data should become more prevalent, allowing
administrators and the public to construct better-informed policies.
My study has the potential to act as a tool kit for districts intent on embracing
the vision of equal educational opportunity developed in this dissertation. This
approach would be a definite shift from current practice, in which systems only focus
on student outcomes. By taking into account both the relative position and the absolute
achievement of students, district administrators would be better able to rectify
inequities and provide for the equal educational opportunity of all students.
Recommendations
As districts continue to struggle to meet the needs of their student populations’
increasingly limited resources, it becomes even more important to use those resources
to the greatest advantage of all students. The findings of this dissertation are relevant to
this goal, and include the following recommendations:
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Districts’ missions should incorporate the goal of comprehensive equity,
whereby students have access to resources such that their subsequent
opportunities are equalized.



Based on this mission, districts should develop resource allocation policies
which support equal educational opportunities for all students.



Districts should regularly collect and examine data on inputs (financial and
human capital resources) and outcomes (academic and other) at the school level
in order to assess intradistrict equity.



Districts should collect new indicators on teacher quality (i.e., measures of
efficacy, measures of effectiveness). No single measure should be used.



Based on the review of the data, districts should investigate the relationship
between inputs and outcomes – to learn how resources are impacting outcomes.



Districts should ensure that resource allocation data is transparent so that school
administrators educators can make informed decisions.



Districts should ensure that resource allocation data is available so that key
stakeholders, including parents and policy makers, can advocate for equity.

Study Limitations
There are several limitations to my research. First, my findings are based on a
case study of only one district, which prevents the reader from generalizing the results
of the study to the larger population of school districts. Related to this limitation in
scope, the Allentown School District is considerably under-funded, which may
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influence the distribution of resources127. For example, in a district with fewer funds,
one school may receive a disproportionate allocation to keep middle class families in
the school system. Also, the demographic make-up of the district, with high poverty
rates in all schools, somewhat limits my ability to discern patterns that demonstrate
inequitable resource allocation.
Another weakness of this study is that it is difficult to test adequacy. With the
data available, it is possible to describe some inputs and outcomes, and compare these
variables across schools. To truly understand how resources impact outcomes, it would
be necessary to conduct a much more comprehensive investigation, including in-depth
classroom observations, to better understand the true relationship between resources
and student outcomes.
Additional issues which cause concern have to do with the variables used to
measure resources and outcomes. The available measures of one resource I have
investigated, teacher quality, including certification and years of experience beyond
year four, have not been found to be strongly related to improved student outcomes
(Clotfelter et al., 2007; Goldhaber, 2008; Rice, 2003; Rockoff, 2004). Student outcomes
also present a problem as the metrics most often used are state assessments which
represent only a portion of the learning that takes place in the school.
Another potential problem with my study is the construction of the needs index
I use to measure vertical and comprehensive equity. The needs index is based on

127

According to Pennsylvania’s Costing-Out Study, the funding gap – the difference between an
adequate education and actual spending - was $5,625 per pupil in the Allentown School District in 2006.
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Pennsylvania’s costing out formula, designed to allocate state dollars to districts. It is
not clear that this formula translates seamlessly to the district-school environment.
Additional omissions on my part include a lack of attention to school size or
concentrations of poverty.
A last concern is that, as an intern in the Allentown School District, I am closely
identified with the Superintendent, Dr. Zahorchak. This may have compromised my
ability as a researcher because key informants may have been reluctant to share
information with me which they think may reflect negatively on them with their boss.
Future Research
Additional research is necessary to help policymakers understand the
implications of different resource allocation policies, including impacts on
opportunities and outcomes for students, so that they may make informed decisions that
will support the learning of all children. Two areas that I identify as fruitful for this
project are resource allocation as it pertains to special education students, and to
students in poverty. In the present analysis, I had to use very blunt measures to look at
these groups of students and although I had wanted to analyze resource allocation for
special education students according to the hours they received pull-out services, I was
unable to access useful data. Another area which deserves attention is student mobility.
As in many high poverty, urban districts, I found high student mobility in Allentown,
which should be taken into consideration when using measures such as teacher
effectiveness based on student outcomes. It would be very useful to understand the
impact of student mobility on both the students that are moving in and out of schools
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and the students in classrooms with shifting populations. Similarly, I had no useful data
to investigate the impact of varying levels of poverty and its relationship to school
resources. As the current study shifts the scale from districts to buildings, another
important analysis would be to look at how resources are allocated to classrooms within
each building. Finally, the manner and degree to which race is related to resource
allocation should be investigated, to inform understanding of the variation of outcomes
across schools for various subgroups of students, as well as for all students.
Two additional research agendas follow from my findings. Qualitative research
reveals a great deal of misinformation among building principals as a result of an
incoherent district mission around equity and weak communication between the schools
and the central office. Much could be learned from an investigation of the relationship
between schools and district central offices. A second issue is related to “rectifying”
inequitable allocation of human capital resources, specifically teachers. Further work is
necessary to develop strategies for ensuring that all students have access to effective
teachers without redistributing teachers that are reluctant to move.
Finally, I hope to develop this work to provide greater focus on implications for
policy and practice, answering the question: “What criteria should district leaders
employ when determining how to best allocate resources?”
This dissertation weaves together a theoretical discussion of equity with the
practical application of theories of equity through the use of various measurement tools.
In so doing, it offers scaffolding for policy makers and scholars alike to understand the
requirements of equal educational opportunity.

APPENDIX A: STUDIES OF INTRADISTRICT RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Study

Equity

Data Source

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest

Methodology

Ajwad, M.I. (September 2006).
Is intrajurisdictional resource
allocation equitable?: An
analysis of campus-level
spending data for Texas
elementary schools. The
Quarterly Review of Economics
and Finance, 46(4), 552-564.

vertical
equity

Elementary schools
(3664) within Texas
school districts (908).
(The school campuslevel data for 1996–
1997 came from the
Texas Education
Agency Academic
Excellence Indicator
System. School
neighborhood
information came from
the 1990 Census of
Population and
Housing.)

Discretionary resources:
total expenditures per
pupil; instructional
expenditure per pupil;
expenditure on school
leaders per pupil; other
expenditures per pupil;
teacher experience;
teacher tenure; and
pupil-teacher ratio.

Low-income, minority
neighborhoods: median
family income; % Black;
% Hispanic; % Other; %
of population with
college degree; % of
population who lived in
same housing unit since
1985; and, % of
population aged 5-17.
Also, information on %
LEP, % economically
disadvantaged, %
special education, and
% gifted/talented.

Estimation of a
district fixedeffects model.

Baker, B. D. (2009). Withindistrict resource allocation and
the marginal costs of providing
equal educational opportunity:
Evidence from Texas and Ohio.
Education Policy Analysis
Archives. 17(3).

vertical
equity

Elementary schools in
Texas and Ohio large
city school districts and
in their surrounding
metropolitan areas

Weighted Student
Funding, elementary
school budgets

Greater resource
equity, special
education populations,
poverty rates,
and school size

Conventional
expenditure
function approach

Findings
The discretionary resources of
school districts are skewed
toward schools in low-income,
minority neighborhoods,
beyond the amounts that would
be allocated based on the state
aid formula. The combined
effect of poor students and a
poor neighborhood is to raise
school spending per pupil.
Districts are skewing resources
toward Black students, but not
Hispanic and other races.
Neighborhoods that are better
educated and exhibit lower
population turnover also receive
more school funds.
Widely reported WSF success
stories provide no more
predictable funding with respect
to student needs than other
large urban districts in the same
state. In some cases, resource
levels in urban core elementary
schools are relatively
insufficient for competing with
schools in neighboring districts
to achieve comparable
outcomes.
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Study

Equity

Baker, B.D. & Green, P.C.
(2009). Equal Educational
Opportunity and the
Distribution of State Aid to
Schools: Can or Should School
Racial Composition Be a
Factor? Journal of Education
Finance. 34(3). 289-323.

vertical
equity

Baker, B.D. (2003). State Policy
Influences on the Internal
Allocation of School District
Resources: Evidence from the
Common Core of Data. Journal
of Education Finance. 29(1) 124.

vertical
equity

Data Source

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest
Black student
population

District-level data on
state revenues and
financial and human
resource allocation
were gathered from the
Common Core of Data
of the National Center
for Education Statistics.

Financial allocations to
core instruction,
administration, and
central administration,
and data on human
resources, including
teachers, support staff
and administrators
(including classroom
teachers per pupil; all
instruction related staff
per pupil, district level
administrators) district
staffing levels;
classroom teachers,
allocations to
instruction and
instruction-related
staff, including
librarians and school
counselors;
administrative
expenses, central office
staffing levels, shares of
administrative staffing.

District size; increased
prevalence of
students with
disabilities; Limited
English proficient and
low-income populations

Methodology

Findings

Education costfunction approach
for estimating the
sensitivity of cost
models and
predicted
education costs to
the inclusion of
school district
level racial
composition
variables.
Statistical tests of
the relationship
between state
policies and
practices and
resource
allocation across
districts and
across states using
a national dataset.

Strong, consistent evidence
across settings that black
student concentration is
associated with higherpredicted costs of achieving
constant outcomes, and that
those cost differences are quite
large for majority black school
districts.
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A range of additional external
factors, such as student
population characteristics, have
an influence on internal
resource allocation practices;
increased prevalence of
students with disabilities was
tied to significant increases in
district staffing levels, from the
classroom to the central office,
though some findings were
inconsistent. Limited English
proficient and low-income
populations, on the other hand,
led to increased allocations to
instruction and instructionrelated staff, including librarians
and school counselors, but not
to increases in classroom
teachers. Further, higher levels
of limited English proficient
student populations led
consistently to higher
administrative expenses and
higher central office staffing
levels, though not higher total
administrative staffing shares.

Study

Equity

Data Source

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest

Findings
All variables except positions
are distributed in higher perpupil amounts to low poverty
sub-district (and school)… On
the other hand, the coefficients
for middle/junior high schools
show that all variables except
average teacher's salary are
distributed in higher per-pupil
amounts to high poverty
schools.
California schools exhibit
considerable inequality in
teacher preparation and
curriculum offered and
relatively little inequality in
average class size. Schools that
have less of one resource tend
to have less of many other
resources as well. Inequalities in
teacher preparation among
schools are large, and they
matter for student outcomes,
whether measured in terms of
test scores or course-taking
patterns.
School level inequalities exist in
the distribution of educational
resources within and across
districts. However, the intradistrict distribution of education
resources appears to be
equitable. Only 75 of the
1,204 total school districts (6.23
percent) had school level Gini
coefficients that were above
0.10 - the standard established
by Odden and Picus (2008)
accepted in the literature.

Berne, R. & Steifel, L. (1994).
Measuring equity at the school
level: The finance perspective.
Education Evaluation and
Policy Analysis. 16(4).
415-421.

vertical
equity

32 community
subdistricts and 800
schools

Average teacher salary
statistics

Poverty

Regression
analysis assesses
the relationship
between the
resource (budget,
expenditure, or
position) data and
poverty.

Betts, J.R., Rueben, K.S. &
Danenberg, A. (2000). Equal
Resources, Equal Outcomes?
The Distribution of School
Resources and Student
Achievement in California.
Public Policy Institute of
California.

adequacy,
horizontal
equity,
vertical
equity

California (1997-1998
census of all schools);
1998 Stanford 9
achievement tests.

Detailed measures of
resources at the school
and classroom levels
(i.e., class size, teacher
preparation,
curriculum)

Economically
disadvantaged
students; student
performance

Variation

Burke, S.M. (1999). An analysis
of resource inequity at the
state, district, and school
levels. Journal of Education
Finance, 24(4). 435-458.

horizontal
equity,
vertical
equity

Data on the student/
teacher ratio for the
school years 1987/1988
through 1992/1993 via
the U.S. Department of
Education. The sample
contains 1,204 unified
school districts located
in 37 states. School
districts with less than
10 total schools in the
1991/1992 school year
were not included.

Teacher-pupil ratio
(used as a proxy for
educational resources)

Variation from perfect
equality

Gini coefficient
analysis
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Methodology

Study

Equity

Data Source

Boyd, D.J., Lankford, H., Loeb,
S., Rockoff, J.E. and Wyckoff,
J.H. (September 2007). The
Narrowing Gap in New York
City Teacher Qualifications and
Its Implications for Student
Achievement in High Poverty
Schools (Working Paper 10).
Washington, DC: National
Center for the Analysis of
Longitudinal Data in Education
Research.

adequacy,
horizontal
equity,
vertical
equity

Carr, M., Gray, N., & Holley, M.
(2007, September 20).
Shortchanging disadvantaged
students: An analysis of intradistrict spending patterns in
Ohio. Policy Report No. 14.
Columbus: The Buckeye
Institute for Public Policy
Solutions.

vertical
equity

Data on New York City
teachers, students, and
schools between 2000
and 2005. The database
is constructed from
administrative data
from the New York City
Department of
Education, the New
York State Education
Department, alt.
certified teacher
programs, and the
College Board.
Ohio - 72 high-poverty
school systems during
the 2005-06 school year

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest
Observed teacher
characteristics: SAT
scores, certification
status, teacher
experience, teacher
demographics,
undergraduate, test
performance, pathway,
college recommended.

Student growth using
student performance
(statewide student
exams). Poverty status,
minority status,
expenditures per pupil.

Students who are
disadvantaged, in
special education
programs, or gifted.

Methodology
Using value-added
analysis to
measure student
growth, regression
models are
developed to
estimate the
relationships
between student
performance and
teacher
characteristics.

Findings
Changes in these observed
qualifications of teachers (i.e.,
SAT scores or certification
status) account for a modest
improvement in the average
achievement of students in the
poorest schools.

Districts, especially larger ones,
tend to use staffing allocations
to distribute funding. However,
these allocations are often a
result of central office decisions
and collective bargaining
agreements, which do not
necessarily reflect student
need.” In our study of 72 highpoverty school systems during
the 2005-06 school year, the
difference between what
individual school buildings
should have spent based on the
demographics of their student
population and what they
actually spent per pupil resulted
in nearly $300 million being
diverted from students who are
disadvantaged, in special
education programs, or gifted.
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Equity

Data Source

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest

Methodology

Findings
School districts in Texas allocate
approximately 60 percent of
operating expenses to the
school. They also showed that
although teacher costs are a
strong determinant of resource
levels in schools, the nature of
the relationship is complicated
by policies and practices that
are unique to each school
district. Moreover, the results
indicated that even in a large
Texas district that seems to be
distributing more resources to
schools serving students with
the greatest need, there is little
measurable effect from the
resources.
Black students are much more
likely than white students to
face a novice teacher, and that
much of the differential
exposure reflects differences
across schools and across
classrooms within districts.

Clark, C. (1998). Using SchoolLevel Data to Explore
Resources and Outcomes in
Texas. Journal of Education
Finance. 23(3). 374-89.

vertical
equity

8 large school districts
in TX from 1994-1995
school year (from the
Academic Excellence
Indicator dataset).

Resources

Students who are
disadvantaged

Students who are
disadvantaged

Clotfelter, C. T., Ladd, H. F., &
Vigdor, J. L. (2005). Who
Teaches Whom? Race and the
Distribution of Novice
Teachers. Economics of
Education Review. 24(4). 377392.

horizontal
equity

A micro-level data set
provided by the North
Carolina Department of
Public Instruction focus on 7th grade
students (2000 - 2001
school year)

Teacher experience

Minority status

Descriptive data
analysis
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Study
Clotfelter, C. T., Ladd, H. F., &
Vigdor, J. L. (2006). Teacherstudent matching and the
assessment of teacher
effectiveness. Journal of
Human Resources, University
of Wisconsin Press. 41(4).

Equity

Data Source

Adequacy

Administrative data on
teachers and school
administrators in North
Carolina provided by
the North Carolina
Department of Public
Instructions through the
North Carolina
education Research
Center at Duke
University. - 5th grade
data is used

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest
Teacher experience,
licensure test scores,
teacher performance in
math and reading

Student performance,
socio-economic status

Methodology
Descriptive
analysis of data,
chi-squared tests
were conducted
to test the
relationships

Findings
There is a tendency for more
highly qualified teachers to be
matched with more advantaged
students. Also, the authors
consistently find significant
returns to teacher experience in
both math and reading and to
licensure test scores in math
achievement. They also find that
the returns in math are greater
for socioeconomically
advantaged students. Also,
Black teachers and teachers of
other races teach students with
significantly lower test scores.
And teachers with degrees from
less competitive institutions
teach students with significantly
lower test scores, and teachers
with advanced degrees show a
slight but insignificant tendency
to teach students with higher
test scores. Higher licensure test
scores are associated with
higher-test scores.
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Equity

Data Source

Clotfelter, C., Ladd, H. F.,
Vigdor, J. L., & Wheeler, J.
(2007). High-poverty schools
and the distribution of
teachers and principals
(Working Paper 1).
Washington, DC: National
Center for the Analysis of
Longitudinal Data in Education
Research.

horizontal
equity

Administrative data on
teachers and school
administrators in North
Carolina provided by
the North Carolina
Department of Public
Instructions through the
North Carolina
Education Research
Center at Duke
University.

Clotfelter, C.T., Ladd, H.F., &
Vigdor, J.L. (2007). Teacher
Credentials and Student
Achievement in High School: A
Cross-Subject Analysis with
Student Fixed Effects (Working
Paper 11). Washington, DC:
National Center for the
Analysis of Longitudinal Data in
Education Research.

horizontal
equity

Test scores on the five
EOC tests typically
taken by North
Carolina students in
either the ninth or the
tenth grades. Those test
scores are matched
with detailed
administrative data on
teacher characteristics
and credentials.

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest
Measures of teacher
quality:
• Experience - % under
3 years of teaching
• Quality of
undergraduate
institution - a
competitive ranking
based on information
for the 1997-98
freshman class from the
Barron’s College
Admissions Selector.
(the percentage of
teachers who
graduated from
uncompetitive
institutions)
• Licensure type - the
percentage of teachers
who do not have a
regular license.
• Average licensure test
scores
• National Board
Certification - % of
Board Certified
Teachers.
Teacher credentials,
experience

Methodology

Poverty (percentage of
students who apply for
and were found eligible
for the federally
sponsored free lunch
program (those with
incomes below 130
percent of the poverty
line)

Student performance,
race, socio-economic
status

Findings
Students in the high poverty
schools are served by school
personnel with lower
qualifications than those in the
lower poverty schools (in many
cases the differences are large).

Student fixed
effects in the
context of a model
estimated across
subjects

There is an uneven distribution
of teacher credentials by race
and socio-economic status of
high school students.
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Data Source

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest

Study

Equity

Methodology

DeAngelis, K.J., Presley, J.B. &
White, B.R. (2005). The
Distribution of Teacher Quality
in Illinois (IERC 2005-1).
Edwardsville, IL: Illinois
Education Research Council.

horizontal
equity

140,000 teachers in
2002-2003 among
Illinois’ public schools
(from the Teacher
Service Record data
maintained by the
Illinois State Board of
Education.

A composite measure of
school teacher quality
including college
competitiveness, years
of experience, type of
credential, performance
on the Basic Skills test
and ACT score.

Poverty and minority
status, student
performance; %
minority students; %
low-income students; %
high-performing
students

Descriptive
analysis of data

The Education Trust. (2005)
California's Hidden TeacherSpending Gap: How State and
District Budgeting Practices
Shortchange Poor and Minority
Students and Their Schools.

vertical
equity

Data on teacher salaries
and teacher
characteristics came
from the annual
California Basic
Educational Data
System (CBEDS) and
2003-2004 California
Department of
Education data on
district salary schedules
and bonuses

Percentage of teachers
with fewer than three
years of teaching
experience; teacher
salaries

Poverty and minority
status

Descriptive
analysis of data

The Education Trust. (2008)
Their Fair Share: How TexasSized Gaps in Teacher Quality
Shortchange Poor and Minority
Students.

vertical
equity

School district data
came from the Texas
Education Agency's
Academic Excellence
Indicator System

Percentage of teachers
with fewer than
three years of teaching
experience;
teacher salaries

Poverty and minority
status

Descriptive
analysis of data

Findings
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Most of the variation in teacher
quality is found among schools
within districts. Students in high
minority and high income
schools throughout the state
typically face teachers with
lower quality attributes than
their peers in other schools –
but other characteristics of
schools also affect teachers'
decisions about where to work.
There are significant gaps in
spending on teacher salaries
between high- and low-poverty
high schools within eight of the
ten largest school districts in
California. Forty-two of the 50
largest districts spend
significantly more on teachers in
their schools serving the fewest
numbers of African-American
and Latino students. In most
cases (31 out of 50), “minority
gaps” in a given district exceed
the “poverty gap.” These gaps
range from $85,534 to
$574,387.
Year after year, Hispanic,
African-American and lowincome students are less likely
to be assigned to teachers who
know their subject matter, less
likely to be in classrooms with
experienced teachers and less
likely to attend schools with a
stable teaching force. Their
teachers are paid less, too.

Study
Hertert, L. (1995). Does Equal
Funding for Districts Mean
Equal Funding for Classroom
Students? In Picus, L.O. and
Wattenbarger, J.L. (Eds.)
Where Does the Money Go?
Resource Allocation in
Elementary and Secondary
Schools. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Corwin Press: 71-84.

Equity
vertical
equity

Data Source
California (1990-1991)
unified districts, and the
"regular" schools within
them - includes 190
districts with ADA of
3,012,498. - Twenty-five
districts serve as a
representative sample
from this population.
Expenditure data from
the sample districts.

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest
Dollars spent for regular
instruction in 1990 to
1991: money and a
number of educational
resources that money
buys.

Equity measured at the
school level (pupil
ethnicity data)

Methodology

Findings

Summary statistics
are used to
measure the
variation in perpupil
expenditures: the
range, the
restricted range,
the federal range
ratio, the
coefficient of
variation, the Gini
coefficient, and
the McLoone
index. The
association of
school-level
characteristics
with per-pupil
expenditures is
assessed by
stepwise multiple
regression.

School-level variations are
virtually unrelated to the
ethnicity of pupils in the
majority of sampled districts.
There was less variation in the
amount of money spent per
pupil at different schools within
a given district than was spent
at different schools in different
districts. (With some notable
exceptions.) However, the
distribution of educational
resources--teacher-pupil ratios,
teacher experience, teacher
education, and course offerings
in higher-level math and
science--was less equitable
across schools than was the
allocation of money used to buy
these resources. Further, the
level of equity varied by
resource, with teacher-pupil
ratios ....distributed as fairly as
educational funding but with
course offerings varying widely
both across districts and among
schools.
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Data Source

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest

Study

Equity

Iatarola, P. & Rubenstein, R.
(2007). New Stakes and
Standards, Same Ol’ Spending?
Evidence from New York City
High Schools. Education
Finance and Policy. 2(1). 74-99.

Adequacy

New York city high
schools

Re-allocation patterns

Low-performing
students; graduation
rates

Iatarola, P. & Stiefel, L. (2003).
Intradistrict Equity of Public
Education Resources and
Performance. Economics of
Education Review.
22(1). 69-78.

horizontal
equity,
vertical
equity

840 elementary and
middle schools in NYC

Expenditures, teacher
resources

Minority status, percent
special need
students

Methodology

Findings

Regression
analysis controlling for
unchanging school
characteristics
through school
fixed effects, and
for changes
affecting all
schools through
year effects.
Analysis includes a
series of time
variables to
represent the year
of the resource
data (postimplementation)
and school fixed
effects to capture
unobserved timeinvariant
characteristics of
the school that
could affect
resource
allocation
patterns.
Equity measures

Some evidence of changes in
spending levels and resource
allocation patterns in New York
City high schools following the
implementation of new state
graduation requirements. In
particular, per pupil spending on
direct services increased
significantly over the period; the
largest increases occurred in
schools with the largest gaps in
graduation rates. The analyses
also presented evidence of
small resource reallocation
following the reforms.

293

Horizontal equity distributions
are more disparate than what
would be expected relative to
results of other studies, vertical
equity is lacking, especially in
elementary schools, and
equality of opportunity is at
best neutral but more often
absent. Middle schools exhibit
more equity than elementary
schools.

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest

Study

Equity

Data Source

Lankford, H., Loeb, S. &
Wyckoff, J. (2002). Teacher
Sorting and the Plight of Urban
Schools: A Descriptive Analysis.
Educational Evaluation and
Policy Analysis. 24(1). 37–62.

horizontal
equity

New York - elementary
schools

Teacher certification,
teacher experience

Minority status,
urbanicity, student
poverty, student English
proficiency,
and student
performance on state
assessment exams

Miller, L. & Rubenstein, R.
(2008). Examining the Nature
and Magnitude of Intradistrict
Resource Disparities in MidSize School Districts. Public
Budgeting & Finance. 28(4). 2651.

horizontal
equity

1050 elementary and
middle schools in four
larger NY State school
districts (not including
NYC)

Teacher experience,
teacher salary

Student poverty

Methodology

Findings
Systematic sorting of New York
State’s elementary school
teachers in 2000. Non-white
students were four times more
likely than white students to
have a teacher who was not
certified in any of the courses
he or she taught and 50 percent
more likely to have a teacher
with no prior experience. The
sorting of teacher qualifications
within districts can also be
substantial. In New York City
elementary schools in 2000,
non-white students were 40
percent more likely to have a
teacher who was not certified in
any of the courses she taught
and 40 percent more likely to
have a teacher with no prior
experience.
Clear relationships between
student poverty and teacher
characteristics, with more
experienced and therefore
higher paid teachers
disproportionately represented
in lower poverty schools in
three of four districts.
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Monk, D. & Hussain, S. (2000).
Structural influences on the
internal allocation of school
district resources: Evidence
from New York State.
Educational Evaluation and
Policy Analysis. 22(1). 1-26.

Equity
???

Data Source
1991-1992 data
collected by the New
York State Education
Department (School
Financial Master File,
Institutional Master
File, Personnel Master
File of the Basic Ed.
Data System (BEDS) for
revenue, expenditure,
enrollment, and staffing
information. Sample of
645 districts.

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest
Spending levels per
pupil, full-value
property wealth per
pupil, the incidence of
poverty as measured by
the percentage of
students in the free and
reduced-price lunch
program, staffing
resources

Property wealth,
poverty, and size

Methodology

Findings

Estimation of a
district fixedeffects model
(elasticity
estimates as well
as the results of a
simulation where
they calculate the
changes in share
ratios associated
with a 10%
increase in
spending in the
average district
within the
sample.)

Differences in spending have
substantially larger effects on
staffing levels than do
differences in property wealth,
poverty, or differences in school
district size. Also, there is a
tendency for higher property
wealth to shift staffing
resources into secondary
academic areas along with some
indication of the tendency for
higher poverty levels to not be
associated with larger
allocations of professional staff
into the academic program.
Differences in spending,
property wealth, poverty and
school district size were
positively related to the total
net supply of resources into
administration. Finally,
increases in spending, poverty,
and size all translate into
reduction in the academic share
of the secondary program (with
the opposite result for property
wealth).
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Equity

Data Source

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest

Owens, J.D. (1972). The
distribution of educational
resources in large American
cities. Journal of Human
Resources. 7(1). 26–38.

horizontal
equity,
vertical
equity

9 large cities elementary schools

Teacher salary
expenditures, teacher
experience, verbal
ability

Low-income and nonwhite neighborhoods

Owens, T. & Maiden, J. (1999).
A Comparison of Interschool
and Inter-district Funding
Equity in Florida. Journal of
Education Finance. 24(4). 503518.

horizontal
equity

A school district in
Florida

Instructional
expenditures (includes
teacher salaries and
benefits, purchased
services and classroom
materials) for basic
programs; interschool
funding

Racial/ethnic
composition and
household income

Methodology

Findings

Regression
analysis was used
to measure the
extent to which a
schoolexpenditure
variable and a
number of schoolquality variables
were influenced
by within-city
variations in the
economic and
racial character of
the families
served by each
school.
Regression
analysis
controlling for size
differences among
the schools

Educational resources are
distributed unequally within
large American cities, with poor
and nonwhite neighborhoods
receiving less than their share.

When expenditures without
federal compensatory funds
were considered, there is clear
evidence that the percentage of
African American students in a
school and the percentage of
students on free/reduced lunch
programs are negatively
associated with instructional
expenditures.
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Equity

Data Source

Pan, D., Rudo, Z., & SmithHansen, L. (2003). Resource
Allocation Does Matter in
Improving Student
Performance. Paper presented
at the Annual Conference of
the American Education
Finance Association, March
27-29, 2003.

Adequacy,
???

Data from low- and
high-performing school
districts in four states in
the Southwest
(Arkansas, Louisiana,
New Mexico, and Texas)
and 12 districts with
consistent gains in
student performance.
Data sources include:
NCES, Annual Survey of
local Government
Finances: School
Systems for 1994-95 to
1998-99; Common core
of Data, Local Education
Agency (School District)
Universe Survey and
Public Elementary/
Secondary School
Universe Survey for
school years 1995-96 to
1999-2000.
Performance data came
from State Departments
of Education.

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest
Fiscal and staffing data

Student performance

Methodology

Findings

To examine the
differences
between the highand lowperforming groups
in fiscal and
human resource
allocation, group
means of the five
years of data were
compared using
an analysis of
variance (ANOVA)
and Tukey posthoc tests.

High-performing districts spent
more money and employed
more staff in certain
instructional categories when
compared to low-performing
districts. The resource allocation
patterns of the 12 improvement
districts showed that they had a
focus on instruction, and also
re-allocated resources toward
instructional areas over time,
more than districts of similar
size.
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Equity

Roza, M. (2008). Allocation
Anatomy: How District Policies
that Deploy Resources Can
Support (or Undermine)
District Reform Strategies.
University of Washington:
Center on Reinventing Public
Education.

vertical
equity

Rubenstein, R. (1998).
Resource Equity in the Chicago
Public Schools: A School-level
Approach. Journal of Education
Finance. 23(4). 468-489.

horizontal
equity,
vertical
equity

Data Source

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest
Funds per pupil

1994-95 line-item
school-level budgets for
every public school in
Chicago, provided by
the Chicago Panel on
School Policy.

School level spending

Student poverty

Findings

Coefficient of
variation
computed on the
total dollars
received per pupil.

Funds doled out through central
budgets were less equitable
than those allocated in school
budgets in both districts; Among
formulaic allocations, those
distributed by student counts
were more equitable than those
distributed by staff counts or by
school. Among the nonformulaic allocations, those
deployed on the basis of central
staff discretion were the most
inequitable in both districts.
Those allocated as a function of
demand were also highly inequitable, but less so.
The distribution of base funding
for both high schools and
elementary schools is
horizontally equitable to some
degree. Horizontal equity
decreases as various special and
categorical funds are included in
the analysis. The findings
regarding vertical equity are
somewhat less clear, though. In
Chicago elementary schools,
different patterns of resource
distribution emerge depending
upon the object used in the
analysis: schools with higher
levels of student poverty receive
lower funding per pupil;
distribution of General Fund
resources to elementary schools
is not strongly related to
poverty; and schools with higher
levels of student poverty tend
to employ lower-paid teachers.

Univariate
dispersion
measures such as
the Gini
coefficient, the
McCloone index,
the coefficient of
variation, the
range, and the
standard
deviation;
regression analysis
to examine the
relationship
between schoollevel spending and
student poverty
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Methodology

Study

Equity

Data Source

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest

Methodology

Findings
Schools that have higher
percentages of poor pupils
receive more money and have
more teachers per pupil, but the
teachers tend to be less
educated and less well paid,
with a particularly consistent
pattern in New York City
schools.
The patterns of spending across
and within school districts in the
state of Ohio vary substantially.
These differences are driven by
both differences in the schools
and by differences in the
districts in which these schools
operate. The regressions
indicate that the combination of
interdistrict variation in the
overall level of spending and the
intradistrict variation in the
allocation across schools results
in a spending system in which
only about 30 percent of the
variation in spending is
explained by a set of factors
that should play an important
role in any spending formula
that might be adopted—
enrollment, the grade level
served by the school
(elementary, middle or high
school), and the percentage of
non-white students or those
eligible for free lunch.

Rubenstein, R., Schwartz, A.E.,
& Stiefel, L. (2007). From
Districts to Schools: The
Distribution of Resources
across Schools In Big City
School Districts. Economics of
Education Review. 26. 532-545.

vertical
equity

New York City,
Cleveland, and
Columbus, Ohio

Resource measures

School and student
characteristics

Estimating de
facto expenditure
equations relating
resource
measures to
school and
student
characteristics.

Schwartz, A. E. (1999). School
Districts and Spending in the
Schools. In William J. Fowler,
(Ed.), Selected Papers in School
Finance, 1997-99. Washington,
DC: National Center for
Education Statistics. 55-83.

vertical
equity

1995-96 school and
district level data for
Ohio (3,284 schools and
586 districts)

Number of teachers,
teacher experience

Test scores,
demographic and
socioeconomic status
(% of non-white
students and % eligible
for FRPL)

Analysis of de
facto formula that
should explain
school spending.
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Schwartz, A.E., Stiefel, L., &
Rubenstein, R. (2008). Why Do
Some Schools Get More and
Others Less? An Examination of
School-Level Funding in New
York City. Conference paper
prepared for the 20th Annual
Conference of the Association
for Budgeting and Financial
Management.

Equity
vertical
equity

Data Source
Dataset includes
elementary and middle
schools in New York City
from school years 200001 to 2003-04. This
includes information on
student performance
and demographics,
teacher characteristics,
and school and gradelevel enrollment (from
NYC DOE Annual School
Reports), and
expenditures and
sources of funds (from
School Based
Expenditure Reports).

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest
Expenditures per pupil,
revenues (tax levy and
state operating funds)

Poverty status, percent
of limited English
proficiency students,
performance, percent
of special education
students, holding
constant school size and
grade level

Methodology

Findings

A series of models
regress schoollevel per-pupil
funding variables
on school-level
characteristics.

The relationships between perpupil funding and observable
school characteristics,
particularly student needs, are
not as strong. Second, funding
does not respond crisply to
changes in characteristics of
schools, even over a three year
period (2001 – 2004). In fact,
previous year funding levels
account for a large share of
current year funding. Third, the
relationship between funding
and the percentage of the
students who are poor (based
upon their free lunch eligibility),
are of limited English
proficiency, and are full-time
and part-time special education
students, is positive.
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Equity

Steifel, L., Rubenstein, R., &
Berne, R. (1998). Intra-district
equity in four large cities: Data,
methods, and results. Journal
of Education Finance. 23(4).
447-467.

horizontal
equity

Data Source
Chicago, New York,
Rochester and Fort
Worth

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest
General education
funds, compensatory
funds

All students, students in
poverty, non-white
students; location

Findings

Coefficient of
variation, a
negative
relationship
between the
percentage of
minority students
and funding

In general, schools in these
cities are in a horizontally
equitable range. For vertical
equity with respect to the
percentage of students in
poverty, Chicago and New York
show some vertical equity
(positive relationships between
these funds and poverty). For
general education or total
funds, all cities show mixed
results--some positive
relationships and some weak
negative relationships. Overall,
in these cities, there are only a
few instances of a lack of equal
opportunity (as indicated by a
negative relationship between
the percentage of minority
students and funding). Dollar
allocations and average teacher
salaries tend to favor schools
with lower poverty levels. There
is a negative relationship
between average teacher
salaries and percentages of
poor, and sometimes minority,
students. This relationship
appears to be compensated at
times by putting relatively more
positions in schools with higher
percentages of poor students.
Without further evidence on the
trade-off between what higher
salaries buy and what smaller
class sizes buy in terms of
achievement or other
outcomes, it is difficult to make
an equity judgment about this
trade-off.
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Methodology

Data Source

Relationship between
Resource (Inputs)
Variable of
Interest

Study

Equity

Methodology

Findings

Summers, A.A. & Wolfe, B.L.
(1976). Intra-district
Distribution of School Inputs to
the Disadvantaged: Evidence
for the Courts. The Journal of
Human Resources. 11(3). 328342.
Tennessee Department of
Education. (2007). Tennessee’s
most effective teachers: Are
they assigned to the schools
that need them the most?
(Research Brief). Nashville, TN:
Author.

horizontal
equity

Philadelphia

Measurements of
teacher and principal
quality; salaries per
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horizontal
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Tennessee Department
of Education data

Teacher quality
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Students in the high poverty
schools are served by school
personnel with lower
qualifications than those in the
lower poverty schools.
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APPENDIX B: CENTRALLY-BUDGETED EXPENDITURES ALLOCATED TO SCHOOLS

SCHOOL
HM MS
Raub MS
SM MS
Trexler MS
Central
Cleveland
Dodd
Jackson
Jefferson
L. Parkway
McKinley
Mosser
Muhlenberg
Ritter
Roosevelt
Sheridan
U. Terrace
Washington
TOTALS

Total
Central
Budget
Allocated to
Schools
$ 1,763,167
$ 1,782,244
$ 2,551,225
$ 1,689,247
$ 1,205,299
$
550,169
$ 1,521,704
$
793,097
$ 1,703,239
$
543,118
$
623,661
$ 1,169,522
$ 1,263,819
$ 1,095,184
$ 1,157,878
$ 1,263,190
$ 1,236,375
$
993,356
$34,127,809

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

SpEd
377,093
312,852
851,592
251,811
220,025
144,737
614,587
293,256
452,362
154,664
95,770
495,764
597,221
216,920
338,433
286,723
334,425
203,661
8,455,221

EAP

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

823
823
823
823
121
823
823
943
823
823
121

$
121
$
823
$ 8,949

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Title I
77,049
110,492
27,507
105,822
20,933
9,701
1,545
3,452
156,703
44,366
9,655
10,577
4,348
1,946
11,792
186,197
100,221
9,784
1,010,228

Title III
$ 14,202
$ 16,991
$ 16,952
$
7,866
$ 34,212
$
8,185
$ 19,794
$
7,488
$ 14,461
$
8,067
$ 12,811
$ 13,877
$
4,379
$
7,920
$ 11,384
$ 18,513
$ 16,283
$ 16,597
$ 319,346

Substitute
Teachers
$
94,860
$
137,647
$
173,929
$
135,181
$
84,052
$
33,770
$
41,273
$
33,186
$
99,595
$
25,865
$
38,954
$
115,311
$
76,433
$
45,131
$
46,648
$
72,190
$
65,585
$
40,717
$ 1,953,198

Tuition
Reimbursem
ent
$ 41,394
$ 23,400
$ 53,271
$ 27,679
$ 17,695
$
7,770
$ 21,815
$
8,590
$ 23,873
$
7,770
$ 11,695
$ 21,788
$ 16,160
$ 32,560
$ 26,380
$ 13,785
$ 29,521
$ 23,400
$ 567,656

Total SS
budget
$
256,164
$
95,157
$
132,822
$
98,134
$
79,106
$
27,903
$
70,783
$
35,287
$
56,786
$
26,594
$
22,099
$
235,021
$
55,271
$
49,953
$
61,885
$
228,532
$
75,426
$
52,232
$ 2,289,803

Benefits
$
902,406
$ 1,085,704
$ 1,295,153
$ 1,062,754
$
748,453
$
317,280
$
751,084
$
411,016
$
899,338
$
274,968
$
431,854
$
276,240
$
509,185
$
739,932
$
661,234
$
457,250
$
614,792
$
646,143
$ 18,515,427
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
My research examines allocation for resources among schools. In order to explain and
contextualize the current resource allocation practices in the Allentown School District
(ASD), interviews will be conducted to gather information about the approach to
allocation of resources across schools. These interviews seek to identify the specific
methods (i.e., formulas) and procedures that have been used in the District. Also,
interview responses should provide the rationale for the current resource allocation
policies.
1. Who is involved in decision making regarding the school budgets? How and to
what extent (e.g., budget office, Superintendent, central office staff, school
leaders, School Board members, parents/community members)?
2. What is the budget process as it relates to allocating resources to schools? (Who
does what when? Or, Which decisions are made at the central office versus the
schools?)
3. How are budgeting decisions made (e.g., formulas, requests from buildings)?
Why?
4. How are formulas used? For what portion(s) of the budget? What is allocated by
formula (e.g., dollars, staff, programs)? What remains at the central office? How
much and how are these dollars used at the school level?
5. Have there been changes to the budget process in recent years? Why?
6. What resources are distributed equally to all schools?
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7. What resources are not distributed equally to all schools? (Do certain
programs/staff exist only at certain schools? What are these programs/staff?)
8. Is there differentiation between schools when allocating resources? If so, what is
this based on? Why?
a. Enrollment
b. Grade level
c. Student characteristics (ED status, ELL status, Special Education, student
performance, etc.)
d. Prior practice
e. Other
9. How do federal, state and local requirements impact the budget process in terms
of allocating resources to schools? Are you aware of any requirements (legal or
otherwise) regarding intra-district resource allocation? How does the district
measure comparability for Title I?
10. Where do categorical grants factor in? How are they allocated? Are they used to
supplement expenditures?
11. ASD has received new funds due to the revision to the State’s funding formula.
How is the district spending these additional funds? Are they being directed to
certain schools and/or certain students? Why? How was it decided what schools
receive the additional resources? Do these new funds influence intra-district
resource allocation? Do you think they were meant to impact intra-district
resource allocation?
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12. How are teachers assigned to buildings? Are there seniority transfer privileges
built into the teachers’ labor contract?
13. Do you find that teachers sort themselves into particular schools? If so, based on
what characteristics (of both the teachers and the schools)?
14. How are students assigned to schools (i.e., by neighborhood, parent choice,
achievement level, other)?
15. Is there any anecdotal evidence that students move because of the schools?
16. Has the distribution of resources among schools ever been an issue? For whom
(e.g., which constituencies)?
17. What do you think of the current allocation system? Is it equitable? What might
you do to strengthen this system?
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APPENDIX D: SURVEY ON TEACHER EFFICACY

Dear Principals:
Please forward to all teachers working in, or affiliated with, your building:
As you know, ASD is working to expand its thoughtful use of data to best support our
teachers in their efforts to improve student outcomes. To this end, I am having Stephanie
Levin, Institute of Educational Sciences Pre-doctoral Fellow, work with Susan Lozada,
Executive Director of Community & Student Services, to collect and analyze information
from teachers on teacher and school efficacy. The link
(https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5X8KCCV) will take teachers to a 25 question survey
designed to help us gain a better understanding of the kinds of things that create
difficulties for teachers (individually and collectively) in their school activities.* All
responses to this survey are confidential.

Please click on the following link to access the survey:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5X8KCCV
Thank you!

*If you would like additional information on this survey, please contact Stephanie Levin
at levins@allentownsd.org.
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Teachers’ Sense of Efficacy Scale1 (short form)
Teacher Beliefs
Directions: This questionnaire is designed to help us gain a better understanding of the
kinds of things that create difficulties for teachers in their school activities. Please
indicate your opinion about each of the statements below. Your answers are confidential.
Nothing (1),

Very Little (3),

Some (5),

A Great Deal (7),

Quite a Bit (9)

1. How much can you do to control disruptive behavior in the classroom?
2. How much can you do to motivate students who show low interest in school work?
3. How much can you do to get students to believe they can do well in school work?
4. How much can you do to help your students value learning?
5. To what extent can you craft good questions for your students?
6. How much can you do to get children to follow classroom rules?
7. How much can you do to calm a student who is disruptive or noisy?
8. How well can you establish a classroom management system with each group of
students?
9. How much can you use a variety of assessment strategies?
10. To what extent can you provide an alternative explanation or example when students
are confused?
11. How much can you assist families in helping their children do well in school?
12. How well can you implement alternative strategies in your classroom?

309

Collective Efficacy Scale (short form)
Teacher Beliefs
Directions: Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements
about your school from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Your answers are
confidential.
Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Somewhat Disagree (3), Somewhat Agree (4), Agree (5), Strongly
Agree (6)

1. Teachers in the school are able to get through to the most difficult students.
2. Teachers here are confident they will be able to motivate their students.
3. If a child doesn’t want to learn teachers here give up.
4. Teachers here don’t have the skills needed to produce meaningful student learning.
5. Teachers in this school believe that every child can learn.
6. These students come to school ready to learn.
7. Home life provides so many advantages that students here are bound to learn.
8. Students here just aren’t motivated to learn.
9. Teachers in this school do not have the skills to deal with student disciplinary
problems.
10. The opportunities in this community help ensure that these students will learn.
11. Learning is more difficult at this school because students are worried about their
safety.
12. Drug and alcohol abuse in the community make learning difficult for students here.

(Copyright© Goddard & Hoy, 2003)

Promax-rotated Standardized Regression Coefficients
(Includes responses for ES and MS teachers – same factors for total sample)

How much can you do to
control disruptive
behavior in the
classroom?
How much can you do to
motivate students who
show low interest in
school work?

Factor 1 – Efficacy
in Classroom
Management

Factor 2 – Efficacy
in Instructional
Strategies

0.92425

-0.06701

Factor 3 –
Efficacy in
Student
Engagement
-0.02909

0.23488

-0.03233

0.72676

310
How much can you do to
get students to believe
they can do well in
school work?
How much can you do to
help your students value
learning?
Can what extent can you
craft good questions for
your students?
How much can you do to
get children to follow
classroom rules?
How much can you do to
calm a student who is
disruptive or noisy?
How well can you
establish a classroom
management system with
each group of students?
How much can you use a
variety of assessment
strategies?
To what extent can you
provide an alternative
explanation or example
when students are
confused?
How much can you assist
families in helping their
children do well in
school?
How well can you
implement alternative
strategies in your
classroom?

0.18123

0.04226

0.73353

0.05672

-0.03054

0.86670

0.01548

0.82380

-0.02486

0.83829

0.02118

0.04853

0.77372

-0.02741

0.14208

0.69143

0.34004

-0.08284

-0.02365

0.81531

0.08179

-0.00522

0.86497

-0.03660

-0.17224

0.12285

0.75629

0.09622

0.67144

0.19170

Correlation Between Factors
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

1.00000
-0.29793
-0.46398

-0.29793
1.00000
-0.28160

-0.46398
-0.28160
1.00000
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